Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines

Amidst the ongoing Ukraine standoff, China and Russia join forces for a one-two punch on Iran

• At the time of a heightened military crisis in Europe, when war in Ukraine looks increasingly imminent, both Russia and China boosted their support for Iran in the Vienna talks.

• To strengthen Iran’s hand in the nuclear deal talks, China attacked the ‘‘unilateral’’ US sanctions on Iran.

• Of course, left unsaid was how impatience with Iran’s untenable and ridiculous negotiating stance was becoming rather multilateral - with all European allies calling out Iran for deliberately stalling and wasting time in order to achieve its ultimate political objectives.

• But boosting Iran’s corner, and not truth-seeking, was Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s ultimate goal.

• Indeed, his statements were delivered during a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, and at the official launch of China/Iran 25-year cooperation agreement on trade and investment - which would generate approximately $400bn of economic value over its full term.

• And just a couple of days later, China gave up on all pretenses and officially admitted to importing Iranian oil in spite of the US sanctions.

• The Chinese Customs agency recorded imports of 1.9 million barrels of Iranian oil just last December.

• Message to Iran is clear: don’t worry about sanctions, proceed with even more brazen negotiations.

• Supplanting Chinese efforts, the Kremlin decided to organize a meeting of Russian and Iranian leaders - inviting President Raisi to Moscow.

• Putin’s calculation is rather simple: if you are involved in a showdown in Europe, would you not want Iran to keep resisting the deal, and thus create a simultaneous crisis for the US to deal with?

• A distracted and overstretched US is a more desirable opponent for Putin to deal with.

• Given this context, and the probable escalation on the Ukrainian border sometime in February after the Beijing Winter Olympics, (and Blinken’s confirmation that a decisive moment in nuclear talks will be reached within weeks - so overlapping with Potential Russian invasion) what was Putin really going to say to the Iranian president?

• Was Putin going to encourage Raisi to negotiate in good faith, and to try to come to a genuine accommodation with Washington?

• In fact, the very opposite is far more likely: Putin urging the Iranians to show maximum resistance to the deal - sticking to their current strategy of stalling the process and continuously enriching Uranium.

• It is also likely that Putin offered some in-person reassurances to the Iranian president.

• There were probably some promises around further supply of defensive weapons - given that the two leaders discussed “strategic cooperation” on economic, defense and space activities.

• And even if Putin wasn’t planning to volunteer such help preemptively, the Iranian president was likely to push for these in any case: adding to sophisticated capabilities in defense of its air space is going to be a crucial issue for Iran.

• And there is of course a recent precedent for this tit-for-tat.

• Back in June 2021, Putin offered the new Iranian administration sophisticated Kanopus-V satellites (which would really add to Iran’s intel capabilities around its key nuclear sites, and additionally equip them with tools for better overall battlefield control) in return for continuation of a tough negotiating style.

• (side note: Putin later denied provisioning these. But as the general rule goes: believe whatever is denied by the Kremlin.)

• The message back then was the same that Putin likely delivered now: keep on resisting and remaining a headache for the US, and we will help you with your defense needs.

• And to demonstrate his seriousness, the Russian Navy sent its ships for joint naval drills with Iran (and of course, another spoiler, China) near Iran’s Chabahar port, in the Gulf of Iran.

• How exactly are these naval exercises going to encourage Iran to agree to resolve things diplomatically?

• Rhetorical of course: they are meant to do quite the opposite.

• Having said all that, there is another side to this issue: Putin is also showing his cards to the US.

• He is displaying his power and influence over the Iranian president - and therefore, his power and influence over the Vienna talks.

• (side note: and Iranian President’s praise for the Moscow meeting, describing it as a “turning point” in bilateral ties with Russia, further adds to the credibility of Putin’s leverage)

• And if say, the inevitable US sanctions (over the invasion of Ukraine) end up biting hard, and cause more damage than expected, Putin can then pull this card and offer to influence Iran (to come to terms with the US) - in return for a promise to not escalate and impose further sanctions.

• Naturally, these would be mere theatrics - Putin doesn’t really have all that leverage over Iran (at least not to the extent pretended).

• The Iranian president is also playing the same game, and just like how the Kremlin gains from the perception of influence over Tehran, Iran in turn, also benefits from a show of closeness and affinity with Russia.

• Let’s hope then, that the Biden admin (desperately trying to close the deal and avoid another military escalation) also sees it for what it is: a ruse.

• In the meantime however, the US should counter these ploys from Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran, by demonstrating bandwidth and will to:

• 1) Deter and if necessary engage in war with Iran, and;

• 2) Engage in strategic diplomacy in the Middle East, showing ability to shape and solidify new alliances - isolating Iran.

• (side note: and what’s not going to help, are US diplomats’ statements expressing hope that Iran merely slows down its nuclear program - allowing for further negotiations in Vienna. How Iranians interpret this: it is ok for you to keep enriching Uranium at levels prohibited by the original JCPOA, and violating IAEA inspection standards - but can you please do it just a little slower? And yes, your estimation is correct. We are clearly not at the point of attacking you / you are not facing serious implications for escalation. We just want you to slow down, that’s all)

• 1) Demonstrate more credible deterrence and willingness to escalate.

• Here, the US should make use of the Israeli PM Bennett’s statement that the JCPOA will not limit Israeli options on Iran - that regardless whether a new nuclear deal is reached between the US, the E3 and Iran, Tel-Aviv reserves a right for itself to use military force in order to prevent Iranian nuclear programs from any further advancement.

• Some strategists have argued that this would reduce Iran’s incentives to agree to a deal that Israel would not ultimately respect.

• But that’s wrong: Iran already suspects that Israel will retain its full autonomy on the nuclear deal, and on any next steps that it deems necessary.

• In fact, for Iran, a good nuclear deal is the only way to (at least indirectly) secure America’s pressure on Israel to refrain from air strikes.

• The US should therefore use this lever to its full effect - emphasizing that Israel is indeed fully autonomous and not bound by the JCPOA - that Iran agreeing to a genuinely solid deal is the only way to reduce the likelihood of Israeli air strikes.

• But mere diplomatic support to Israel will not suffice - credibility is needed to add weight to American warnings.

• The US should therefore take steps that a country ready to deploy and use military forces would take.

• It must make it clear that Iran’s Best Alternative To the Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is a military response - instead of a free pass to escalate further and do whatever it wants.

• Specifically, and to create this perception, the US should supply Israel with every tool that it needs to carry out potential air strikes with more efficacy: from the KC-46 fuel tankers (to support air refueling of Israeli fighter jets), to sending America’s own F35 fleet to prop up the Israeli air force.

• Moreover, American naval presence in the Gulf of Oman and the strait of Hormuz must increase significantly.

• This is not only useful as a forward projection of military force, but additionally, essential to reassure regional allies located closest to Iran.

• Should things escalate, the Gulf Arab states will be particularly worried about potential Iranian retaliation.

• And the attack on Abu-Dhabi by the Iranian proxy Houthi forces, gave a taste of what is about to come.

• To feel reassured therefore, the gulf state allies must see and feel America’s leadership and protection in the region (especially at the time of increased courting from Beijing).

• 2) Demonstrate interest and ability in shaping regional alliances

• Here, the US should accelerate the Turkey/Israeli rapprochement that would further isolate Iran.

• Iran already had a political conflict with Turkey back in October: when Turkey and Azerbaijan held joined military drills in response to Iranian military