Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, and Russia's retaliation.
*we will discuss the Hezbollah leader Nasrallah’s assassination and implications in the upcoming post.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Russia continues to advance - slowly.
Both in the Kursk oblast (responding to Ukraine’s incursion) and near Kupyansk, Selydove, and Vuhledar in Donbas.
2) Ukraine reportedly kills Russian drone operations Colonel.
According to Ukrainian media reports, Russian resistance movement - working in coordination with Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR), assassinated Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev, head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation.
The killing allegedly took place in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.
If true, the reach of covert ops forces in targeting key military figures within Russia has reached a new level.
3) The U.S. announces a new $7.9bln military aid package for Ukraine - Biden switches to ‘‘win’’ rhetoric.
In announcing a new $7.9 billion security assistance package, President Biden said the following: “Today, I am announcing a surge in security assistance for Ukraine and a series of additional actions to help Ukraine win this war. … Through these actions, my message is clear: The United States will provide Ukraine with the support it needs to win this war….”
In addition, new long-range capabilities were also included in this package - Biden: “to enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities, I have decided to provide Ukraine with the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) long-range munition.”
This is a new shift in rhetoric - at the time when Putin is doubling down on threats and warning against further aid to Ukraine, focusing on Ukraine’s capacity to ‘‘win’’ is a welcome rebuttal
4) Speaker Mike Johnson’s ludicrous attack on Zelenskyy.
President Zelenskyy (here primarily to speak at the UN, and meet with Biden and Trump) toured an ammo manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania.
This is a plant that supplies Ukraine with ammo that they use to defend the nation against an unprovoked invasion.
It is of course the most natural thing for the President of Ukraine to tour this location and express his gratitude.
And yet, Speaker Johnson found this a little problematic - ridiculously accusing Zelenskyy of playing politics (a ‘‘shortsighted and intentionally political visit’’) and advanced extraordinary demands that the President of Ukraine must ‘‘immediately’’ fire his ambassador to the U.S. (who organized the visit).
It is a political visit in the sense that Zelenskyy was highlighting how 1) he is grateful for the U.S. support, and 2) how helping Ukraine is a win-win strategy that a) helps the US to rebuild its military-industrial base, and b) creates local manufacturing jobs (isn’t that what GOP constantly harks about anyways?).
But to suggest that this was meddling in US politics and helping Democrats win in Pennsylvania is a ridiculous stretch.
Yes, when touring a factory producing ammo used by Ukrainian forces President Zelenskyy was accompanied by Pennsylvania’s Democrat Governor Ben Shapiro.
But so what?
Are we to really believe then that had Texas Governor Greg Abbott extended a similar invitation for Zelenskyy to tour the new ammunition plant in Mesquite, Texas, Ukraine’s President would turn him down?
Of course he wouldn’t - in fact, Zelenskyy would probably be doubly as happy to be seen with a Republican Governor - helping his pitch to sway the GOP faction in Congress.
But unlike Shapiro, Abbott did not extend such an invitation - and why not?
Probably because that would anger Trump..
(side note: if anything, even from the narrower perspective of domestic politics, the House Speaker’s baseless attacks reminded Ukrainian and Polish Americans that the GOP is much cooler towards their cause of containing Putin’s imperialism in Europe.)
Speaker Johnson is being a tryhard in his attempt to please Trump - to go on call on the leader of an allied state (in the middle of fending off a Russian invasion) to fire their ambassador is just too embarrassing - what a gift to grant the Kremlin’s propaganda machine.
Russian retaliation has practical and strategic limits.
We have previously discussed the importance of equipping Ukraine with long-range missiles that could reach deep into Russian territories and destroy air bases, depots, and other important military-industrial infrastructure.
That these strikes are essential and impactful has now been proven beyond any doubt.
Those that doubt/argue against the efficacy of these long-range missile capabilities (like ATACMS and Storm Shadows) need only to look at the following three proof points:
1) Massive bombing of Toropets - these particular strikes were carried out via Ukraine’s own long-range drones.
But the explosion at this depot (500 km from frontlines) was so big that it registered as a low-scale earthquake.
A ton of Russian ammo on the way to Kursk and Eastern Ukraine was destroyed;
2) The fact that Russia has decided to remove most of its fighter aircraft/logistics planes out of sight and far away from locations reachable by Ukraine’s current capabilities.
This is making it harder for Russia to inflict devastating strikes on Ukraine.
Whether that is an air-launched cruise/ballistic missile or a 2k pound glide bomb, the launch-site (air planes) are forced into activation far behind the frontlines - these allow Ukraine more time to shoot down the incoming supersonic and hypersonic missiles.
3) The Kremlin’s own conduct undermines the narrative that these capabilities don’t make a difference.
If these are truly insignificant capabilities to make such a fuss about, then how come Putin is threatening a major escalation two weeks in a row.
Judge the impact of these capabilities by Russia’s reaction: by how they are forced to adjust their own posture on the battlefield, and the extent of a threat display that they engage in.
Russia’s threats - and limits of retaliation.
Broadly speaking Russia can (plausibly) retaliate in the following ways:
1) Increase sabotage activities across Europe/NATO member state territories: blow up more ammo depots and engage in other forms of sabotage.
Russia is already doing this, but there is always more that it can do.
2) Direct missile strikes against military depots/logistics nodes in NATO territories.
This is less plausible - at least for now, when the issue is limited to Ukraine acquiring long-range missiles.
3) Tactical nuclear strikes against Ukraine - we have discussed this before.
This is unlikely to happen in retaliation to Ukraine getting ATACMS etc.
More plausible if Putin is about to lose Crimea for example.
Even then, a demonstration strike somewhere barren and unpopulated in Ukraine will surely precede the main attacks.
4) Arm and help third parties and/or non-state actors that target the West.
We have periodically discussed the previous three options.
Today, we can delve deeper into option 4.
Practical and Strategic limits on Moscow’s support for non-state actors.
But even then, retaliation will always be limited to at least some extent.
Partly, this is going to be due to limits of capacity: there is simply a hard limit on what Russia could realistically supply to non-state actors like the Houthis.
Indeed, at the time when Russia is securing weapons from North Korea and drones/ballistic missiles from North Korea and Iran, there is really a limit on what Moscow is able to forego for side projects.
Of course, from Moscow’s perspective, this is not just retaliation - not just Russia signaling cost for unfavorable Western action.
But it is additionally, a means to an end: amping up pressure on the West by creating mini-crises and aiming to thus dissuade further support from Ukraine.
In other words: you keep helping Ukraine and we will make life hard for you in general.
With that said however, at the end of the day, there is always a better military use for Russian missiles in Ukraine than in Yemen.
Although in this particular situation, Russia is allegedly in talks with Iran to send P-800 Oniks missiles to the Houthis.
These are anti-ship missiles and Ukraine doesn’t really have a huge Navy in the Black Sea (but that will start to change with the delivery of Turkey-produced corvettes).
(side note: one could infer Moscow’s broader calculus from the type of weapon it is willing to dispense with. Russia could for example keep as many as possible if a potential clash with NATO-state Naval forces was deemed as likely. Evidently, it is not.)
But the example with Houthis is a good demonstration of strategic constraints on Russia’s actions.
Russia cannot afford to hurt its friends.
To see these constraints, consider again the type of weapon in question and the likely implications of their use.
The P-800 Oniks is a fearsome missile and many missile experts agree that these would allow the Houthis to conduct more accurate strikes against commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
They will of course also increase the threat to the US/UK and other European warships that would inevitably be mobilized to defend these commercial vessels.
But, at least two important stakeholders would face added commercial and strategic costs from this action:
1) Saudis and the UAE will get to see more confident Houthis in Yemen.
And the source for this strengthening is going to be Russia: a country that they have been helping avoid sanctions (especially the UAE).
2) Disruptions to commercial shipping will inevitably affect China.
There is of course a scenario where Houthis refrain from an all-out campaign and use the missiles as a deterrent.
But if at some point they were to engage in a powerful campaign, then disruptions would of course affect China - both imports and exports.
And China is Russia’s most important friend.
Not only due to increasing economic dependence, and China’s supply of crucial microelectronics, semiconductors and chip machinery that enable Russia to keep on building precision-guided missiles.
(side note: On September 27th, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted Russia's growing dependence on Chinese supplies for its military production. Approximately 70% of Russia's machine tools and 90% of its microelectronics imports are sourced from China and Hong Kong. These imports are being used to manufacture critical military hardware, including missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions, underscoring the increasing role of China in sustaining Russia's war efforts.)
But recently, China is increasingly adopting a more direct role.
There was a recent Reuters report that outlined how Russia (per European intel sources) has recently set up a weapons program in China to produce long-range attack drones for use in the Ukraine war.
IEMZ Kupol, a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Almaz-Antey, developed and flight-tested a new drone named Garpiya-3 (G3) in China, with the assistance of local specialists, according to a report sent to the Russian defense ministry earlier this year.
This is a major escalation for sure - but also means that Beijing’s leverage over Russia has increased even further.
Consequently, Moscow would be ill-advised in creating a powerful (and already semi-autonomous) militia that can harm Beijing’s interests.
Not only would there be an economic cost to China, but the pressure and calls from Europe on Beijing to rein in instability-sponsoring Russia will also increase.
None of this is to say that Putin will not take on these risks.
But there are these risks to contend with - and real practical/strategic limits and costs on his threats to arm non-state actors.