Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - subscriber Q&As: "Why is Turkey Cozying up to Saudi Arabia?"
Saudi - Turkey Rapprochement.
When addressing ‘‘why is Turkey cozying up to Saudi Arabia”, (and subscribers have lately been emailing with a variation of this question) first off, we must dispel the notion that this is a one-sided initiative, and that Turkey is somehow significantly more interested in stronger mutual relations than Saudis (although, a slight variation in the urgency of desire certainly does exist - given that Saudi funds can indeed alleviate Turkey’s short term economic/currency problems - more on that later below).
In fact, both sides have a lot to gain from improved relations - and we shall look at these in turn.
Secondly, we must also unpack how exactly had these relations soured in the first place - this will enable us to see that the initial irritants are no longer there (and if not in absolute terms, then at least, not at the same level of intensity).
We can then look at how a range of geopolitical and economic factors make such a rapprochement attractive to both sides.
The root of the Saudi - Turkish conflict.
The ultimate reason for a decade-long period of Turkish - Saudi tensions was Turkey’s response to the uprisings of the Arab Spring.
Given its status as a major NATO power, its strong demographic heft, and its varied economy benefiting from advanced manufacturing and strong industrial sector, Turkey was always a natural regional leader in the Eastern Mediterranean.
And Erdogan was certainly going to use the opportunity in upended political orders of the hitherto authoritarian Arab states, to Turkey’s advantage.
Turkey decided to back political opposition groups that irked and irritated Saudis - the latter preferred old guards keeping a hold on various Muslim Brotherhood offshoots from Tunisia to Syria.
Erdogan’s notable success was in support of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - the party came into power and was removed only through a military coup in 2013 (by the current Egyptian President Al-Sisi)
It is important to note that even though Turkey was clearly also pursuing realpolitik goals of further regional influence and reach, Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, was a) still broadly popular with the general public and elected to power in democratic elections, and b) surprisingly, politically and religiously tolerant - significantly more tolerant than the authoritarian leaders that it proceeded - as well as those that had pushed them out thereafter.
But Turkey’s activism spread across the region, and Ankara and Riyadh found themselves on the opposite ends of a conflict in Libya - with Turkey supporting the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), and Saudis (alongside Russians) backing the Tobruk-based “Libyan National Army” militia led by Khalifa Haftar.
Turkey’s interventions in Syria and Iraq were further irritants to Saudis.
In return, Saudi decision to form a coalition and impose a blockade on Qatar was not received well in Ankara - Qatar being a long-standing ally of Turkey.
All of these irritants peaked into an open confrontation in October 2018, when Turkey publicized investigations into the brutal murder of the Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi - at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
But a lot has changed since then, regional realignment, Erdogan’s normalization of relations with the Egyptian leader, and acceptance of the fact that Muslim Brotherhood wave had broadly failed (removing a major irritant and a blocker for a rapprochement with Saudis), the war in Ukraine, uncertain long-term US policy in the Middle East, and Iran’s re-emergence have all altered the calculus for both sides - who both have now much more to gain from closer cooperation than remaining at a distance.
What Turkey wants to accomplish from rapprochement.
1) Cash infusion to prop up the Lira.
In near term, this is Turkey’s number one, most urgent goal.
Gulf states are a big help already: only two weeks ago, Erdogan secured a major win on his trip to the UAE: a pledge of up to $51bln in deals.
And as part of the signed deals, the UAE’s sovereign wealth fund, the ADQ, will purchase further $8.5bln of Turkish government bonds.
Saudis have already helped as well - with a $5bln support for the Turkish central bank in March of this year.
This is a major prop for the Turkish Lira.
Of course, even before all of these, there was also (and always) Qatar - the help of this Emirate stretches back many years (even before the recent additional support and investments).
Even back in 2020 (and before the Lira took a proper nosedive in 2021), Qatar had a $15bln currency swap agreement with Turkey.
It is important to emphasize the often missing point of all these investments - the signaling to the FX markets and foreign investors that is going, is arguably even more important in the medium term revival of Turkish currency crisis, than the actual cash itself.
When major sovereign wealth funds buy Turkish bonds, they signal trust for Turkey’s prudential macroeconomic management, and confidence that the freshly appointed Finance Minister, as well as the head of the Turkish Central Bank, will do what is necessary to prevent a further slide.
And with these moves, the Gulf States are naturally gaining powerful leverage over Turkey.
This should not be in the interests of the US - a major NATO ally should not be under undue influence of any other power - be that Russia, China, or rich Arab monarchies that frequently hedge their bets.
And this is precisely why these cables have repeatedly called for the FED extending currency swap lines with Turkey and acting as generously as needed (like what they did in relation to the ECB during the Eurozone crisis).
Not only would it extend America’s own influence, and weaken that of the Gulf states, but it would also be an opportunity for a genuine exchange of goodwill and a real, solid reset with Turkey.
2) Market for advanced and expensive weapons.
It is tough for a country to sell weapons that are both a) highly strategic in their impact/very advanced, and b) are quite expensive.
In terms of a Venn diagram overlap, such countries must simultaneously be rich and non-threatening enough for Turkey to sell weapons to.
And we are not talking about very impactful Bayraktar drones either - they are quite affordable.
But in addition to such ingenious low-cost tools (that can already lead to decisive battlefield outcomes: from Libya to Ukraine), Turkey produces advanced missiles, missile defense systems, MLRS assets, and in a few years, Turkey will even produce its own 5th stealth fighter jet - the T-FX.
Turkey will therefore soon join a very exclusive club of only three other countries that currently produce a 5th generation stealth fighter jet: the US, Russia, and China.
(side note: there is also the “Tempest” program - a joint production by the UK, Italy, and Japan to build a 6th gen fighter. But it appears to be at an earlier stage of development than the T-FX)
This and other advanced weapon systems by major Turkish defense manufacturers (like Aselsan and Roketsan), will need rich buyers that are not a threat.
Many of the potential rich (and at least non-threatening, if not allied) buyers are either already utilizing the American F-35s or are on track to do so.
But countries like Saudi Arabia do want to have a diversified supplier of advanced weapons, and if things go well between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, there is no immediate strategic friction of such a scale that would preclude Turkey’s willingness to sell such expensive and lucrative systems to Saudis.
After all, risk of a direct military confrontation between two countries is minimal and going forward, is likely to reduce even further.
Ultimately, whether or not Turkey would agree to sell such powerful weapons, will depend a lot on their assessment of likely conflict via proxy wars.
But as discussed, the risk of these has been minimized as well - and it is unclear what could realistically happen in the next 10-20 years that would place both countries at diametrically opposite ends of another major conflict.
And if anything, having Saudis rely on Turkey via weapons dependencies (those spare parts and maintenance levers) will reduce the probability of such outcomes in the first place.
3) Disrupt unfavorable alliances and prevent isolation.
Alarms were raised in Ankara when the UAE and Saudi pilots took part in joint air force training with those from Greece.
It is obvious why this is bad, but even beyond the most blatantly unfavorable strategic set ups, it is in Turkey’s interests that Saudis and Gulf states should not have a closer relationship with any other major Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean state than Turkey itself.
Case in point - Israel, which sooner or later will normalize its relations with Saudi Arabia.
And it would not be in Turkey’s interests for the Arab states to have a closer relationship with Israel than one enjoyed by Turkey.
In general, Turkey’s interests dictate strong bilateral relations with all major powers, while there being no major regional bloc that keeps Turkey on the outside.
A closer relationship with Saudi Arabia (and the consequent gain in additional leverage) will allow Turkey to prevent and disrupt such unfavorable coalitions.
4) Stay in the loop re Assad.
Related to the previous point, and now that Bashar Al-Assad has unfortunately been welcomed back into the Arab league, Turkey is extra cautious to not be left out from discussions on the Syrian leader’s rehabilitation.
Erdogan had tried to topple Assad a number of times, but now Turkey is quick send its Foreign Minister to hold talks with the Syrian regime.
Why? Because Turkey can see that 1) Like it or not, Assad is going to stay around for the foreseeable future, and 2) It is important to neutralize the risk of Syria being turned into a gulf monarchies’ tool of leverage over Turkey.
In fact, and as part of his rehabilitation with the Arab league, it is quite plausible that ability to remain a thorn in Turkey’s side will be one of Assad’s value propositions to other Arab monarchs.
(side note: as a parasite, Assad’s value proposition to other states is always to be less annoying. For example, a promise to rein in the captagon trade (a powerful amphetamine that is spreading like wildfire in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) was one of the main levers Assad used as a final push to expedite readmission into the Arab league)
Assad could therefore be selling himself as an effective on/off switch for headaches inflicted upon Turkey.
And Saudis would love to have access to this switch.
Consequently, a closer Turkey/Saudi relationship lowers the likelihood that Assad would be turned against Turkey and used as a deliberate nuisance whenever Saudis need to exercise some leverage over Ankara.
What Saudis stand to gain in return.
1) Weapons.
With Iran’s re-emergence and (largely misplaced) uncertainty around America’s commitment to the region (and to Saudi security), the Kingdom is interested in arming itself with highest-tech gear possible: everything and anything to secure its competitive military edge over Iran.
The US is of course an ideal source for such military hardware, but the reliability and consistency of supply are increasingly under question - especially now that many senior Congressional leaders want to punish Saudis for their OPEC+ oil cuts and cozying up to China.
As such, diversifying supplies and hedging their bets, is only the most natural and logical thing for Riyadh to do.
Turkish weapons aren’t only very high in quality, the also come with added benefits of expanding Saudi leverage (as a significant buyer with deep pockets) over Ankara.
2) Stay in the loop re Qatar and Israel.
This is the flip side of the Turkish concerns: Saudis are also wary that Turkey should not be too close with Qatar and Israel with Saudis remaining out of loop.
3) Multiply its diplomatic reach and influence - using Turkey as a lever.
Saudis are increasingly willing to partake in global diplomatic “prestige projects”.
Case in point: hosting Ukraine “peace summit”.
But Saudis understand the reality that with Ukraine specifically, as well as with other regional issues in general, having Turkey on your side is an effective tool to multiply your leverage and reach.
4) Recycle export revenue and invest into strategic high ROI projects.
Saudis have always recycled the US Dollars secured from sale of oil, by buying up American weapons and investing into American stock markets.
But for strategic reasons, it is increasingly important for Saudis to diversify their asset allocations.
Investing in the fast growing Turkish industry, real estate and companies (and Saudis are major investors in Turkish construction companies - with Aramco investing up to $50bln) is not only a good way to maximize ROI on their sovereign wealth fund, but also come as an added side bonus of creating stronger dependency (for Saudi funds) in Turkey.
Ultimately however, (and leaving aside the particular specific interests sought) a rapprochement and closer mutual relations is in the interests of both sides.
If the current trend continues, Iran is set to re-emergence as a powerful regional force.
And if Tehran unlocks (via sanctions relief) even a portion of locked away $billions in assets, then the power and reach of the Iranian regime is set to expand even further.
Under that scenario, both Ankara and Riyadh would benefit from a mutual cooperation to impose a check on this rising threat.