Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines

The Polish Mig-29 debacle - an embarrassment to the US and NATO, and a prestige boost for Putin.

• Against all strategic & tactical prudence, the US ruled out the provision of the MIG-29 to beleaguered Ukraine.

• But that’s just the start of the embarrassment - the lead up to the refusal, miscommunications & misalignment, contradictory statements between the DoD and the DoS, and the poor framing of the final decision, all played a significant role in displaying: a) lack of confidence within NATO, b) Putin’s ability to impose self-deterrence on the US.

• First things first, those who argue that the transfer of jets wouldn’t have made a difference, are patently wrong.

• This is just a poor post-hoc rationalization for a significant policy failure.

• Contrary to the claims of certain ‘‘strategists’’, there is good evidence that the Ukrainian air space remains fiercely competitive, and that the Ukrainians have ‘‘enjoyed considerable success” in preventing Russia from gaining “any degree of control of the air’’.

• In other words, the expectation that the jets would have been destroyed soon after entering the Ukrainian air space, is plain wrong.

• And if Russia hasn’t managed to establish a total air dominance two weeks into the war (with an opportunity for an overwhelming blitz now gone), the likelihood of them achieving this now/or in the next few days is low - this is particularly the case given the delivery of more Turkish drones and MANPAD missiles, as well as UK’s decision to supply Starstreak missiles.

• And besides, the appeals of the Ukrainian government fighting on the ground (with the best feel for the pulse of the ongoing campaign) are first and foremost directed at the supply of fighter jets - more so, than requests for additional drones/ATGMs/MANPADS.

• And it is not hard to see why - with Russia proceeding with its (even if slow) encirclement of Kyiv and Kharkiv, and likelihood of an attack on the coastal Odessa growing with every day, additional fighter jets could have been used to target key supply columns that are harder targets for Turkish TB2 drones (due to the protection afforded by the Pantsir SAMs).

• Initial miscommunication

• First off, this strange habit of discussing NATO-wide key tactical decisions and logistics planning in public, has got to go.

• At the time of a major war taking place in Europe, the public must be informed of material tactical decisions only when the parties have arrived at a conclusion.

• We are not talking about a discussion of a major foreign policy principle here - the decision to supply Ukraine with lethal military aid has been made a long time ago.

• But as long as the US is unclear on precise logistics of further tactical help, they should not be announced prematurely - creating an impression of sloppiness and misalignment within NATO.

• And this is precisely what happened: Just a few days ago, Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed the supply of MIG-29s to Ukraine: "That gets a green-light. In fact, we're talking with our Polish friends right now about what we might be able to do to backfill their needs."

• Yet only three days later, the Pentagon changed its mind, claiming that it was a “high risk” policy, and in the process, contradicting Blinken’s previous announcement.

• Now then: what is the message sent to key allies?

• That the definitive promises made by America’s chief diplomat can be overruled in the matter of days?

• That allies have to always double-check and confirm assurances coming from the most senior leaders of the USG?

• What other statements made by Secretary Blinken need to be taken with caution?

• When Blinken says that the US is ready to defend ‘‘every inch’’ of NATO territory, do NATO allies need to confirm this with the Pentagon? In case they find this commitment ‘‘high risk’’ too?

• Messaging errors

• There were three major framing errors in this whole process: a) initial & follow up statements made by Poland, b) Pentagon’s response to Poland, and c) final rationale presented to justify the change of heart.

• 1) Poland’s mistakes.

• If Poland was unsure about providing these jets directly, it should have discussed the issue with the US in private first - before making public statements on the matter.

• Poland’s decision to take an indirect route to the supply of fighter jets demonstrated two things:

• a) fear of Russia, and;

• b) an implicit distrust of the US security guarantees made to NATO - for if Poland was absolutely sure that the US would protect it (in case of a Russian attack), it wouldn’t matter whether the jets were going to be delivered directly from Poland, or via the US base in Germany.

• Indeed, this implicit lack of confidence around security commitments was later aired explicitly - when the Polish PM said that the decision to supply Ukraine with fighter jets should be made by all NATO members as a whole.

• Translation: we are not so sure that if we made this decision alone, and were to be thereafter attacked, the rest of NATO would come to our aid.

• This is a significant damage to NATO’s credibility - for if the Article V common defense commitments were perceived to be as truly automatic (and not open to multiple, softer interpretations), there would not be any need to seek for additional assurances by requesting a unanimous buy-in for the policy.

• And if such concerns were lurking under the surface (which they clearly are), these should have been discussed privately well in advance of any public pronouncements - which (especially at the times of crisis) must always create an impression of iron-clad unanimity and alignment.

• 2) Pentagon’s response.

• Pentagon’s press release on the matter was just…terrible:

• “We are now in contact with the Polish government following the statement issued today.  As we have said, the decision about whether to transfer Polish-owned planes to Ukraine is ultimately one for the Polish government.  We will continue consulting with our Allies and partners about our ongoing security assistance to Ukraine, because, in fact, Poland's proposal shows just some of the complexities this issue presents. The prospect of fighter jets "at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America" departing from a U.S./NATO base in Germany to fly into airspace that is contested with Russia over Ukraine raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance.  It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it.  We will continue to consult with Poland and our other NATO allies about this issue and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland's proposal is a tenable one[emphasis added].”

• John Kirby’s statements validate Polish concerns about America’s commitment to NATO.

• If the fighter jets’ entry to the contested airspace is a threat to NATO, then why does it matter if it departs from Germany or from Poland - aren’t both countries considered as NATO territories?

• Or was Kirby thinking that the jets would be delivered in any other way?

• Perhaps Kirby thought that instead of flying them in from the air bases, the Polish government would invite Ukrainian farmers to pull them with their John Deere tractors? (after all, they have great experience pulling Russian tanks with those.. )

• What is the implication of saying that this was a decision ‘‘ultimately for the Polish government’’?

• We will defend every inch of the NATO territory, but we won’t send these jets from a US base in Germany (too risky), and if Poland wants to supply these directly, it is for them to decide?

• Implying what exactly? Isn’t Poland covered by the ‘‘every inch’’ policy? If it is, then what possible difference does it make, if the jets are sent from Poland as opposed to the US base in Germany?

• What is the meaning of this? What should Poland think?

• Most importantly, what should Putin think?

• That NATO’s security guarantees to Poland may not be that definitive?

• Mixed messages and contradictions around common NATO security posture, invite gamblers like Putin to take risks.

• This was a significant faux pas on the part of the Pentagon.

• President Biden needs to step in and publicly reassure the US commitment to Poland.

• Moreover, concrete actions must be taken - sending over Patriot batteries is a good start.

• Next step: send more US F-16s to Poland.

• The US is in the damage-control mode right now: Everything must be done to reassure Poland and confirm America’s commitment to NATO.

• Framing failure

• The final framing of the decision was also pretty bad - in fact, the only statement worse than the one delivered would have been: ‘‘we are scared of Putin”.

• Justifying the refusal to supply the jets by claiming that the policy would be ‘‘high-risk’’ and that “the transfer of combat aircraft right now could be mistaken by Mr. Putin and the Russians as an escalatory step” is nothing short of self-deterrence.

• And then again, what makes this policy particularly high-risk? Are the US Javelins and Stingers not used to kill Russian soldiers and destroy their hardware?

• In fact, one could argue that all those Javelin and Stinger missiles could end up causing more damage than MIG-29s - especially if/when the urban warfare phase of the war begins.

• Some have argued (unconvincingly) that MANPADs and ATGMs are defensive in nature - whereas fighter jets are offensive.

• First of all, almost no battlefield weapon (with the exception of a few SAMs) is defensive or offensive in nature - its label depends on its utilization - and Ukraine is the country defending itself from an invasion.

• Moreover, the idea that (when calibrating his response) Putin would focus on narrow definitions rather than outcomes produced by these weapons, is plain foolish.

• The Pentagon’s rationale was faulty - adding credibility to Putin’s bluffs.

• Here is the essential meaning of the Pentagon’s response: Putin will engage in threat displays, and we will simply play along - precisely in the way he wants us to behave…

• US leaders then wonder why Putin constantly implies risks of nuclear war (blaming it on his mental state) - because his threats work!

• And he has every incentive to use threats that are effective.

• And all this after the initial Russian warning was rather tentative:

• “The basing of Ukrainian military aviation that is subsequently used against the Russian armed forces may be regarded as the involvement of those countries in the armed conflict [emphasis added] ’’ said Russian Ministry of Defense.

• In other words, we are not sure yet: we may respond - but then again, we also may not.

• And besides, Russia would always retain a considerable leeway in this matter - they could simply “fail” to identify the specific jets that targeted Russian assets - was it the MIG-29 already under Ukrainian possession? Or the new ones supplied by NATO?

• That would be up to Russia ‘‘to investigate’’ - and one may suggest that finding the correct answer to this question (and self-imposing a necessary consequent response) wouldn’t have been in Putin’s interests in any case.

• Overall then, the decision to turn down Ukraine’s pleas for fighter jets, the embarrassing justifications for it, and miscommunications indicating misalignment between the different branches of the US government, as well as between NATO members, and implying a lack of commitment to the NATO’s common defense, have all damaged the US and its allies.

• This is very unfortunate, since to date, the Biden admin was handling this crisis relatively well - but this was simply weak.

• And weakness is provocative.

• Way to boost Putin’s threat display prestige at the time when his army is stuck in the muds of Ukraine, his fighter jets are dropping like flies, and his soldiers resort to stealing chickens from besieged farmers..

Possibility of a Kremlin palace coup - and Putin’s most likely successor.