Cable From The Diplomatic Frontline - Zelensky in DC, and Japan's historic militarization.

*note: cables will be off for holidays - resuming in January.

Zelensky’s historic Washington trip.

• This was a monumental event: President Zelensky is now one of only two wartime leaders (second only to Churchill) to have visited Washington and delivered a speech to a joint-session of the US Congress.

• Greeted with a gift of a $1.85bn of additional military aid that included the first ever shipment of US Patriot air-defense missile systems, Zelensky’s visit couldn’t have been timed better.

• At the time when Putin is in effect announcing a protracted war (by admitting to complications and doubling down on military investments with a promise of ‘‘no limitations’’ on defense spending for the war in Ukraine), and implying an upcoming Belarusian complicity (his first visit there since 2019 - that coincided with Belarusian authorities’ decision to restrict access to the border regions with Ukraine), President Zelensky received much needed support and affirmation of highest order in the US.

• And there could not have been a better contrast between what each country stands for: Ukraine’s leader was in Washington to demonstrate defiance, will to fight, a determination to withstand all hardship, and ultimately, a will to win and finish the job.

• He was here to rally support for freedom, liberty and dignity of small nations facing the aggression from tyrannical regimes.

• At that very moment, a close Putin confidant, and Russia’s former President (and a Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council) Dmitry Medvedev was in Beijing to meet Xi Jinping - pitching for money and ammo to crush a beacon of liberty on Russia’s western borders.

• The visit, joint press conference with President Biden (who pledged publicly that Ukraine would ‘‘never stand alone”), and the address to the US Congress was a major diplomatic, symbolic and strategic victory.

• It was well-timed to secure bipartisan support and push the bill that would secure more than $40bn for Ukraine going into 2023.

• Zelensky’s Congress speech featured references to FDR, appeals to a common cause, shared ideals, and promise to win with dignity - all of these were well-timed elegant reminders of common struggle that had to end with an eventual victory for the sake of both nations.

• In a dig to those ‘‘concerned’’ about granting Ukraine a ‘‘blank check’’ (Rep. Kevin McCarthy), Zelensky reminded that American money was “not charity” - but an “investment” to achieve a safe and liberal world - an essential ingredient for the comfort, security and prosperity of American citizens.

• (side note: he was not crude - he did not remind the hesitant Republicans that Ukraine was doing the dirty work of defeating America’s major “great power’’ adversary at a fraction of the cost)

• President Zelensky did not forget to insert a little bit of realpolitik (to an otherwise idealistic speech): he warned of ascending Iran-Russia axis, and cautioned that if they are not stopped in Ukraine, it was only a matter of time before the pair would target another US ally.

• This is a rhetorical gift to both the Biden admin (who will most likely have to consider plan B/military option in earnest - now that the JCPOA/nuclear deal is “dead” per Biden’s own admission - and long predicted by these cables) and to the hawkish wing of the GOP that would love to see someone with global moral authority paint a target on Iran’s back.

• It is also important to note that the mere fact of this trip already accomplished a lot.

• For months, Putin was traveling all over the world with indifference and composure - pretending that the war in Ukraine was indeed some low-level “special military operation” that did not require his full attention.

• In contrast, Zelensky was stuck in Kyiv - worried (rightly) that in his absence, the day to day management of the country would be under a serious threat (or worse, there would be a Russia-orchestrated coup).

• Even on this trip itself (his first ever foreign visit since the start of this war), Zelensky traveled only a day after visiting his frontline troops in Bakhmut.

• But the very fact that he did in fact leave Ukraine, and traveled so far away from the scene of the battle, was a much-needed demonstration (to the whole world) that Ukraine is no longer in a political crisis mode - the wartime President is confident that in his absence, chaos will not ensue.

• Perhaps this is the biggest takeaway: ironically, and after 10 months of war, Putin succeeded in creating an even stronger and more secure Ukrainian state.

• Through his actions, he strengthened the national identity and unity in Ukraine, and it was his war that forced the government in Kyiv into a disciplined and professional mode of governance.

• Putin claimed that Ukraine did not exist as a separate state or national identity - yet somehow, something that allegedly does not exist, is in fact driving Russia back and humiliating its army on the battlefield.

• Putin’s greatest legacy is surely a modern, powerful, and effective Ukrainian state and a nation with an even stronger identity and a will to fight for its liberty.

Japan’s radical u-turn and militarization.

• A historic post-WWII moment in the entire Pacific: breaking with its hitherto ‘‘pacifist’’ (not the best term to describe the actual reality on the ground - yet a useful placeholder nonetheless) military posture, Japan is once again on track to become a major military power.

• With a recently announced $320bn 5-year military modernization plan (further elaborated in the new National Defense Strategy), Japan is on track to becoming the third highest military spender in the world (reaching the NATO standard of 2% of the national GDP: meaning that the hitherto self-imposed 1% spending limit that has been in place since 1976, is now gone for good).

• Now, granted that Japan is starting from a very low baseline (for example, its ammo/spare parts reserves are extremely limited in comparison to the rest of America’s military allies), a significant proportion of the funds will be allocated towards the catching up part.

• Having said that, Japan will also invest heavily into ‘‘offensive’’ weapons - especially into missiles capable of striking mainland China (as well as the Chinese Navy).

• Japan’s domestic defense companies will be significant beneficiaries of this splurge (and will no doubt help to kickstart its lagging defense industry).

• Companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will be tasked with the development of long-range missiles.

• But foreign (and especially American) firms are going to secure some winnings as well.

• Raytheon will get to sell Tomahawk missiles, and Lockheed Martin will get contracts for the crown jewel: F-35 stealth fighters.

• Japan will also invest into procurement of helicopters, submarines, warships and heavy-lift transport jets, interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense, attack and reconnaissance drones, and satellite communications equipment

• Framing Language used.

• In the press conference aimed to contextualize the new defense strategy, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that China presented the “greatest strategic challenge ever faced’’ by Japan.

• Note the deliberate choice of words here: challenge vs threat.

• Naturally, China is a threat - but Japan is carefully calibrating to soften the blow of the planned militarization.

• Softer rhetorical framing aims to achieve four primary objectives:

• 1) Aligning the rhetoric with the US.

• Japan does not want to stand out as a sore thumb here. If the US (in its own recently published national security strategy) labels China as a “competitor”, and uses the term “threat” only in Relation to Russia, then Tokyo was clearly not going to jump the gun and stand out as the party willing to escalate more than the US.

• For it is risky to be in a much more forward position than your primary military ally is ready and willing to go - you enter the danger zone of overreaching and finding yourself exposed to bigger risks alone - without a guarantee that your closest ally is willing to share the proportionate burden of this particular risk.

• 2) Implicit promise to not be the party that escalates first - this is a measure to avoid spooking Beijing into counter-militarization and tighter timelines of action (more on that later below).

• In addition: softer framing removes the teeth of Chinese propaganda machinery: use of the phrase ‘‘threat’’ (as it is strictly more appropriate), would have been a gift to Chinese propaganda - a gift of free rally ‘round the flag effect for Xi Jinping - a useful distraction precisely when he needs it the most

• (side note: this would have been especially timely and useful to Xi given the recent protests and a serious u-turn in COVID zero policies - something that incentivizes protesters to do more of the same in future: after all, it proved effective at least once already)

• 3) Avoiding abrupt decoupling.

• At the time of slowing growth and rising inflation (which prompted The Bank of Japan to relax the YCC bands / loosen 10-year yield curve controls from 0.25 to 0.50 fluctuations to reduce the monetary burden of propping up the bond market and allowing for some ammo to counter future inflation) Tokyo is not interested in complicating things further by incentivizing China to deploy its trade levers too soon.

• Overall, 23% (the latest available stats) of the total value of the Japanese imports depend heavily on China.

• Rapid militarization in tandem with a rhetorical escalation of labeling China as a ‘‘threat’’, would have added to Beijing’s worry - encouraging China to apply early leverage it has in trade with Japan - ahead of an actual conflict that would have in turn looked far more imminent.

• 4) Preventing relative complacency from the US.

• Tokyo does not want to appear as more eager to confront Beijing than even Washington itself.

• If that perception was crystallized, strategists in DC would worry less about offering sweeter defense deals/military aid to Japan.

• In other words, if Japan was good to go 100% on its own, all of the limited resources could then be devoted to propping up Taiwan.

• Convincing the US that Japan is a reliable ally that will take action if/when needed, is in the national security interests of Tokyo above all else - for it lessens doubts that an American leader may have about regional allies (affecting the calculus of whether to enter the war/escalate against China, if/when a critical threshold event takes place).

• But going the extra mile is (perversely) penalized in this scenario - it lowers the probability of Tokyo receiving that “special attention”.

• Geostrategic implications.

• This is no small event, and will naturally have spillover effects & implications beyond Japan itself.

• To be clear, there is surely a range of third and fourth order unforeseeable effects.

• But we shall focus on the relatively inferable potential opportunities and risks.

• Opportunities and favorable implications.

• 1) The most obvious point - easier defense of Taiwan.

• Whenever an actual conflict over Taiwan occurs, it is Japan (due to its proximity, prowess and own security interests) that will play the pivotal regional role (not Australia or South Korea).

• Consequently, Japan’s militarization is an obvious win for war planners at the Pentagon.

• 2) Deterrence effect on China.

• This goes beyond the actual conflict - Japan’s militarization will turn it into a harder target - discouraging adventurism, provocation, and below-threshold ‘‘test’’ incidents from Beijing.

• This very calculus will also apply in relation to Taiwan - it will now look like a less tempting acquisition target - given the more militarily capable and ready Japan’s potential involvement in defense of the Island.

• (side note: there is however a perverse negative effect baked into the calculus as well - incentives for China to pull the trigger sooner rather than later - before Japan gets an opportunity to complete its modernization. More on that later below)