Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Ukraine vs Russia proxy wars expand in the background.

Proxy wars and coalitions intensify.

• When it comes to the Ukraine war, most of the attention is (justifiably) placed upon Ukraine’s (impressively, ever-expanding) incursion into the Kursk region.

• We have covered the strategic tactical and strategic objectives in the previous cables.

• And we will continue to evaluate the developments on that front.

• However, not all of the action is limited exclusively towards the main battlefront in Ukraine only.

• Both countries are fighting proxy wars in other regions as well.

• In fact, it was the death of 84 Wagner mercenaries in Mali in late July that caught a lot of global attention - serving as an important reminder that Ukrainian special forces are chasing Russian mercenaries all across the world.

• Just two days after the massacre, the spokesperson of Ukraine’s military intel service (HUR) Andriy Yusov, said that ethnic Tuareg rebels in Mali had “received necessary information, and not just information, which enabled a successful military operation against Russian war criminals” [emphasis added].

• But Mali and other West African states aren’t the only locations where Ukrainian special forces are pursuing Russian mercenaries (as well as the formal army/military intel officers of Russia).

• There are now at least three different theaters where Ukraine’s military intel agency HUR is pursuing Russia: West Africa, Sudan, and Syria.

• Today, we shall focus and unpack their involvement in the two primary regions where their involvement has the potential to produce the most outsized tactical and strategic outcomes: Syria and Sudan.

Proxy war in Syria.

• In June 2024 the Ukrainian main intelligence director at HUR released footage showing their special operators coordinating with Syrian opposition Rebels together they launched attacks on Russian forces inside Syria they hit Russian checkpoints ammunition storage Depots and Logistics convoys that were filled with supplies

• What’s more is that all of this is happening in the Golan Heights area.

• Since the start of 2024 Moscow's forces have been observed creating three new forward operating bases and 14 observation outposts on the Syrian controlled side of the Golan Heights on the border with Israel.

• In fact, it is the first time in recent history that Russian troops have set up only a few hundred feet away from the IDF positions.

• One question stands out immediately: why are Russian troops saturating the Golan heights?

• This is not an area that harbors ISIS terrorists (or other sunni groups) and/or units of anti-Assad Syrian opposition: the two challenges to the Syrian regime that Russia helps Assad defend against.

• No - the region is rife with Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned militia.

• One could speculate that Russian intel officers may be “advising’’ the aforementioned Iran-aligned groups in their missile attacks against Israel.

• Clear benefit to Russia would be the know-how and intel gathered from observing how Iranian ballistic/cruise missiles operate against Israeli air-defense systems like Arrow and Iron Dome.

• But even though Iran and Russia are now certainly very close, Moscow would still be crossing Israeli red lines with such a brazen involvement - Mossad would find out any Russian involvement pretty quickly.

• More likely (albeit still speculative) reason is that Russians are there to simply observe: merely learning how Israeli missile defense systems operate against missile barrages is already a highly valuable endeavor - especially since these systems may one day end in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s objectives in Syria.

• 1) Tactical: prevention of recruitment.

• This is the most near-term and measurable goal: to preclude Russia's recruitment efforts in Syria.

• Indeed, as of late 2022 the Syrian Observatory for human rights that observed that around 2k soldiers from Syria had been deployed to fight on behalf of Russia inside Ukraine so far.

• And this is just the number of soldiers identified by an NGO in 2022.

• The actual (and current) number is likely much higher.

• In this war of attrition, relative strengths in manpower will play a critical role - and at the moment, Ukraine is losing this race.

• Attacking Russian troops in Syria creates logistical difficulties for Russian recruitment efforts - it also sends a signal to potential recruits: they should think twice before joining a war against a country that is intense enough to pursue its adversary this far out.

• 2) Strategic: helping the west by driving weakening out Russia’s hand and precluding Iran-Russia alliance strengthening in Syria.

• This is primarily a favor to the US - reminding Washington that Ukraine is a great ally.

• Earning America’s goodwill is never a bad idea - especially when so much depends on the US help.

• (side note: and Russia getting weaker in Syria is not a phenomenon limited to the region only. Putin’s global reputation gets a hit. His word and his commitment to anti-US dictators all over the world is now undermined. Where is the guarantee that Russian help for Maduro in Venezuela will be adequate if Ukraine is pursuing Russian troops all over the world?)

• 3) Military.

• The fact that Ukraine’s anti-Russia campaigns also take place in Golan Heights suggest that there is something else that is going on here.

• To see why Ukraine may be targeting Russia in the Golan Heights region (as opposed to north-west/ areas controlled by pro-US Kurdish forces) we need to remind ourselves why Russia is there to begin with: If Russians will get valuable intel on air defenses that could be potentially deployed to Ukraine, then preventing Russians getting their hands on that very intel is clearly in Kyiv’s interests.

• (side note: there is also another strategic/goodwill argument with Israel - it is in Israel’s interests that no other country should maintain a strong presence in the section of Golan Heights that is not under a direct occupation of Israel. Ukraine attacking Russian troops fulfills this interest. Something that Kyiv will not tire of reminding Israelis when appealing for military aid and requesting Patriots/Arrow-3 air-defense systems.)

Proxy war in Sudan and West Africa.

• Earlier in February, Ukraine’s premier publication, The Kyiv Post, released a video suggesting Ukraine’s involvement in Sudan's civil war - expanding Ukraine's anti-Russia operations beyond Ukraine and Russia.

• The video depicts the interrogation of three blindfolded Russian soldiers belonging to the Wagner group.

• This interrogation takes place in Sudan, and there is an owl insignia on the interrogator’s arm - the mark of Ukraine’s military intelligence responsible for covert operations.

• And even before this video (where it is pretty clear that the intel officers wanted to be ‘‘caught’’ by the media), there were a number of reports/rumors of Ukraine’s involvement in Sudan in general - as well as their targeting of Wagner specifically.

• So what gives?

• Why is Ukraine using up its precious resources to engage in a global hunt, and chase Russians so far away from the battlefield?

• To see how fighting in Sudan affects the battlefield in Ukraine, and helps Kyiv to fight Russians closer to home, we shall unpack the main strategic interests served by the pursuit of this policy.

• But before that, a quick backgrounder on the Sudan civil war.

Proximate causes for Sudan’s civil war.