Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - possible Israel - Hezbollah War: Calculations and Costs.
War against Hezbollah is tempting to both Netanyahu and Israel as a state.
Netanyahu may very well estimate that a military campaign against Hezbollah is in his personal political interests.
And he will most likely be correct in this estimation: the public (angered especially after the fires caused by Hezbollah rocket attacks) is in favor of the war, and a new military campaign means at least three things for Netanyahu:
1) Redirect attention away from Gaza and political crisis around lack of ‘‘day after’’ governance plans which led to the collapse of his war cabinet (with the departures of prominent politicians like Gantz and Eisonkot) and increasing political pressure from the Biden admin;
2) New excuse to prolong the shelf-life of his government and create a new wave of rally ‘round the flag effect;
3) Boost his own political popularity through a successful military campaign against Hezbollah - removing (at least to some extent) the stain of the October 7th fiasco.
At the same time, there is urgency of domestic political crisis:
1) The military establishment is turning against Netanyahu.
For a very long time now, there were complaints within Israel’s military establishment that political objectives and military means were misaligned - and this all came to a head when the IDF spokesperson Daniel Haqqari claimed that promises of eradicating Hamas were misleading to the Israeli public.
(side note: this is a fireable offense. Not only is this untrue and Hamas can in fact be destroyed as a military organization (and in fact, 40% of its combat power has already been attrited within eight months), but it is also an improper and unprofessional comment for a military officer to make: imagine Pentagon spokesperson saying that defeating ISIS in Syria is impossible and that the President of the US was misleading the public. You probably cannot imagine that because it would never happen.)
2) The War Cabinet has collapsed and Netanyahu is on thin ground.
3) The Supreme Court ruling is another crisis for Netanyahu.
Israel’s Supreme Court ruled that Ultra-orthodox Jews must be included in conscription.
This is opposed by the far right and ultra-orhodox communities - a massive headache for Netanyahu.
War against Hezbollah is likely overall in Israeli national interest.
We have previously discussed how having a massive militarized non-state actor on its northern border was unacceptable for Israel’s national security (with public now even more insecure after October 7th attacks).
In addition, at some point, 60k Israeli citizens will need to return to their homes in Northern Israel - persistent Hezbollah threat (and frequent attacks) precludes this possibility.
So sooner or later a confrontation was likely in any case.
And the timing may never be as advantageous (or rather even less advantageous going forward), since: the US resources will be further captured by the war in Ukraine, the need to contain China in the Pacific and confronting ever more belligerent North Korea (aided and abetted by Russia now) too.
Add to all that: for Israel, it is easier to extend the current Gaza war into a war on all fronts vs start a new war some other time in the future.
This is because the global political costs of the war are already priced in.
The indiscriminate nature of the bombardment seen in Gaza has already caused massive reputational damage to Israel on the global stage.
Israel is isolated both at the UN security council (even states like the UK don’t block unfavorable resolutions now - full reliance only on the US), and the General Assembly.
And so perversely, if Israel is to launch an attack on Hezbullah (and possibly, Iran), then it is far better to do so now - with little to lose on the world stage - than to wait for a later future date after a new Israeli government tries to recover from a reputational stain.
In other words, it is better to associate belligerence and reputational damage with the current Netanyahu government, and then try to shed this whole dark chapter with a new government.
Moreover, the perception of Israel could also change if it launches a war against Hezbullah (and especially if Iran backs the latter strongly).
The narrative of the war will change (even if slightly) from Israel using indiscriminate crude force to level Gaza in an attempt to eradicate Hamas (and causing mass civilian toll in the process) to Israel being besieged by terrorists on all fronts, and fighting a general war against Iran’s proxies that surround its tiny territory.
The latter is a far more favorable narrative - one that also lends more sympathy to Israel’s otherwise crude application of power.
For if a nation is surrounded by terrorists on all fronts, its leaders lashing out indiscriminately is more indicative of a paranoia (rooted in legitimate existential fears) than a proactive desire to commit genocide (an already preposterous accusation that will weaken even further).
And beyond reputational losses (some of which will be recouped due to a change of narrative), there are little (if any) strategic/geopolitical costs.
On the contrary: Iran will weaken no matter how the war against Hezbullah plays out (either the Hezbullah is wiped out and Iran suffers immense costs that stem from supporting them directly, or Hezbullah is degraded/wiped out and Iran suffers from reputational costs associated with inaction/lacklustre support).
And this then means weaker Iranian leverage across the Middle East, and thus, less leverage to prevent Israeli normalization with key Arab states - since Iran’s capacity to inflict costs (both direct and indirect) will diminish significantly.
Moreover, with Iran weaker in the region, Israeli dependence on Russia’s tacit cooperation in Syria (Moscow closing its eyes, and shutting down its S-300 SAMs at the time of Israeli strikes on Syrian targets) will also reduce.
The current status quo of Russia growing ever closer to Iran and Iranian proxies remaining intact and operational, (and so, their threat to Israel remaining alive and well) is naturally far less favorable than the scenario where Israel gets to wipe out key Iranian militias - starting with Hezbullah.
Hezbollah threat: economic and military costs
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