Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Moscow- Pyongyang alliance, and imposing major costs on North Korea.

North Korea - Russia alliance deepens: strong disincentives for a continuous long-term cooperation must be imposed on Pyongyang.

• The flourishing North Korea-Russia alliance isn’t exactly new - reports suggest North Korean aid in soviet-style 152mm artillery shells since mid to late last year.

• But it appears that things are about to escalate, and Russia is desperate to secure a bigger and more consistent pipeline of artillery shells and anti-tank missiles.

• And the number of shells to be given to Russia must necessarily be so high as to justify for all these theatrics of in-person summit, and for Putin to finally cross yet another rubicon of indignity and embarrassment by openly aligning with the ultimate Pariah state.

• In exchange, for this help, North Korea is to receive much-needed food as well as tech and knowhow for satellites, nuclear-powered submarines, and ballistic missiles.

• (side note: apparently, the expertise on the missiles is already being exchanged - there is a very good analysis of this here: that Hwasong-18 is based on Russia’s Topol-M. On the other hand, there is also a pretty persuasive analysis that this is not the case. In any case however, even if Russia was not helping out thus far, it is pretty clear that it is on the track to do so pretty soon..)

• In fact, the first public remarks following a meeting between Putin and Kim Jong Un (at Russia’s far east Vostochny cosmodrome for space launches) are quite revealing..

• Putin was more reserved - he is clearly quite embarrassed of a closer association with a country that is short of food..(and not the finest hour for the Kremlin propaganda machines - that now have to somehow sell this to a domestic audience that was hitherto assured of Russia’s dominance in the war..)

• As such, we didn’t get major rhetorical highlights from Putin - apart from a confirmation that Russia would help with satellite tech.

• Kim Jong Un on the other hand, spoke like a true cartoon character/James Bond movie villain - promising “a new era of 100-year friendship” to help Russia fight against the “evil forces” of the west and declaring that “Russia will emerge victorious in the fight to punish the evil forces..I will always be standing with Russia.”

• Now, the pathetic (and honestly, quite hilarious and over the top) rhetoric aside, this is a major development and severe financial costs must be imposed on North Korea.

• It is of course extremely unlikely that North Korea would simply reverse course in the face of such economic costs: doing so would create a negative precedent, which North Korea is extremely conscious of - this is the regime that has chosen to starve its population for decades, instead of giving into pressure and changing its policy.

• But if correct levers were to be applied (more on that later below) Pyongyang could certainly reduce the intensity of support - coming up with a number of legitimate-sounding excuses in order to save face.

• In addition, punishing North Korea is essential to dissuade other countries from offering strong material support to Russia.

• For example: imposing extreme costs on North Korea could alter the calculus in Beijing.

• Now, naturally, China is not North Korea, and it being a number one trading partner for 120 countries all over the world, the level of costs that can be imposed on China are capped in practice.

• But both the US and EU can impose high costs, and the disparity from those imposed on North Korea (even if it will inevitably be lesser) cannot be too big - if only to preserve the consistency and credibility of the West.

• We need to unpack what measures are the most likely to produce an asymmetric impact.

• But before all that, we need to also dispel two notions that are usually advanced by media pundits and geopolitical analysts in dismissing the potential seriousness of this alliance:

• 1) That Russia risks leaking away its ultimate secrets and edge in advanced weapons.

• (side note: ICBMs and nuclear-powered and nuclear-missile capable attack submarines are way more sensitive tech than what Russia is usually happy to sell: S-400s or SU-35s etc. We are talking about extremely important strategic weapons - not mere next generation fighter jets/Air defense systems/SAMs)

• This is certainly a plausible risk - that advanced documentation and knowhow on Russian ballistic missiles and submarine capabilities may end up in the wrong hands is certainly a significant risk in terms of magnitude, but what about probability?

• How exactly would these capabilities be distributed?