Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Strategic implications of Iran - Israel shooting match.

Strategic implications.

• 1) US prestige and reliability received a boost.

• There is no other major power that can galvanize an international coalition in defense of its ally and fly fighter jets and use anti-missile defense systems on warships to shoot down incoming drones and missiles from an adversarial nation.

• Russia is not doing this for any other country - and neither is China.

• None of the challenger powers have mutual defense treaties that could produce such an outcome.

• In the unlikely scenario of a Russia - NATO open war, it is almost inconceivable that China would fly its fighter jets to defend Russia against NATO forces.

• Or that Russia would deploy its forces in defense of Iran.

• What unites these countries is opportunism and desire to spoil things: there is no solid alliance in place.

• And the US-led response to the Iranian attack was a stark reminder of this fact.

• By defending Israel against Iranian attack, the US sent a signal that its commitments globally are meaningful.

• That America’s word and promise to defend a treaty ally should not be in doubt.

• And this is important: right this moment, the US and Philippines are conducting the largest military exercise to date - which includes joint missions in the South China Sea.

• And mere days before an operation to defend Israel, Biden hosted his Japanese counterpart for a state dinner and a major upgrade to US-Japanese defense pact was announced.

• Japan agreed to further integrate their military command structures and enhance cooperation in defense technology and equipment production.

• There are even possible plans to link Japan into the AUKUS trilateral security pact involving Australia, the UK, and the US (particularly in areas of advanced technology such as AI and hypersonic missiles).

• In addition, the US and Japan plan to expand their cooperation in missile defense and space.

• This includes integrating their missile defense systems more closely, potentially with other allies like Australia, and collaborating in space exploration efforts, such as those outlined under the Artemis program.

• These have been a couple of good weeks for US credibility and prestige worldwide.

• And this has a major impact on the credibility of US promises to ‘‘defend every inch’’ of NATO territory, or to defend South Korea, Japan and Philippines in the Pacific.

• There has been a long gap in time where the US did not have an opportunity to signal its reliability to allies all over the world - fortunately, the Biden admin seized on this opportunity and capitalized on the Iranian attack to send important signals worldwide.

• 2) Free PR for Biden’s “Middle East air defense alliance” project.

• Iranian strikes simultaneously: 1) demonstrated the need for a joint air defense project, and 2) managed to induce conditions for an actual test-run of this network.

• This is important: in the absence of concrete threats that push for focused alignment in response, military alliances atrophy and lose their relevance fast.

• One only needs to look at the example of NATO: a mere couple of years ago, the French President was directionally correct when applying the label of ‘‘brain death’’ to the alliance.

• Today, it is an essential guarantor of security for the entire Europe and is an alliance that is finally stepping up (and would remain a potent force even in the unlikely scenario of US leadership somehow disappearing in the wake of Trump’s re-election).

• Same goes to AUKUS - a monumental defense alliance between US, UK, and Australia - something that would not come about without a need to confront China.

• Similarly, Iran’s attack was an important reminder to gulf monarchies, Saudis, and to Jordan that Ayatollahs will not respect sovereignty and security needs of Arab states standing in the way (quite literally).

• And as mentioned above, the aspiration for a deeper Middle East defensive network that would entail overlapping networks of air defenses was in the works for several years now.

• As part of this architecture (project of bringing in Arab states and Israel under a shared US- led umbrella), Israel officially joined the US-led regional military command in 2021 - in the wake of the Abraham Accords treaties signed with several Arab states.

• Since then there have been a number of IDF-Arab states war games, with an emphasis on aerial defense.

• All of this was as part of a burgeoning network described as the Middle East Air Defense Alliance.

• But progress in this direction stalled last year: first there was a China-brokered Saudi/UAE rapprochement with Iran, and then the obvious events that started last October.

• In other words, there was a need for a concrete trigger event to create a much-needed refresh to the project.

• And what a trigger that was..

• Not only did Arab states like Jordan (and allegedly, Saudis too) cooperate with Israel, they effectively conducted an actual test run of a defensive operation together.

• Jordanian jets downed dozens of Iranian drones flying across northern and central Jordan heading to Israel.

• Additionally, Israeli fighter jets were also allowed into Jordan to conduct their own defensive operations.

• This is unprecedented: a historic first.

• There could have been a better trial for the Middle East air defense network than what happened on April 13th.

• Not only was there a stark reminder that Iran is an ever-present security threat, but Israelis and Arabs worked together to conduct a highly successful defensive operation.

• 3) Public pressure on Arab leaders will intensify.

• Now in its 7th month, the war in Gaza has taken an extreme toll on Palestinian civilians and has galvanized pro-Palestine sentiment across the world.

• But when it comes to acute support, neighboring Arab states have seen the largest public outcry.

• The situation in Jordan is especially tense.

• (side note: Approximately half of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin. This includes both registered refugees and those who are not registered but consider themselves of Palestinian descent. Many of these individuals and their descendants arrived in Jordan during the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1948 and 1967.)

• Streets of its capital Amman have seen major anti-Israel protest rallies taking place non-stop.

• And although the ruling monarchy has been critical of Israel’s conduct in this war, there has not been any concrete action against Israel.

• To be clear, Jordan doesn’t have major levers of influence and power over Israel.

• On the contrary, it depends on Israel for a lot of basic things - including water.

• Jordan’s dependence on Israel for water is significant and under the terms of the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, Israel is committed to providing Jordan with 55 million cubic meters of water annually.

• This agreement was crucial for Jordan - given its status as one of the most water-scarce countries in the world.

• And in recent years, this dependence has become even more critical: in 2021, Israel agreed to sell an additional 50 million cubic meters of water to Jordan, on top of the annual amount specified in the treaty, to help alleviate Jordan's acute water shortage.

• And this is just one area: there are plenty of other areas where Jordan depends on Israel.

• As an example, energy is another major area of dependence: Jordan has historically relied on gas imports from Israel.

• This became more prominent with a $10 billion deal signed in 2016 for the supply of natural gas from Israel's Leviathan gas field to Jordan.

• And Israel plays other major roles in Jordan’s economic prospects: The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan are a significant aspect of this economic dependence: where goods produced in this zone can be exported to the United States tariff-free - provided they contain inputs from Israel.

• (side note: same benefit is bestowed to Egypt as well)

• So there is not much Jordan could do (but for some trade restrictions that would hurt its fragile economy more than Israel).

• Be that as it may however, the Jordanian public is not happy at all.

• And this latest open cooperation and active role in defense of Israel was not viewed positively by many Jordanians.

• The ruling regime is frequently accused of being an Israeli vassal state (not entirely untrue).

• To be clear, Jordan did not take up such an active role on April 13th out of unconditional love for Israel.

• Domestically, it justified its actions as a measure of defending its own skies, and protecting the safety of its own people.

• After all, who could really guarantee that all of those ballistic missiles would arrive at their intended destinations?

• (side note: especially given how many of them failed during launch)

• But there were undoubtedly at least two additional strategic reasons for Jordan’s active role on April 13th:

• 1) signal to Iran that it will not tolerate violations of its sovereignty, and;

• 2) signal to Washington that it is a reliable and dependable ally in the Middle East.

• Regardless of good reasons for such an intervention, the pressure on the ruling regime will increase.

• In the meantime, Saudis had the luxury of not being on the way and playing their hands better: limiting their role to intel-sharing only (allegedly).

• Similar anti-Israeli sentiments are common in the Saudi Kingdom as well.

• But less so, and the regime in Riyadh is much stronger, more ruthless, and less afflicted by economic woes that face Amman: in short, the Saudi monarchy is much more stable than that of Jordan.

• But both Kingdoms are equally interested in the Gaza war ending soon - the longer it drags on, the higher are the domestic political risks.

• 4) Netanyahu’s position looks a little more secure.