Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines
Contingency measures against Russia’s two big threats: mass mobilization and use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The performance of the Russian army in Donbas will determine the Kremlin’s next steps.
As such, next couple of weeks, and the ongoing battles for Donbas, will be highly consequential.
There is now a popular rumor that Putin wants unquestionable and conspicuous evidence of military victory prior to the 9th of May WWII Victory parade in Moscow’s Red Square.
Putin wants to show clear military accomplishments in the war against the modern-day ‘‘nazis’’.
Naturally, this is an artificial timeline that doesn’t correspond with the realities of the battlefield - Russian logistics and operational prowess are nowhere near the sufficient levels to deliver such a victory.
And besides, if the new theater commander, Army-General Dvornikov was worth his salt, he would push back vigorously against such artificial constraints imposed only for short-term needs of feeding material for the political theatre in Russia.
Given the current configuration on the battlefield, it is really hard to see how Russians could accomplish anything meaningful in Donbas, in such a short time.
Yes Mariupol will most likely fall, and its strategic value is of course immense (allowing Russia to consolidate its forces in the south, and move onto north to trap JFO forces in a joint-pincer movement coming down from northeast. And there is also the crystallization of the land corridor with Crimea), but its symbolic value is highly questionable.
Takeover of Mariupol isn’t really significant enough for the grandiosity of a red square parade.
But even beyond this artificial constraint, there is an argument to be made that the Russian campaign in Donbas could very much stall unless there is a fundamental shift in the balance of powers.
If : 1) Russians continue to fight with the remnants of their initial 120 BTGs (battalion tactical groups) - many of which (and by some estimates, only 80-90 BTGs are fully combat ready, and that currently there are only 76 BTGs actively involved in combat in eastern Ukraine), are not well-equipped and suffer from a general issues of low morale; 2) Ukraine continues to recruit more volunteers, expands its territorial defense army, and 3) The US/NATO doubles down on its assistance with heavy weaponry and more rapid and elaborate battlefield intel assistance, one could argue that Russian advance could very well stall.
That would amount to a huge embarrassment for Putin.
Faced with this new reality, and with a dire economy (2022 GDP contraction predicted at a 12-20% range - according to various estimates), Putin may very well estimate that the highest costs have already been incurred, and so it wouldn’t be too costly and detrimental to do something drastic to change the course of the war.
Specifically, two threats are the most pressing and urgent to prepare for:
1) Russia’s general mobilization, and;
2) Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
The rationale for both
Both tactics would aim to achieve two simultaneous goals:
1) Inflict extreme military/psychological costs and thus generate a favorable balance of power on the battlefield, and;2) Demonstrate sheer capacity and will to take extreme military measures, and therefore encourage submission and acceptance of Russian demands as part of the compellence strategy.
Domestically, the Kremlin could sell either or both of these measures as the necessary evil of stopping NATO from defeating Russia.
Peskov has repeatedly outlined how Russia could resort to nuclear weapons if there was an ‘‘existential threat’’ to it.
And although no Kremlin statements must be taken at a face value, when analyzed holistically, they do make sense.
Of course under this scenario, the “existential threat” would be framed as originating from NATO itself - claiming that Ukraine exclusively and singularly poses an existential threat to Russia would, in addition to being highly embarrassing, be also extremely implausible - and thus a tougher sell domestically.
This is why the Kremlin propaganda team has already been laying down the rhetorical context for either of these measures - by framing the conflict as Russia vs the entirety of NATO arming and fighting through Ukraine.
Russia’s mass mobilization threat: potential impact and limitations.
Putin pouring all of Russia’s reserve resources into a general war could spell significant trouble for Ukraine.
With 76 BTGs (battalion tactical groups) Russia is already on the brink of taking over Mariupol and thus solidifying its land corridor with Crimea.
To be clear, after two months of fighting, hundreds of armored vehicles, tanks and aircrafts lost, thousands killed and up to 25-35k total casualties (killed, wounded, missing/captured/ deserted), and humiliating withdrawals from northern Ukraine and a failure to make any meaningful progress in the Northeast/Kharkiv and north of Crimea axis, this is not an achievement that Russia could be proud of.
It is however an indicator of the overall potential - even if 25-40k of the original 190k army is no longer available for combat/logistics, and Russia is already very close to solidify its land corridor grip, what happens if this force is tripled in size, and Russia continues to limit operations only in the Eastern/open ground territories of Ukraine - battlefields that favor Russia’s heavy firepower use?
To be sure, most of the new conscripts will not be professional soldiers capable of combat effectiveness.
And then there is the issue of weapons in reserve.
One could go with numbers outlined in IISS’s military balance or a wide range of other strategic think tank reports, but none of them are likely to paint an accurate picture.
(side note: the official White House/DoD/DIA has not released the latest estimates of Russia’s overall reserve capacities)
Crude numbers of tanks and artillery weapons are not going to be reliable guides to Russia’s overall combat prowess.
Most of the often cited 10k+ tanks in reserves are older models that are operationally deficient/inadequate - indeed, technically speaking, there are even hundreds of WWII era T-34s used only for military parades.
In addition, there are now indications that Russia may now be struggling to produce new heavy weapons in medium to long term - given that its primary tank production facility/Uralvagonzavod just ceased production of T-72 tanks due to shortage of necessary parts (as a result of the Western import bans).
So with a struggling economy and weapons production facilities, Russia may not come on top in the long-term either.
But what about the medium term? What if Russia doubles down, mobilizes its entire army and prosecutes the war with ruthlessness in the next 6-9 months?
In such a scenario, a manpower advantage of 4-5x and a mechanized armor/heavy artillery advantage of 3-4x may be sufficient to inflict significant pain on Ukraine, and invade entirety of Donbas - potentially even successfully taking over Kharkiv and most (if not all) of the territories east of the river Dnieper.
And if that happens, there are no guarantees that (riding the momentum) Putin may not try his luck again with invasion of Odessa and the entirety of the Black Sea coast - possibly even renewing the compellence strategy campaign against Kyiv itself.
Preparing Ukraine for a longer/larger scale war with Russia.
1) Ukraine’s staying power must be extended/advanced.
Ukraine must be equipped to meet the demands of a longer war with a mobilized Russian army.
If Putin is convinced of Ukraine’s longer staying power, a protracted war will become extremely unappealing.
So the first part is rather obvious: continue to arm and supply Ukraine and increase its ability to prosecute a longer war.
(side note: and allied countries like Germany that refuse to transfer heavy weapons to Ukraine, must be name & shamed by other NATO allies for their blatant failure to contribute appropriately)
There are some encouraging signs that the US/UK/Canada will lead the way with heavy gun supplies - but the scale & speed is still not on par with the challenges that Ukraine is facing in Donbas (and will face if Russia mobilizes further).
Howitzers, BM-30 Smerch MLRS systems, and other heavy artillery guns must be supplied in hundreds, not dozens.
Ukraine must also receive hundreds of tanks - Czech Republic’s T-72 tanks will most probably not survive beyond several weeks of heavy fighting.
To withstand a renewed and mobilized Russian army, Ukraine will need plenty of tanks - open ground battles demand it.
As Australia’s Major General Kathryn Toohey once said: ‘‘Tanks are like dinner jackets. You don’t need them very often, but when you do, nothing else will do’’.
2) Ukraine must prepare a fresh second army.
These preparations must happen in western Ukraine - which must be covered/protected with a de-facto no fly zone.
This de facto no fly zone could be accomplished without any overt declarations - but merely by creating new facts on the ground - an impenetrable wall of air defense covering the entirety of Western Ukraine.
NATO must create this reality: either by supplying dozens more S-300 SAMs, (already producing impressive results), or ideally, by supplying Patriot SAM batteries (operated either by NATO member state nationals as independent contractors signing on to work with the government in Kyiv, or by Ukrainian soldiers themselves - a complex system like Patriots will require an early start to train these officers - for them to be ready to take over in a matter of 3-4 months)
With airspace relatively safe, a new, completely fresh army must be formed.
This army must have the following characteristics:
a) It must have an overall characteristic of a large territorial defense force based on the Polish model - and trained specifically in urban combat, anti-siege tactics, and open-ground combined arms warfare/tactics;
b) The new army must contain smaller and agile special forces units tasked with supply chain (and other high value) sabotage, and trained to interoperate with international volunteers, and;
c) Soldiers must be trained to operate most advanced NATO heavy weapons: artillery, tanks, MLRS systems, different types of attack drones (for example, switchblade 600s - against heavy armor).
3) Ukraine must breach the Black Sea blockade.
Ukraine must destroy Russia’s remaining 12 surface combatant warships in the Black Sea.
The timing is especially opportune: for with Russia’s cruiser Moskva (and its advanced long-range air defense system) gone, the rest of the Black Sea fleet is now especially vulnerable to attacks.
Now that Ukraine successfully sunk Moskva with its domestically produced Neptune anti-ship missiles, the rest of the fleet has repositioned further into the Black Sea - out of Neptune’s range.
Ukraine will thus need to find some creative new ways.
Perhaps Iran-style explosive carrying speedboats that overwhelm the Russian warships (especially if attacked simultaneously by Bayraktar TB-2 drones).
Or smaller ships could carry loitering switchblade 600 drones (that would need to be supplied by the US) and launched when within range of the ships (up to 90+km).
None of these missiles are likely to cause huge devastation to the hull of these warships - but Russian warships carry their weapons above deck - a successful hit that causes rapidly spreading fire, could cripple if not sink these ships.
If this war is to continue for many more months, Ukraine will need its shipping and trade revived.
Destroying these warships is therefore vital to crush the economic blockade that Ukraine is currently facing in the Black Sea.
Tactical nuclear weapons use.
Russia’s nuclear weapons doctrine does not have a ‘‘no first use” policy, and clearly allows for the use of nuclear weapons under an ‘‘existential threat’’.
And as discussed above, Russian propagandists could very well frame the war as Russia vs entire NATO - concocting the very existential threat needed to justify the selection of this extreme option.
It is unlikely, though not wholly implausible that Russia would use such weapons.
The Kremlin would probably turn to tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort - and probably after declaration/mass mobilization needed for a lengthier war of attrition.
Naturally, this is not because Putin is some kind of a humanitarian - but because the use of nuclear weapons would lead to a definitive political isolation of Russia.
It is quite likely that the entire West would unite in imposing the most crippling economic sanctions - simultaneously implementing most widespread secondary sanctions worldwide.
Russia is a classical personalist autocracy - but not a regime ready to embrace the living standards of North Korea.
But never say never - Putin could resort to nuclear weapons if he sees no other effective solution to break the will of Ukraine.
In fact, another Russian doctrine, ‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’ proposes exactly that: infliction of such a disproportionate pain/injury (in this case, via nuclear weapons) that the adversary is simply compelled to de-escalate, and forced to accept Russia’s political terms.
And in the meantime, and before that threshold is ever reached, Russia will continue its ambiguous stance on the matter - making everyone guess just how far away that red line is.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s deliberately ambiguous “reassurance” that Moscow is “not currently considering a nuclear strike against Ukraine [emphasis added]”, serves precisely this purpose: the use of the word ‘‘currently’’ implies that the situation could always change in the future.
Before we go any further, it is important to note that:
1) Russia distinguishes tactical nuclear weapons from strategic ones, in the following way:
Tactical nuclear weapons are defined as those “designed to engage objects in the tactical depth of enemy deployment (up to 300 km) to accomplish a tactical mission.”
Strategic nuclear weapons are defined as those “designed to engage objects in geographically remote strategic regions (over 5500 km) to accomplish strategic missions” - method of delivery doesn’t matter here : whether they are land-based missiles, modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles, dropped via heavy bombers, or delivered via hypersonic missiles.
2) The use of tactical nuclear weapons within the context of a conventional war is a concept clearly established within Russia’s nuclear weapons doctrine - in other words, this would not be some astonishingly insane/irrational act of a madman.
On the contrary, Russia clearly sees use of tactical nuclear weapons as an acceptable tool of war - and if it didn’t, it wouldn’t have developed a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons in the several thousands - and most certainly wouldn’t have engaged in continuous efforts to modernize their deployment.
3) Putin is ruthless enough to kill tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands of innocent civilians - his disgraceful decision to honor the unit responsible for the Bucha massacres is in itself sufficient evidence of this.
Finally, it is also important to remember that (in a hope to compel Kyiv without actually resorting to a full-scale use) Russia could always start with a limited demonstration strike - for example, detonating a lower yield tactical nuclear weapon over relatively unpopulated plain fields of Ukraine.
Minimizing the risk of Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The US strategists are undoubtedly busy modeling Putin’s decision-making framework and generating a range of options for deterrence.
It is quite likely that the US is using AI tools (that were previously used to gauge/predict China’s potential military response) to play out a range of scenarios.
But no matter how much game theory modeling the RAND or DARPA team engages in, there is a dearth of available information - especially, when it comes to Putin’s actual perceptions (we cannot be confident of how information is filtered/presented to him).
Without having this perfect information, modeling becomes difficult - ergo, deterring Putin will be more of an art (that uses plenty of decision-making science).
Putin’s decision to comment on Russia’s Sarmat ICBM test, emphasizing the capacity for nuclear deterrence, and stressing that this test should ‘‘provide food for thought for those who, in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten" Russia, shows just how important it is for him to save face and maintain his public threat display prowess.
As such, most consequential US warnings/counter-threats are best delivered in private - reducing the necessity for Putin to escalate whilst trying to avoid a loss of face.
A sophisticated negotiator/diplomat like the CIA Director William Burns, could for example deliver the right mix of threats/incentive with a sufficient nuance to avoid an escalation.
But fundamentally, the message delivered must affect Putin’s calculus, and convince him that:
1) The costs of using tactical nuclear weapons will outweigh the benefits - that Russian economy will come under a full blockade, and the Kremlin will be totally choked financially (and with France coming onboard, an EU-wide ban on sale of Russian oil/gas is already higher in likelihood).
Putin must see that if he was to use nuclear weapons, his only option would be to become a Chinese vassal state - and even then, Beijing already proved its unreliability - after refusing to help in crucial ways (for examples, see how Beijing refused to provide necessary parts for Russia’s aviation industry to remain in an operational shape, or how Chinese state enterprises avoided Russian oil).
Surely, a permanently crippled and crushed Russia is not worth merely compelling Ukraine in an otherwise limited war?
2) The decision to use the nuclear weapons could itself backfire - creating bigger (than acceptable) risks to Russia itself.
For example, if Putin was warned that the US would provide reliable and speedy intel to Ukraine ahead of a nuclear attack (and this threat would be credible - Putin can already see that a) the US has spies high-up in Russia’s chain of command - successfully predicting and publicizing most of its major moves, and b) use of nuclear weapons would require more prep/and commander sign offs than a simple missile attack - providing extra time for US to gather the crucial intel), and that Kyiv would furthermore receive further tactical/military assistance, and necessary hardware (limited range S-300s would not work here. Something more sophisticated like THAAD/Arrow 3 would be needed to create this capability credibility) in spoiling this attack/shooting down the missiles/aircrafts carrying the warheads over Russia’s own territory, then that might just be enough of a risk to pause and rethink the wisdom of resorting to such an attack.
For these warnings to be credible, Ukraine must be supplied with/and trained on all of the sophisticated air defense/anti-aircraft hardware that is currently available to NATO.
The good news is that there is probably time to a) deliver and b) train Ukrainians on the use of such hardware.
Naturally, there are of course a range of other policy measures/strategies to affect Putin’s calculus.
But fundamentally, any tactic/strategy would have to convince Putin of the same basic beliefs: that a) costs would outweigh the benefits, and b) risk of use to Russia itself/backfire risk is unacceptably high - given the relatively lesser benefits of compelling a militarily less superior adversary to submit to Russia’s outrageous demands (this is not after all, an existential war for Russia - Putin could always simply temper his maximalist demands - especially if the costs of escalation would be untenably huge).
Convinced of these two beliefs, Putin may decide to avoid a nuclear option - and either a) seek continuous achievement of his goals in more conventional ways (for which Ukraine must of course be continuously prepared for and helped by NATO), or b) temper his expectations and settle for lesser political demands.
Achieving this outcome will require diplomatic finesse - in the meantime, and if/when asked about the potential US response if Russia was to use tactical nuclear weapons, President Biden must stop further comments that definitively rule out America’s military response.
Doing so would undermine the hard work of his strategists - ‘‘nothing is off the table’’ should be the standard ambiguous response to such public media inquiries.