Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - contrasting incentives influence probability of a ceasefire in Gaza.

Hamas and Netanyahu have contrasting objectives for the ‘‘day after’’ in Gaza.

• Netanyahu’s incentives.

• As discussed in the previous cables, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's death opens up an opportunity for a long-term ceasefire (while the prospect of a comprehensive peace still remains largely elusive).

• And although it is common to blame Netanyahu's desire to stay in power (to avoid facing corruption/bribery charges) as a reason for why this will still not be possible to achieve, the reality is far more nuanced.

• (side note: that Netanyahu is prolonging the Gaza war to stay in power is now a well-accepted truism. Even Biden himself once famously said that there was ‘‘every reason” for the Israeli public to conclude that Netanyahu was deliberately prolonging the war against Hamas in order to stay in power.)

• For starters, Netanyahu no longer needs a protracted war in Gaza to stay in power.

• And this is laregly for two reasons:

• 1) Following the assassination of Nasrallah and killing of Sinwar, destruction of Hezbollah facilities in Lebanon and pager attacks, Netanyahu is enjoying boosted domestic popularity, has expanded his de-facto majority in the Knesset with a new alliance in September (with the New Hope party), and is less dependent on far-right support to remain in power - so he cannot be bullied into prolonging the war by people like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, and;

• 2) Even if he needed a war to stay in power, he now has other avenues for this: there is already an ongoing campaign against Hezbollah (which doesn't appear to be ending anytime soon).

• And in fact, the campaign against Hezbollah has been far more effective.

• It has also featured fewer civilian casualties in comparison to the campaign in Gaza from the very beginning.

• Israel was successful in destroying the senior leadership of Hezbollah and their arms depots and is now going after their financial institutions that fund the troops, and the entire organization (including their ability to provide social services – and not being able to do so will certainly put additional pressure on Hezbollah, and reduce their public support within Lebanon).

• And it is also the case that Israel has faced far less global pressure in this campaign against Hezbollah than in its bombing of Gaza.

• In fact, the Biden administration has already changed its tune and is no longer pushing for a cease-fire at any cost and is instead trying to use this opportunity to get rid of Hezbollah, all of this is to say that there's already a good/opportune military campaign for Netanyahu to stay in power.

• There is no need to use Gaza as a prop anymore.

• In fact, with Sinwar dead, the outrage on Israeli forces for every single civilian loss going forward is going to be much higher than before - everyone is now calling for Israel to finally negotiate a cease-fire and get their hostages back.

• There is very little support (even from closest allies like the US) to continue with the total destruction of Hamas.

• So then, and given all this, what are Netanyahu's actual incentives?

• 1) Inflict upon Hezbollah what has been done to Hamas - a complete decimation and degradation of Hezbollah as a fighting force.

• 2) Return of resettled Israeli citizens in the north of the country within the essential context that their return will be secure, and they will not be facing constant barrages of rocket fire from Hezbollah.

• 3) Return of hostages, kept by Hamas and a cease-fire that precludes Hamas from playing any political role in the governance of Gaza.

• (side note: this includes them normalizing their relations and forming a ‘‘coalition’’ with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank - something that China was trying to orchestrate last Summer when they achieved the first part of the equation: reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah (which runs the West Bank/PA).)

• This is important: although Netanyahu may indeed be willing to let the remaining Hamas militants “leave and live”, he will most certainly not let them play any role in the future governance of Gaza.

• He wants Hamas to be remembered as a terrorist organization- and their potential role in the future governance of Gaza will consequently be unacceptable for Netanyahu.

• 4) Demilitarize Iran, and ideally destroy its capacity to develop nuclear weapons for a very long time.