Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Responding to reader questions: Iran nuclear deal is dead - what comes next?

Q: What happens now that the Iran nuclear deal - the JCPOA is dead? Will the US and/or declare war on Iran? Will they wage war covertly?

• A variation of this question is currently the most frequently asked by our readers.

• Now that President Biden declared the JCPOA as dead (with little indication/movement to suggest that he merely misspoke), what happens next?

• This is an especially pressing question given the events of last days/weeks:

• 1) There was a Mossad-orchestrated Israeli drone attack (not strike - looks like they dropped ammo instead of targeting the facility directly - like a suicide drone would do) against military production facilities in Isfahan, Iran.

• How do we know that this was indeed Israel’s doing?

• Well, firstly there is basic logic - only the US and/or Israel would (at least at this point in time) dare to escalate directly against Iran.

• It is unlikely that any Gulf state would risk such a move.

• Secondly, there is this The Wall Street Journal report, where the unnamed US official/s confirmed that Israel’s Mossad was indeed behind the attack, and that the US and Israel are actively looking at ways to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions (and capabilities).

• Finally, neither the US nor Israeli officials formally rebutted the WSJ report - in other words, the ‘‘leak’’ by the US officials was coordinated and deliberate - otherwise, we would hear a clear rebuttal (if US/Israel didn’t coordinate the attack), or would at least hear promises to investigate the ‘‘leak’’ of such a sensitive info (if the intent was to keep this attack a secret).

• So we can be pretty sure that the Israeli special ops/Mossad was behind this attack.

• Now, Iranians claim that their air defenses shot down two of the three quadcopters that targeted a munitions factory in Isfahan - and that apparently, the third quadcopter exploded above the roof and caused little damage.

• (side note: Russia was quick to condemn this attack and ‘‘provocation’’ - cue for Ukrainian diplomats to double down on their pitch to Netanyahu for the Israeli military support. Naturally, Israel is concerned about the risk of its weapons getting into Iranian hands (and research) if captured in combat by Russia. But this is a lesser risk when it comes to Isreali air defense systems like the Iron Dome - those would presumably be placed well behind the frontlines - consequently, there is no good argument against their supply to Ukraine).

• Whether this “minimal damage” part is true is hard to tell - at least for now, until surely, some private satellite images from Maxar could confirm/rebut the Iranian claims.

• In the meantime, we have the word of the ‘‘Western intelligence sources’’ that claim it to be a major success.

• With all that said, it makes sense however, that Isfahan would be the target: for it is a major center of Iran’s missile production program: for example Shahab medium-range missiles (that can reach Israel) are assembled at the targeted facility.

• Moreover, the facilities that were struck by Israel were located just across the street from the “Iran Space Research Center”: a subsidiary of Iranian Space Agency (ISA), that was itself previously (in 2019) sanctioned by the US - for its role in development of ‘‘Space launch vehicle (SLV)” : a capability that allows for the advancement of Iran’s ballistic missile program.

• Note also how the quadcopters were most likely launched from within Iran - for they are unlikely to have a range to be launched from any of the bordering regions.

• This is a clear deliberate signal to Tehran - that Mossad’s reach extends well into Iran.

• Tel-Aviv has a history of sending similar messages in not so distant past:

• a) June 2020 Natanz sabotage;

• b) November 2020, assassination of one of the key Iranian nuclear scientists, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

• c) April 2021: another Natanz bombing/sabotage. According to the US intel agencies, this blast set back Iran’s enrichment program by 9 months.

• d) June 2021: Israeli drone strike against the Karaj centrifuge production facility, causing major damage.

• e) February 2022: hundreds of Iranian drones at a base near Kermanshah were destroyed by Israel (apparently, also by quadcopter drones).

• And this latest attack was a reminder that the very same range and capabilities still remain.

• 2) Major US-Israeli military drills.

• Arguably, the Juniper Oak - the US/Israeli military exercises were an even more powerful indicator of intent than the actual Isfahan strikes.

• This is because the combination of size, scale and breadth of these joint-drills was truly unprecedented.

• Most importantly, more than 140 US aircraft: fighters, bombers and refueling aircraft took part in this exercise.

• Given that future sorties/missions targeting Iran would most likely require intensive use of refueling aircraft - like the Boeing’s KC-46A tanker aircraft (and Israel is buying at least four of these), their presence at Juniper Oak was a clear message to Iran.

• Ordinary and prophylactic military exercises need not involve use of refueling aircraft.

• In addition and overall, the exercises were successful in demonstrating the following capabilities: a) combined arms maneuvers - e.g. coordination between infantry, armor and artillery - this is not as simple as it first appears - just ask Russians in Ukraine; b) “jointness” : coordination between Land, Navy and Air Force; and c) “interoperability” between Israeli and US troops & equipment: demonstration of seamless integration and communication (avoidance of errors/friendly fire).

• All of these capabilities were demonstrated across a wide breadth of domains - all key military domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyber were involved in the Juniper Oak.

• The complexity, size and scope of these drills sets it apart from all of the previous joint drills.

• Not only was this a signal to Iran that (in spite of political differences between the Biden and Netanyahu admins) the US and Israel were on the same page, but that they were prepared to act together - and do so in a highly competent and interoperable way.

• As a side effect, this was also a message to other Middle Eastern states that are currently hedging their bets on: 1) Ukraine war - cozying up to/working with Russian money, and 2) The US vs China competition.

• In other words, this was primarily a signal to the non-NATO allies in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states.

• And the message is clear: if you too want to experience the proximity and capabilities enjoyed by Israel, well..you know what you’ve got to do.

• This is an added incentive to Saudis and Gulf states - they can play along with Russia (which - in the nearest future - is poised to arm Iran with advanced weapons - more on that later below), or cozy up with China ( and Beijing is certainly not going to take sides in a conflict against Iran), or they can be a part of this highly interoperable and capable military alliance that comes with the necessary preconditions of acting like a true strategic ally.

• Factors leading to escalation.

• With this context in mind, let us now consider why this is all happening - what is pushing Israel (and to a lesser extent, the US) to escalate with confrontational/combat tactics?

• Primarily, it comes down to three key factors:

• 1) Iran is likely to embark on a nuclear development sprint.

• With war in Ukraine serving as a distraction and taking away from the US and EU bandwidth, and with the JCPOA all but dead, there is little incentive for Iran not to go on a dash for (nuclear) growth - investing heavily into the existing tech, accelerating scientific R&D into building an actual bomb, and escalating Uranium enrichment.

• Recall how as far as in late 2021, many experts were questioning the utility of the Nuclear deal/JCPOA given that the status quo (even then) was no longer comparable to that of 2015 - and that Iran was mere months away from a breakout period - time necessary to reach weapons grade (90%) enriched Uranium for one bomb.

• And that was then, in late spring of 2021 - when even the Secretary of State Antony Blinken worried about a breakout time of mere ‘‘weeks”.

• In addition, last summer, Israel’s Institute For Science And International Security (INSS) published the following ominous report:

• “Iran has crossed a new, dangerous threshold; Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero. It has enough 60 percent enriched uranium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to be assured it could fashion a nuclear explosive.¹ If Iran wanted to further enrich its 60 percent HEU up to weapon-grade HEU, or 90 percent, it could do so within a few weeks with only a few of its advanced centrifuge cascades.²
  

  In parallel, within a month, it could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear explosive from its existing stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium. Whether or not Iran enriches its HEU up to 90 percent, it can have enough HEU for two nuclear weapons within one month after starting breakout. [emphasis added].”

• Now, given that the INSS informs and shapes the thinking of Israel’s national security establishment, even if the aforementioned report is a little exaggerated, it would not matter nearly as much as it should when it comes to predicting Israel’s next moves: we can be quite confident that the officials in Tel-Aviv will broadly align with this assessment.

• If the perception and beliefs of Israeli security officials is necessary to predict their next steps - well then, here we have it: they think Iran is mere weeks away from having enough enriched Uranium to develop a bomb.

• And given then they do most likely think that, and given that a more hawkish Netanyahu is back in power, one could assume that Israel will err on the side of preemption rather than waiting passively to see the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) compliance progress or assurances (whatever that means at this point) from Iran.

• To be clear, there is plenty of evidence that this perception is correct and that Iran is not only capable of developing and escalating its nuclear enrichment on short notice, but that it is in fact also willing to take steps towards building an actual bomb.

• For example, in March of 2022, the IAEA discovered that Iran was in breach of its safeguards obligations and failed to declare its use of nuclear material at one of the sites - Lavisan-Shian.

• In addition, there was an unexplained presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at three undeclared locations in Iran, namely Turquzabad, Varamin and Marivan.

• No satisfactory and/or legitimate explanation were offered for any of these breaches.

• But then again, what is it that Iran could really say here?

• How can Iran justify shutting down the UN-installed monitoring cameras at its nuclear facilities?

• It cannot - because there isn’t an innocent explanation to any of this.

• It is pretty clear that Tehran has both the capability and the intent to develop a nuclear bomb, and as suggested by these cables, the JCPOA was dragged out to earn Iran enough time and bandwidth to do just that.

• At least now, we have Biden accept the reality that JCPOA is indeed dead - this means that there is still time to reverse Iran’s dangerous escalation towards acquisition of a nuclear bomb (through increased deterrence and sabotage).

• And this timeline is most definitely shorter when it comes to beliefs and perceptions of Israeli leaders.

• 2) Iran is likely to get richer in the short-to-medium term.