Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Putin's next steps after Prigozhin's attempted coup.
Putin’s next steps and the dual signaling pressure on the global stage.
Following Prigozhin’s attempted coup, Putin now faces two major challenges: 1) Domestically, he needs to convince a) his closest “inner circle” security apparatus, b) the wealthy “business elite”, and c) the general public, that: 1) He is totally in control, and that 2) He is still the best option available to all three of these stakeholders.
In foreign policy, he needs to convince adversaries that:
1) He is as dangerous as ever - that this ‘‘incident’’ did not weaken his resolve and capacity to prosecute the war in Ukraine (and if necessary, his will to outlast the West in the waiting game), and that if anything, he has become even more aggressive and determined in his maximalist war aims, and;
2) Simultaneously, he must convince the West/his adversaries that the ‘‘incident’’ did not make him mentally unstable - that his conduct will not become unpredictable, and/or dangerous.
The second point is crucial - for if he is too dangerous and too unstable, then the West would now be facing a resentful madman at the top of a nuclear state: this very reality, and the fact that Putin appears to have been weakened domestically (at least perceptually), could in combination create an incentive for a regime change in Russia.
In other words, if Putin’s regime is already shaky, and he is increasingly becoming even more paranoid and dangerous, then why not find/create opportunities to topple him in Russia? Why not try to identify would be challengers (and if the plan to replace him is on the balance less risky than letting him stay in power) and help them to get rid of Putin?
Putin, (or few remaining sane and rational people within his closest inner circle) must understand this reality - otherwise, he risks overreaching and creating a huge target on his back.
And this is also relevant to the signaling pressure in relation to his allies - he needs to convince his ‘‘friends’’ in Beijing and Tehran that he is reliable and good for business: being a madman and openly paranoid is clearly not part of this value proposition.
Moreover, and in addition to adversaries and allies (applied loosely), there is also a third group of countries: vassals (like Armenia and Syria) and countries trying to escape Russia’s orbit (like Kazakhstan in Central Asia).
Both vassals and escapists are busy evaluating Russia’s evolving posture and Putin’s personal grip on power.
(side note: a good illustration of this is the Prime Minister of Armenia calling to check in on the Kremlin right in the middle of the attempted coup)
With these incentive structures in mind, let us now unpack how Putin is actually performing against these strategic and tactical objectives that he now faces following Prigozhin’s attempted coup.
Domestic moves: cleaning house, displays of generosity, return to normal, and rewarding loyalty.
First off, we are now getting additional details of Prigozhin’s attempted ideal scenario - details that reveal the seriousness of a challenge that Putin was facing last weekend.
As it turns out, Prigozhin’s original plan was to kidnap both the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoygu and the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army (and Ukraine theater commander) Valery Gerasimov.
Apparently, the FSB found out about this plan two days in advance - forcing Prigozhin to improvise.
One can assume that Putin was also aware - that is, unless the FSB (and at this point, this could only happen deliberately) - withheld such crucial information from him.
In addition, there have been some reports of General Surovikin being complicit at least in some way (whether that was active support or passive consent is unclear) in helping Prigozhin to pull off this attempted coup.
And yes, given these additional details, it is now even harder to deny that this was in fact an attempted coup - a significant level of premeditation was involved.
It is also rather obvious that having captured Shoygu and Gerasimov, Prigozhin wasn’t simply going to be content with them losing their formal jobs at the top of the Russian military.
What could have been the play here?
Was Prigozhin’s ambition really going to be limited to his demands (from Putin) that both Shoygu and Gerasimov be fired?
And then what? Appoint someone else (perhaps himself or Surovikin) as the Minister of Defense?
How on earth would that work? How can one imagine Putin agreeing to this absurdity?
In such an insane scenario, Putin would simply sign off on his own execution.
Clearly then, Prigozhin’s ambition was not limited to his removal/replacement of the military top brass.
Such an extreme escalation makes no sense whatsoever if Prigozhin’s ultimate goal was not to challenge Putin personally, which, (in his post-resolution voice memo) he claimed (with zero credibility) was not at all his intent.
By kidnapping Shoygu and Gerasimov, Prigozhin would have reached a point of no return: there is only one way to go from there on - toppling Putin.
So then, and when evaluating Putin’s domestic moves, we need to keep the following fact in mind: as discussed in the last week’s cables (and now confirmed), this was not a localized mutiny or an insurrection - but rather, a premeditated coup with an ultimate objective of toppling Putin.
(side note: there are some further embarrassing details revealed by the Belarusian President Lukashenko. It is unclear how much of it is true (Lukashenko has a habit of embellishment to say the least), but when describing his role in resolving the conflict between Putin and Prigozhin, Lukashenko revealed an interesting fact: neither could find a way to reach Prigozhin. At one point Putin suggested that maybe the FSB would have Prigozhin’s number. Maybe… Perhaps.. The FSB should have known what Prigozhin had for lunch, let alone have his number. Either the FSB is not all that.. or Putin is not fully aware of their capabilities. Neither possibility is ideal for the Putin regime..)
With all that in mind, let us now unpack Putin’s (constantly evolving and updating) domestic game plan:
Step 1: Discredit Wagner - damage its institutional reputation.
Putin has a dilemma here: he needs to ruin Wagner’s reputation in order to neutralize it as a political threat, but doing so without necessary finesse, risks the ire of a significant portion of the Russian population: many of whom have begun to associate ‘‘Wagnerites’’ with true warriors of higher caliber and excellence.
Consequently, the goal here is to separate Wagner’s leadership from the rest of the revered ‘‘warrior core’’.
And this is pretty clear from Putin’s rhetoric: he accuses those at the top of the organization of “betrayal” and ‘‘stab in the back” while praising the rank & file of Wagner for their ‘‘bravery and sacrifice on the battlefield”.
Even in his first ever address on Saturday June 24 (and before the Lukashenko deal was struck, and Wagner was still on the March to Moscow), Putin warned the Wagner fighters of being dragged into ‘‘criminal adventurism’’ by their traitorous leaders.
And this divide and conquer strategy continued last week, when Putin outlined the incredible amount of money (by Russian standards) spent on Wagner and for Prigozhin’s catering company by the Ministry of Defense.
He wanted both the Russian people (presumably, especially those greeting and sending off Prigozhin as a hero in Rostov) and Wagner fighters to know that the Russian state had spent $3bn on Wagner in the period of May 2022-2023.
A lot of Wagner fighters will no doubt question how much of this enormous wealth they got to enjoy?
True, their salary is considerably higher than that of an average Russian soldier, but the contrast with Prigozhin’s gain will become ever sharper.
(side note: and Putin has now announced that the official Russian soldiers will also get a 10.5% boost to their paychecks from October. A way to boost morale/loyalty in the military - demonstrating that they are not of a lesser importance that the Wagner warriors, but also, a way for Putin to signal staying power and resolve in this war of attrition)
Crucially, Putin is turning the tables on Prigozhin - who was fond of accusing Shoygu and Gerasimov of being comfortable and corrupt ‘‘fat cats’’.
Well then, who is the fat cat now? Who is getting $3bn from the Russian state (in one year) and then sending his men on ‘‘human wave attacks’’ in Bakhmut?
The goal is to turn this ‘‘man of the people’’ Prigozhin into a ‘‘fat cat’’ himself.
Not a bad start.
Even so, Putin is also ignoring two important implications of this very fact of bloated state funding for Wagner:
1) After all, who was the one who approved it all? And what does that say about Putin’s judgment that those treated well by his regime, turn around and decide to betray him - and then go on a retirement in Belarus (avoiding criminal charges) when the plan fails?
(side note: this is why, (as stated in the last week’s cables), the current status quo is untenable: for Putin to regain his charisma, gravitas, and perception of being fully in control, Prigozhin is gotta go - that is, at some point, Putin will need to make some drastic decisions about Prigozhin’s life..Other wannabe Prigozhins need to know that this is a path towards destruction, and not towards a peaceful retirement in a third country… And perhaps this is step 1 in that process: weaken him politically, and remove the status of a ‘‘hero/frontline warrior” before proceeding with more nefarious plans of ‘‘neutralizing’’ Prigozhin.)
2) Inadvertently, Putin is accepting Russia’s state level complicity in all of Wagner’s crimes (including its war crimes, international human rights abuses, and troll factory/disinformation campaign activities - Prigozhin was the official owner of the ‘‘Internet Research Agency” which meddled in the US elections (as well as the democratic processes elsewhere) - indeed he even admitted being behind the IRA, and promised to repeat this election interference again).
For a long time, the Kremlin (implausibly) maintained that Wagner was a private institution for which it bore no responsibility.
Well, Wagner is recognized as a terrorist organization by major Western countries (facing a number of sanctions - most recently, those imposed by the US on gold companies playing a role in their funding), and by admitting that the Russian state was behind their funding, Putin had essentially turned Russia into a state sponsor of terrorism.
Western diplomats should seize on this opportunity and impose new sanctions on the Kremlin - this is a perfect opportunity to get the ‘‘Global South’’ (or at least, many of them) onboard with the new sanctions on Russia.
And those that refuse to participate in such sanctions, will have to explain on a global stage exactly why they are unwilling to sanction a state sponsor of terrorism (per Putin’s own admission).
Surprisingly, US/NATO member state diplomats have been rather mute on this issue - they need to wake up and seize this diplomatic opening.
Step 2: Imply western complicity - push for “rally ‘round the flag” effect.
“We made clear that we were not involved. We had nothing to do with it”, said President Biden when commenting on the US actions at the time of the attempted coup.
And it is pretty clear that the Kremlin is aware of this truth - otherwise, there would have been a massive state sponsored campaign to make use of any minor yet potential evidence of US complicity.
But this knowledge did not of course prevent Putin from throwing around implied accusations.
Russia’s Foreign Minister said that Russia would look at the potential involvement of Western spies in this ‘‘rebellion’’.
Such accusations are of course unsurprising: when a regime promoting itself on its capacity to ensure order and stability loses its center of gravity, every little helps to repair its damaged reputation.
And if Western spies are involved, then the narrative shifts from “Putin vs his mercenary he could not control”, to “Russia vs its enemies uniting with homegrown traitors”.
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