Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Reader Question: Criteria to evaluate Ukraine's success in the upcoming counteroffensive.

*note: A lot of readers send emails asking about certain geopolitical issues: when the questions are too specific/esoteric (for the wider audience), I respond directly. When they are pressing questions highly relevant to the current issues of the day, I may decide to post a response to them in public (with reader’s consent). We now have several Q&As worth publishing to all the cables readers. Here is one.

Reader Question #1: “How should we evaluate Ukraine’s counterattack? Against which metrics? How do we know if they succeed or fail?”

• This is a very important question, especially in the light of the following facts:

• 1) Ukraine’s previous counteroffensive (late last summer/early fall) beat all expectations and recovered a significant chunk of territory (recovering 727 square miles of territory, or 54% of the land captured by Russia since the new February 2022 invasion) - especially around Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts (regions).

• Consequently, the latest data point for comparison is one where Ukraine has accomplished way more than anyone was expecting - clearly, this is not a favorable starting point for Kyiv.

• 2) Months of media focus on Russia’s inadequacies has created a background scene where Ukraine is simply expected to walk all over the tired, broken and undersupplied Russian forces - this is of course an entirely wrong picture.

• Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and has solidified its defensive positions - establishing layered defenses full of minefields and other tactics to slow down Ukraine’s heavy armor.

• 3) Ukraine has received significantly more military and financial aid since last fall - with new tanks and more than 98% of armored vehicles promised by NATO already delivered.

• 4) Kyiv has also survived major attacks against its infrastructure and power grid.

• Having said all this, Ukraine is also launching this counteroffensive without a) modern air power; b) with air defense systems running out of crucial supplies, and c) with original attack plans revealed to Russia through Pentagon leaks - necessitating either last minute adjustments or a dangerous bluff of sticking to the same targets.

• In other words, a lot (largely unfairly) is expected from Ukraine, and very little from Russia.

• As it stands therefore, any major deviation from the scale and impact of the previous success (last fall) may be evaluated as a failure by the media and western public (and perhaps even by the US / NATO policymakers as well).

• With that said, there clearly needs to be some criteria to judge Ukraine against.

• This criteria has to be fair, and should not be construed too narrowly: it must be both analytically sound (taking into account all relevant factors, and allowing for a wider range of outcomes to be considered as progress), and helpful to Ukraine’s propaganda - perceptions matter, and the West must err on the side of generosity (without straining all credulity and appearing delusional).

• The following list is not exhaustive, but takes into account strategic, political, tactical, and operational factors when evaluating Ukraine’s progress: