Display of crude measures will hurt Israel more in the long-term.
After two months of IDF operations in Gaza, the US Secretary Lloyd Austin warned Israel of marching towards a ‘‘strategic defeat’’.
The context for these comments was the ever rising toll of civilian casualties: latest figures stand at 18k, with 6,600 of these deaths being children...
Israel estimates that Hamas has around 30k soldiers, of which approximately 4-5k have already been killed.
That is a very significant number if true - but it is unclear how Israel can be so confident in the precise allegiance of fighters resisting their assault.
How are the Hamas fighters distinguished from other organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad?
In addition, the base number for Hamas fighters is assumed to be static - but how accurate is this assumption?
A retired American General Stanley McChrystal was famous for a commission/study on counterinsurgencies - with an often repeated conclusion that for every civilian killed 10 more civilians are recruited.
Now, this was obviously a hyperbolic number produced to make a larger point - that killing civilians, and demonstrating a complete disregard to their lives will only recruit more terrorists and their passive sympathizers.
That the coefficient is not literally accurate is obvious - otherwise, we would still have ISIS alive at a level of strength not too far from that of its peak in 2014.
But that a total disregard to Palestinian lives will recruit more soldiers for Hamas is also not in doubt.
And Israel is indeed displaying a level of reckless disregard uncharacteristic of a westernized, liberal-democratic state.
It is pretty obvious that if Hamas soldiers were hiding in an Israeli building in Tel-Aviv and not Gaza, these very buildings would not be reduced to ground.
The IDF would not engage in indiscriminate bombing, and kill thousands of Israeli children if Hamas terrorists were hiding in the buildings of Israeli cities.
Let us be blunt for a moment - this is only happening because unfortunately, the value of a human life in Gaza is not very high.
It is tragic to admit this, but this is literally true - nowhere else would this fly: in no corner of the world would it be acceptable to level an entire city, cause hundreds of thousands to be homeless, cut off water and electricity to 2.3 million civilians and kill 17k civilians (half children) to kill 3-4k terrorists.
When it comes to the manner in which Israel is prosecuting this war, it is now entering the league dominated by Russia (even then, Israel managed to kill more Palestinian civilians in two months than Russia could in Ukraine in nearly two years).
Of course, when it comes to the intent behind the wars - the two could not be any more different.
Russia is an invader, whereas, not only is Israel right to defend itself, but it has in fact a duty to unleash hell on Hamas.
But the manner in which these operations are being conducted is conspicuously and brazenly callous.
And this is not even limited to the number of civilian deaths or blatant violations of the Geneva convention (like the collective punishment involved in denying essential services to civilians in Gaza).
Last week, the social media was consumed by photos of the IDF stripping Palestinian detainees and marching them (in their underwear) in the streets of Gaza.
There is of course no military justification for this treatment, and the pictures reminiscent of Abu Ghraib, showing how the IDF stripped Palestinian detainees of dignity in addition to their clothes, will bring no clear benefit to the state of Israel.
At the time when globally, Muslims outnumber Jews by more than 100 to 1 on social media, Israel is engaged in an extremely reckless form of self harm.
Let us not forget that Hamas had essentially three strategic goals in launching its barbaric attack of unprecedented scale on October 7th:
1) Prevent Saudi-Israeli normalization, and renew the rage between Arabs and Israelis across the Middle East,
2) Isolate Israel on the global stage, make it politically challenging for the US to keep arming/funding the IDF, turn the global mood against the status quo, and reinvigorate talks around Gaza being the ‘‘open air prison’’;
3) Force Iran’s/Hizbullah’s arm into opening a second front;
4) Recruit sympathizers, funders and soldiers.
Although there uncertainty around objective #4, and #3 seems to have been averted (mainly thanks to the US deterrence), Hamas has clearly attained the first two objectives, and if Israel doesn’t change course, then recovery and reversal of Hamas’s gains on those two points will be hard to pull off.
With all of this said, it is also important to unpack potential Israeli motivations in their persistence with the current strategy (in spite of overwhelming strategic costs), their short and long-term calculations, whether assumptions underpinning these are accurate or faulty (and come with a very high risk of a strategic backlash), and what should the Israeli strategists do to prevent a further slide towards irreversible self-harm.
Israel’s calculations: strategic objectives for the present & the future, and intervening personal political incentives.
Present-day objectives.
The current goal of Israel as a state is to eliminate Hamas as a fighting and institutional force that is capable of posing a security threat to Israel.
This is a valid goal - in fact, it is a must for Israel.
And contrary to what many pundits now assert, destroying Hamas is not impossible.
No - it is not an idea that you cannot destroy.
True, the sentiments and grievances that underpin Hamas as an institution will not be eliminated (and if the current approach of an indiscriminate slaughter persists, they will in fact worsen).
But Israel is not in war with an ideology or sentiment - it is in war with a concrete institution with approximately 30k fighters.
There are many countries (Iran primarily) and terrorist organizations that share extreme hatred of Israel, but the October 7th attack was perpetrated by a concrete actor located an hour’s drive from Tel-Aviv.
And just like it is possible to destroy ISIS as an institution without destroying sentiments that enabled it, it is also very doable to do the same with Hamas in this case.
And this is not merely about revenge and justice either - it is, in the main, a practical security concern.
Israel cannot afford Hamas surviving as a potent force (and their destruction is also needed for a sustainable political settlement - more on that later..).
There have now been many well-substantiated media reports that (relying on Netanyahu’s own statements) documented the pre-October 7th strategy of Benjamin Netanyahu in relation to Hamas: tacitly allow for their survival and limited operational freedom, and use their extremism to divide & conquer Palestinian factions, marginalize and separate Gaza from West Bank, and use the fervency of terrorist sentiments as an excuse/blocker for a two-state solution.
That security concept was already flawed from the very outset: you cannot possibly hope to maintain a sustainable long-term status quo by having a perpetually rabid terrorist organization on your border, and feed it enough to simultaneously: 1) use it as a political prop/tool, but also 2) somehow contain its worst instincts and possibilities of backlash.
Leaving aside the massive organizational security failures (with credible reports from middle-manager level intel officers providing a number of warnings of impending attack - alerts that were nevertheless ignored), on a purely strategic level too, this was bound to fail.
And now it is time to correct the error.
Israel must (ideally) destroy, or at least diminish/degrade Hamas to such an extent that it effectively becomes a demilitarized and a decentralized institution.
But there are also additional signaling needs in play here - Israel must demonstrate resolve and staying power in its willingness and ability to prosecute a messy war to inflict severe pain on attackers.
This is essential for its deterrence of Hizbullah and Iran.
If the latter two see that it is possible to inflict significant attacks and still end the war/freeze the conflict after only a few weeks of heavy casualties (but crucially before getting totally annihilated by Israel), then the calculation for future similar attacks becomes more favorable.
Israel’s relentlessness in response to Hamas is a message to Iran/Hizbullah: try me and see what happens.
And in the long-term, this is perhaps even more important than the current campaign - Iran must see that its crown jewel of a proxy would get wiped out in a serious war with Israel.
Longer-term calculations.
Pressure is building from the UN, the EU, and the Biden administration - relations with Arab states are also souring with every day that the war is prolonged.
But this could in fact create a perverse incentive for Israel: if the reputational damage sustained is already very high, why not go all in?
Indeed there are already indications that Netanyahu may use the ongoing conflict and the associated political/reputational damage to deal with other strategic mess: primarily with Hizbullah.
Last week, Netanyahu’s national security adviser argued that the 80k evacuated Israelis would not be able to return to their lands if Hizbullah was to remain entrenched as a potent force in southern Lebanon.
Implication of this statement is quite clear: for Israelis to return, Hizbullah will need to be removed from southern Hizbullah, and given that they are not likely to do so out of their own volition, use of force becomes ever so likely.
(side note: and if after making this implicit threat, Israel does not use any force to push Hizbullah further north, then going forward, the credibility of all uttered statements by the Israeli national security adviser will weaken significantly)
And Netanyahu himself had already laid down a rhetorical groundwork for a potential escalation with Hizbullah:
"If Hezbollah decides to open an all-out war, then with its own hands it will turn Beirut and southern Lebanon, which are not far from here, into Gaza and Khan Yunis”.
Translation: it is not on us, we will only be responding.
But Hizbullah is of course nowhere near opening an all-out war against Israel - it has been deterred.
America’s two aircraft carriers, public and private threats by the Biden admin, and Israel’s own ferocity in Gaza (and in Lebanon - in early days of clashes where Hizbullah lost more than 60 fighters within few days of “low-intensity” fighting) have all been sufficient to deter Hizbullah.
Indeed, in his speech, and whilst emphasizing lack of foreknowledge and complicity in the October 7th attack, the Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah came up with an excuse for not going all out against Israel: that apparently, tying IDF forces up north (a full third according to Nasrallah) was enough to help Hamas.
And since then, there haven’t been any significant indicators/evidence of Hizbullah’s appetite growing suddenly.
Hizbullah is clearly not interested in an all-out full-scale war with Israel.
But from Netanyahu’s point of view, if Israel is already bruised reputationally, if in other words, Israel is already covered in mud, why not go all in and be done with it?
Why leave this conflict to another day? When Israel would need to wait for a new attack from Lebanon or launch preemptively and lose further political support?
(side note: this is especially so, since pulling off a ‘‘self-defense’’ argument will be harder to get away with politically, and so further obstacles from the UN security council/other international players will be tougher to overcome)
And in fact, there are potentially, some additional political benefits in launching a war against Hizbullah: changing the narrative and creating a new reality of Israel being surrounded by, and fighting multiple terrorist organizations from all sides.
Such a narrative of ‘‘breaking out of a siege’’ may distract from Gaza itself, and help soften the blow and political costs associated with the current operations in Khan Yunis.
Personal political incentives affecting state policy.
Adding to all of the above, the key players in Israeli governance and leadership structures share a set of personal political incentives that push them towards further militarism combined with lack of concern for the wider global reputation of Israel as a state.
Netanyahu wants to remain in power - this much is clear.
Ideally, he wants to recover enough to remain for the foreseeable future - a time period sufficient for him to entrench a new political narrative and leave a more positive legacy.
The devastating security breach happened on his watch following years of ‘‘Hamas vs Palestinian Authority” divide & conquer strategy.
As such, whatever the investigative commission/s find in the aftermath of the October 7th attacks, he will bear the ultimate political responsibility.
This is not a good legacy to leave, and it is becoming clear that Netanyahu is trying to overcorrect for his grave mistakes with over the top indiscriminate militarism in Gaza.
He is personally incentivized to do whatever it takes to be once again remembered for his ‘‘security credentials’’ - as someone who destroyed Hamas and avenged the deaths of killed Israeli civilians.
A leader who would not carry the burden of having to prove himself would be a better bet to lead Israel at this time - such a leader would likely be far more successful in prosecuting the war in a detached and rational manner: placing the interests of the state at the top of the hierarchy of needs.
Netanyahu is unfortunately saddled with too many personal political incentives to remain a sober pair of hands at a time that is crucial for the future strategic outcomes of Israel.
Add to this, he is surrounded by a far right cabinet with leaders like the openly segregationist finance minister Bezalel Smotrich, and the Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir.
Smotrich, Ben-Gvir and many other senior members of the cabinet have pursued and continue to pursue extremely inflammatory and divisive policies.
Most of these cabinet individuals openly call for further settlements in the West Bank, and provide an implicit (and sometimes explicit - by providing weapons) cover to those settlers that have killed many Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.
In fact, at least 273 Palestinian civilians have been killed by the Israeli settlers on the West Bank.
And these are reports confirmed by Israel’s own media and non-profit human rights organizations.
And yet, the cabinet continues to support such activities in blatant violation of Israel’s own laws (not to mention, international law).
The reality is that this far-right cabinet is thoroughly invested in perpetuating a cycle of violence and never-ending tensions.
And many members of this cabinet (including Netanyahu himself) may calculate that Trump is likely to return to power next year, and that both Trump and any other likely GOP winner like Nicky Haley will grant them a blank check to continue/proceed as they please.
In other words, given that the reputational damage on the global stage is already there, why not just hunker down, double down, and wait it out until a more favorable government returns to Washington?
Two issues with Israeli calculations: they are running out of time and major assumptions may prove to be outright wrong.
It is increasingly clear that Israel is running out of time - as discussed above, there is already an overwhelming global pressure in support of the ceasefire.
America was the only country blocking a UN security council resolution in support of a ceasefire..
And just this Tuesday, the General Assembly of the UN passed an overwhelming (albeit non-binding) resolution in support of an immediate ceasefire.
Crucially, most civilized/western and non global south countries had also voted in favor of a ceasefire.
One could of course argue that this doesn’t really matter in practical terms - that as long as Washington is behind Israel, there will be a block on any unfavorable UN security council resolution that could have otherwise been proven to be an obstacle.
But this would be a serious analytical error, since even if Israel doesn’t care, America does and must in fact care.
Washington is in a global superpower game: its concerns are of grand strategic magnitude: containing and (ideally) isolating China, and weakening hedging by the global south.
Hamas is just another terrorist organization that is nowhere near causing existential threat to Israel let alone to the US.
America is not willing to be dragged down into a diplomatic confrontation with the rest of the world.
Standing alone in the UN security council (when even allies like the UK abstain) is simply not a good look.
This is why when Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin complains of strategic errors and Biden complains of global isolation, there is an unspoken yet powerful implicit message: you are dragging us down.
For example: as America is focused on China, the two crucial states (and up and coming economic powerhouses) in the APEC region are Indonesia and Malaysia.
Together, they are home to hundreds of millions of Muslims.
Leaving basic ethics aside, pissing off the aforementioned nations with a blank check to Israel to continue with an indiscriminate massacre in Gaza is not a strategically prudent approach for Washington to take.
As such, it is only a matter of time before the Biden admin will (rightly) openly distinguish between support for Israel and support for Netanyahu.
In fact, the most recent comments from Biden (chastising Israel for its conduct, and isolating itself on a global stage) should be viewed as opening warning shots, and as an announcement of things yet to come.
And signals coming from Congress should be even more worrying to leaders in Israel: who would have thought that mere two months after October 7th attack, Israel would push itself to a corner where senior politicians in Washington complain about the State Department decision to sidestep Congressional oversight in approving the transfer of 14,000 tank shells worth roughly $106 million?
(Side note: and leaving aside the near term concerns, there is also an element of strategic gross negligence at play here as well. It is one thing not to care about the near-term global public opinion, but Netanyahu is risking a permanent bad reputation with a generation of young Americans - who are far more sympathetic to Palestinian needs and often conflate legitimate Palestinian demands for statehood with support to a terrorist Hamas. It is simply not strategically prudent to sour relations with an entire generation of Americans. Future governments will have a different electorate and may therefore become less receptive to Israel’s national security interests. Netanyahu is taking future public support in the US for granted and by doing so, endangers strategic interests of an entire generation of Israelis)
Future calculations may not pan out
Trump may not win, and even if he does, Israel should not forget his (and his son in law’s) warm ties with Saudis - a country which will always insist on a less heavy handed approach to Gaza as a precondition to normalization with Israel.
Indeed, Netanyahu (and his far-right supporters) must not forget that Trump is a pragmatist, and that if he sees the current Israeli government as a blocker to regional peace and ‘‘doing business’’, he will not shy away from withdrawing his support.
Israeli leaders must not forget that Trump only recently (and shamefully) called Hizbullah ‘‘smart’’.
And attacking Netanyahu is not something that Trump isn’t used to.
Likewise, and as the humanitarian conditions worsen, Arab states will lobby Washington to rein in Israel and impose concessions on the Israeli government.
Every day, millions of young Arabs in the Middle East witness with horror what is happening in Gaza - countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Jordan will be the most affected and pushed towards some action.
In addition, future financial reconstruction of Gaza (and Arab participation in this effort) will be increasingly interlinked with a demand that Israel should participate in a process towards a two-state solution.
This much has been made clear by senior Arab leaders - including by the UAE: a country that was one of the most eager backers of the Abraham accords of 2020.
Finally, not only could a number of assumptions backfire, but as time goes by, certain geopolitical realities in the Middle East may also shift.
Russia may grow more confident in its ability to prevail in Ukraine, and its relationship with Iran may grow stronger as the 2024 unfolds.
And closer relations with Iran may come with Tehran’s insistence that Russia ends its policy of turning off its Syria-based S-300 SAMs when Israeli aircraft decide to strike Iran-backed militia (who play a key role in a supply chain to Hizbullah).
Russia is not going to engage in an outright conflict with Israel, but it may demand a higher price for continuous access to Syrian air space.
In short, it is not a given that Israel will continue to enjoy a free rein over targets all across Syria.
(side note: this long-term threat to target acquisition may also end up being another incentive for Israel to go after Hizbullah now - before Russia-Iran relations grow even stronger)
Israel must stop this strategic harm.
Before it ends up digging itself an even bigger hole, and drags America down along on a trajectory towards diplomatic isolation and collapse of soft power.
Cruel, unusual, and collective punishments must end: no more strip searches, no more indiscriminate bombings with 2 thousand pound bombs dropped on Gaza.
In one week, Israel dropped almost as many bombs that the US did in a year in Afghanistan.
And it did so in one of the most densely populated areas on earth - where 50% of the population are children.
This has to stop - Israel must end indiscriminate bombing and only resort to precision air power: like the hellfire missiles launched from Apache helicopters or drones.
Door to door to campaigns against Hamas must continue and unfortunately, many IDF soldiers will die - this is the price of urban warfare.
Once IDF succeeds in a) eradicating all/most senior commanders and leadership of Hamas, and b) destroying all crucial infrastructure of Hamas, it must be willing to accept surrender of remaining Hamas fighters in return for release of all hostages and laying down arms.
Israel must also do more, and be seen doing more on a humanitarian front.
It is a very rich country, and it must offer generous humanitarian aid to the Palestinian civilians affected by this operation.
Once the immediate operation against Hamas is over, the more difficult questions around the political governance in both Gaza and the West Bank and reconstruction and humanitarian aid to civilians will come alive.
Until then, Israel must reverse its current trajectory and make sure when the ‘‘day after’’ political discussions commence, it still has a prominent say on a global stage.
Thanks for the great summary