Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Russia is on its backfoot after Assad fiasco: time to maximize gains & and move against other Kremlin-friendly dictators.

• Russia’s embarrassing withdrawal from Syria and inability to defend its puppet hereditary autocrat Bashar Assad (not for lack of trying - there were some significant airstrike campaigns early on in late November and early December) creates a new geopolitical dynamic: other Moscow-aligned dictators will be wary of Russia’s prowess as a protector of fellow dictators.

• This is significant since for the last couple of years, the general trend/theme was that the West, and the liberal-world order in general were on the defensive and that more and more countries were joining the ranks of authoritarian states.

• This was not just vibes-based mood shift exemplified by a few notable cases either.

• Freedom House has long tracked countries by their freedom/authoritarianism score - classifying them as either free, not free (authoritarian), or partly free (hybrid regimes).

• Here was the intro to their latest report in 2023:

  Global freedom declined for the 18th consecutive year in 2023. The breadth and depth of the deterioration were extensive. Political rights and civil liberties were diminished in 52 countries, while only 21 countries made improvements. Flawed elections and armed conflict contributed to the decline, endangering freedom and causing severe human suffering.

• But what we saw in the past two decades, wasn’t just a decrease in the number of countries that are considered to be democratic.

• As if this bleak reality wasn’t enough, we observed something else as well: revisionist powers like Russia and Iran embarking upon a deliberate foreign policy of encouraging authoritarianism: both in their neighborhood and globally as well.

• From the prism of purely pragmatic national interests as viewed from the Putin’s regime, this makes total sense.

• Helping other authoritarians helps Putin in a number of ways:

• 1) It strengthens his regime by normalizing authoritarianism at large.

• If your political regime is not an exception to the norm, if the norm is instead evolving towards your regime’s style of governance, then securing a domestic buy-in becomes much easier as well.

• It is much harder to convince your nation and the elites to comply with a global pariah regime vs a type of political order that is becoming ever-more common;

• 2) Securing transactional deals is easier with other authoritarians - they don’t need to be accountable to their people;

• 3) Being an authoritarian pariah state means that the liberal-world order led by the U.S. becomes weaker.

• 4) Leaders of these authoritarian states end up in confrontation with the West - this makes it easier for countries like Russia to exercise leverage over them in return for the offer of basic security.

• Examples abound: Venezuela, Syria under Assad, Belarus under Lukashenko.

• 5) If all else fails and your people overthrow your regime, there is a safe place for retirement.

• But underpinning this understanding - this transactional deal where Russia gets to underwrite other dictators in exchange for them being either an outright vassal (Assad), or very favorable to Russia and Russia-aligned policy (Venezuela/Maduro) is brute hard power.

• Without Russian hard power and ability to underwrite these regimes, Putin’s word and consequently, his geopolitical influence over these authoritarian states will decrease.

• They will face a choice: either hedge their bets and normalize relations with the West (and this involves some form of opening up/softening/reform), or find a new Patron.

• But there is no real alternative to Russia.

• True, there is China, but Beijing doesn’t involve itself in propping up authoritarian states all over the world.

• Realistically, countries like Venezuela, Belarus, and dictatorships of Central Asia, need Moscow.

• This means that Russia’s failure in Syria creates a new dual opportunity for the U.S.-led Western powers:

• 1) Dissuade countries in hybrid regimes from embarking upon a Russia-aligned authoritarian path (e.g. Georgia);

• 2) Push out dictators left exposed after Russia’s demonstrable weakness.

• The West should seize this opportunity to do both.

• We shall discuss how Trump could affect change in Venezuela once he is back in office.

• But Georgia is a matter of urgency, and Biden may still affect a lot of change here.

Pulling Georgia away from Russia’s orbit: the West must support the pro-EU protesters.