Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Putin’s mixed messages on Ukraine

Putin’s mixed messages on Ukraine - recovering the narrative, sowing confusion, and increasing options for the Kremlin

• The week started predictably - with all eyes on Putin: what will he do next? Will he follow through? Or backpedal?

• In a not so shocking turn of events, Putin hacked everyone’s OODA loop, and kept everyone guessing.

• Specifically: he threw around a lot of mixed messages to muddy the water, encourage confirmation bias (in everyone, and on all sides of the ‘‘what is his next move’’ prediction markets), and recovered the control over the narrative - increasing his capacity for tactical maneuvering.

• We shall take a holistic view of his most recent moves - exploring his potential rationale for each step.

• 1. Uncorroborated signals of de-escalation

• At the time of the (strategically correct) US/NATO campaign of raising alarm around a potential invasion, Putin decided to throw some red meat to those that have been asserting that Russians simply want diplomacy - and it is the West that is spreading panic.

• In a meeting with his Foreign Minister Lavrov (that included an even longer table - at an extreme distance, where a Zoom call starts becoming a more appealing option) Putin inquired whether there was still some room left for diplomacy:

• “In your opinion, is there a chance to agree … or is it just an attempt to drag us into an endless negotiation process that has no logical conclusion?”

• “There is always a chance” responded Lavrov.

• And this brief, and televised (also, without doubt, highly choreographed) exchange was enough to fuel speculations that the war was off, and that the US was after all, wrong to hype it up so much.

• But such an interpretation is (to put it mildly) rather absurd.

• It is unclear what media pundits were expecting Putin to do? Was he going to declare war on national television, just two days after the US warnings of precisely that eventuality?

• Or was Lavrov expected to respond with ‘‘actually no - let’s not give diplomacy a chance. Tell Sergei (Shoygu) to rev up the tank engines!” ?

• But surely these were not just words? After all, the Russian defense ministry announced the withdrawal of troops?

• Well, let’s see.

• 2. Evidence to the contrary

• a) No real withdrawal

• All we have thus far, is a bunch of 10 second long youtube and TikTok videos of Russian tanks moving (somewhere) and crossing some bridges.

• Redeployment is not withdrawal.

• Here is the true test of withdrawal: when all those BTGs from the Eastern Military District return to their bases, when all those field tents deconstruct, pack-up and leave the scene, when Iskander-Ms and SU-24s and SU34s return to their usual bases - and end their deployment at the air bases several dozen miles from the Ukrainian border - only then can we begin to cautiously consider the moves as truly amounting to a withdrawal.

• But so far, the opposite is true: satellite images indicate that there is an increase in deployments in Belarus, Crimea and Krasnodar (Western Russia).

• The NATO Secretary- General is therefore correct to comment that there has been no indication of de-escalation on the ground, and that in fact: ‘‘ Everything is now in place for a new attack”.

• Indeed, after all the hype about Russian withdrawal, the US intel confirms that in fact, an additional contingent of 7k troops was deployed to the Ukrainian border.

• b) Pretexts for further aggression and intervention

• Indirect indicators

• There were plenty of indicators of escalatory intent - even for those who like to focus exclusively on the verbal signals:

• a) Nato-Ukraine remarks

• During a joint press-conference with the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Putin was asked about Russia’s next steps - to which he responded with declarations that Russia will act “according to the plan”, and that the said plan would depend on the “development of the situation”.

• At the same press-conference, Putin declared that “the three basic Russian requirements that were put forward have not been met”, and that the question of guarantees (of Ukraine never joining NATO) had to be addressed rather urgently: “We need to resolve this question now”.

• b) The Genocide Pretext

• Putin accused Ukraine of committing a ‘‘genocide’’ in the separatist regions of Donbas.

• This strong (and obviously untrue) statement was not made in a vacuum either -the leader of the Donbas People’s Republic Denis Pushilin, announced the evacuation of people from the frontlines of conflict (this was accompanied with the rebels’ claims of coming under mortar attacks by the Ukrainian forces).

• In addition, Russia’s law-enforcement agency launched a criminal investigation into the allegations (mentioned in the previous cables) of the discovery of mass graves of citizens killed by the Ukrainian forces.

• Never mind that the Russian law has no jurisdiction over formal territories of Ukraine, but this additional twist (a concrete action taken by Russia’s state institution), is a strong signal that the Kremlin is planning to develop and legitimize this fake ‘‘genocide’’ narrative.

• c) Cyber/DDoS attacks on key Ukrainian infrastructure.

• Overall then, a strong emphasis on the need for expedited negotiations (highlighting the cost untenability of maintaining an offensive posture for too long), as well as aggressive declarations to proceed in accordance with the plan, (that apparently includes a potential military retaliation against a fake genocide), and evidence of hybrid warfare/cyber attacks, do not fit well with the narrative of the Russian de-escalation.

• 3. Last ditch diplomatic attempts - nothing new on offer

• There were two notable diplomatic overtures:

• a) Putin - Scholz meeting in Moscow

• The German Chancellor’s visit produced mixed reactions - some accused him of selling out Ukraine, and some praised him for his ability to stand up to Putin (yes, the bar is that low).

• The truth is somewhere in the middle - German Chancellor pointing out the absurdity of escalating towards a conflict due to a question (Ukrainian membership) not even being on NATO’s agenda, most definitely did not amount to betrayal of Ukraine.

• It is true that (for the foreseeable future) Ukrainian membership is out of question.

• And all parties are aware of this - the problem is that this includes Putin himself.

• Mr Scholz therefore, failed to offer something new to Putin - what he seeks is control over Ukraine’s destiny - a formal guarantee will provide such control, and will solidify his foreign policy legacy.

• And such a guarantee will never be offered (in fact, if anything, it became even less likely with the UK’s rhetorical line in the sand - with PM Johnson’s declaration that Ukraine’s sovereign right to seek the NATO membership cannot be “traded away”) - it is therefore over the top to accuse the German Chancellor of treating Ukraine as a bargaining chip (especially when there is plenty of subject-matter for a justified critique).

• The German Chancellor furthermore rebutted Putin’a attack on NATO for its air strike campaign on Serbia in 1999 - by pointing out that this was essential to prevent the genocide of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

• Separately, Scholz also raised issues with Putin’s description of Donbas incidents as amounting to a ‘‘genocide’’.

• (side note: this is in contrast to Macron - who didn’t even put any effort into rebutting Putin’s attack on NATO for campaigns in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and Serbia)

• b) Biden’s Ukraine Speech

• Was (surprisingly) quite successful in its delivery of the key messages - he appealed to Russians directly - declaring ‘‘you are not our enemy’’, and going down the memory lane of fighting the Nazi Germany as allies.

• Biden also expressed willingness to ‘‘give diplomacy every chance to succeed’’ (whilst still reminding that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline ‘‘will not happen’’ in case of a larger invasion).

• Crucially however, Biden promised to ‘‘respond forcefully’’ if Russia was to target Americans in Ukraine - this was significant, and a much needed compensation for last week’s statements that expressed over the top (and quite embarrassing) concern around confronting the Russian troops.

• 4. Fundamental problem with the de-escalation narrative

• Almost a week after the US warning of an impending Russian invasion, nothing fundamental has changed to dissuade Putin from taking further actions.

• Sure, the US/NATO have certainly caused operational/tactical difficulties of implementing the Kremlin’s strategy - but nothing substantive has happened to affect Putin’s calculus.

• The incentive structure remains unaltered.

• The last minute offers of diplomacy haven’t had a significant impact either - since why would they?

• Scholz offering Putin to return back to the Minsk agreement framework is nothing new - in fact, quite the opposite: it would entail a return to status quo ante.

• And given that Putin’s political objectives stem from the perception of the previous state of affairs being unacceptable, there is no reason why he would backpedal now - without securing any major strategic concessions.

• The threat of sanctions may have caused a hesitation - but there hasn’t been any substantive change to the proposed Western sanctions since late January/early February - and no new game-changing sanctions have been introduced since last Friday - after the US raising alarm of an imminent Russian attack.

• (side note: in fact, if anything, there has been a failure to advance a bipartisan sanctions bill in the Senate - even after last Friday. And sure, there has been a GOP alternative - but currently, at its introductory phase only)

• No change on the sanctions front, and certainly no concessions from the US/NATO.

• The facts speak for themselves: Putin’s latest attempts did not produce a persuasive reason to de-escalate - if anything, they reaffirmed NATO’s resolve and unwillingness to be coerced into concessions.

• The UK for example, is doubling its troops in Estonia, and NATO is considering a permanent boost to its Southeastern flank in Europe.

• So then, here is the crux of the matter: why pull back now?

• Additionally, here is a question for the ‘‘Putin is bluffing, and only engaging in heavy-metal coercive diplomacy’’ crowd (who somehow treat that strategy as an opposite of military response - instead of a being on the continuum of all policies utilized by the Kremlin) : if coercive diplomacy is the goal, and Putin is bluffing - why backtrack now? At the moment of highest pressure? Especially when (even if NATO continues to demonstrate resolve) the cracks in the Ukrainian government are begging to show? What is the logic of reducing tensions without getting concessions first?

• 5. Mixed messaging is deliberate