*note: A lot of readers send emails asking about certain geopolitical issues: when the questions are too specific/esoteric (for the wider audience), I respond directly. When they are pressing questions highly relevant to the current issues of the day, I may decide to post a response to them in public (with reader’s consent). We now have several Q&As worth publishing to all the cables readers. Here is one.
Reader Question #1: “How should we evaluate Ukraine’s counterattack? Against which metrics? How do we know if they succeed or fail?”
This is a very important question, especially in the light of the following facts:
1) Ukraine’s previous counteroffensive (late last summer/early fall) beat all expectations and recovered a significant chunk of territory (recovering 727 square miles of territory, or 54% of the land captured by Russia since the new February 2022 invasion) - especially around Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts (regions).
Consequently, the latest data point for comparison is one where Ukraine has accomplished way more than anyone was expecting - clearly, this is not a favorable starting point for Kyiv.
2) Months of media focus on Russia’s inadequacies has created a background scene where Ukraine is simply expected to walk all over the tired, broken and undersupplied Russian forces - this is of course an entirely wrong picture.
Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and has solidified its defensive positions - establishing layered defenses full of minefields and other tactics to slow down Ukraine’s heavy armor.
3) Ukraine has received significantly more military and financial aid since last fall - with new tanks and more than 98% of armored vehicles promised by NATO already delivered.
4) Kyiv has also survived major attacks against its infrastructure and power grid.
Having said all this, Ukraine is also launching this counteroffensive without a) modern air power; b) with air defense systems running out of crucial supplies, and c) with original attack plans revealed to Russia through Pentagon leaks - necessitating either last minute adjustments or a dangerous bluff of sticking to the same targets.
In other words, a lot (largely unfairly) is expected from Ukraine, and very little from Russia.
As it stands therefore, any major deviation from the scale and impact of the previous success (last fall) may be evaluated as a failure by the media and western public (and perhaps even by the US / NATO policymakers as well).
With that said, there clearly needs to be some criteria to judge Ukraine against.
This criteria has to be fair, and should not be construed too narrowly: it must be both analytically sound (taking into account all relevant factors, and allowing for a wider range of outcomes to be considered as progress), and helpful to Ukraine’s propaganda - perceptions matter, and the West must err on the side of generosity (without straining all credulity and appearing delusional).
The following list is not exhaustive, but takes into account strategic, political, tactical, and operational factors when evaluating Ukraine’s progress:
