Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Ukraine hunts Russian mercenaries in Sudan: tactical and strategic gains sought by Kyiv.

Ukraine follows Russia into Africa.

• Earlier in February, Ukraine’s premier publication, The Kyiv Post, released a video suggesting Ukraine’s involvement in Sudan's civil war - expanding Ukraine's anti-Russia operations beyond Ukraine and Russia.

• The video depicts the interrogation of three blindfolded Russian soldiers belonging to the Wagner group.

• This interrogation takes place in Sudan, and there is an owl insignia on the interrogator’s arm - the mark of Ukraine’s military intelligence responsible for covert operations.

• And even before this video (where it is pretty clear that the intel officers wanted to be ‘‘caught’’ by the media), there were a number of reports/rumors of Ukraine’s involvement in Sudan in general - as well as their targeting of Wagner specifically.

• So what gives?

• Why is Ukraine using up its precious resources to engage in a global hunt, and chase Russians so far away from the battlefield?

• Can they really afford this?

• These are the most recently aired criticisms of Ukraine’s global strategy to actively chase and interfere with Russia’s strategic interests.

• But these critics are wrong.

• And what may at a first glance seem like an unaffordable adventurism, is actually a very prudent and practical strategy to weaken Russia everywhere all at once.

• To see how fighting in Sudan affects the battlefield in Ukraine, and helps Kyiv to fight Russians closer to home, we shall unpack the main strategic interests served by the pursuit of this policy.

• But before that, a quick backgrounder on the Sudan civil war.

Proximate causes for Sudan’s civil war.

• We shall first unpack the proximate causes for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighting each other in a civil war.

• Essentially, and without delving too far into the history of the previous Omar al-Bashir regime (overthrown by general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF) in 2019 - following large-scale public protests against the regime), there are two proximate root causes for the current conflict:

• 1) Faulty architecture underpinning the process of empowering a transitional civilian government , and 2) Misguided security reforms that have produced perverse incentives.

• 1) Inadequate agreement for a transitional government.

• The post-Bashir transitional constitution called for the elections to take place in 2022.

• However, until that happened, the military/SAF (led by Burhan) was allowed to run the country for the first part of the transition.

• The following was the comment made by Sara Abdelgalil in 2019, (back then, a spokesperson for the Sudanese Professionals Association - one of the pivotal forces in organizing protests to oust the al-Bashir regime):

• “Omar al-Bashir is not there, but the regime itself is still there. Objective one has not been achieved. Objective two has not been achieved, which is a civilian government.”

• The transitional constitution of 2019 set out provisions that would allow the military to lead the government for the first 21 months, followed by a civilian rule for the next 18 months.

• But crucially, no major incentives were set to ensure that this would be followed through.

• Burhan faced no significant repercussions for a future failure to comply with this provision: no automatic sanctions, blacklisting, or any other major strategic costs for reneging on this commitment were put in place.

• As such, was it really that surprising that Burhan decided to stay in power instead? (in effect, pushing out the interim civilian PM Abdalla Hamdok - who technically resigned)

• 2) Security reforms and the new “Framework” for civilian rule.

• The aim of the 2021 security sector reform was to unify the SAF and RSF into a single army - an understandable goal if Sudan was ever to return to a full civilian rule.

• The state must have a monopoly on power: that is a given for any stable political order.

• Having said this, insufficient incentives (and disincentives) were offered to the relevant parties to make this happen.

• There were no major penalties for a failure to come to an agreement.

• Secondly, the balance of power was not too lopsided: although the SAF has access to more modern weapons and has an actual air force under its command, the numerical disparity was not enormous: it is difficult to accurately estimate each force’s size, but the SAF has around 100k soldiers to RSF’s approximately 30-50k.

• But even this is not enough context: RSF’s Hemedti has access to large reserves and can mobilize tribal allies.

• In addition, the RSF leader has access to gold mines (once again, with Russia’s Wagner also involved) - a fact that makes Hemedti exceptionally rich (and thus able to fund and sustain combat operations - at least long enough for an external aid to arrive).

• Given all this, and since Hemedti had a lot to lose, quite understandably (and crucially, predictably) he wasn’t too keen in giving up all this power and accepting a much demoted role within the formal power structures of Sudan.

• For that to happen, he would have needed a much stronger disincentive: unpalatable implications of a failure to agree to much-reduced power and autonomy.

• Add to that, a deal on a gradual transfer of power to a civilian government known as the “Framework agreement” (with a missed deadline on April 11) incentivized both sides to seek additional power to secure more leverage - in order to insist on better terms.

• Without clear, and specific obligations laid out for each side, both the SAF and RSF were bound to insist on advancing their own interests.

• And Hemedti simply did not face enough pressure to comply - his best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) was simply not undesirable enough.

• The outbreak of violence was therefore not at all surprising: in fact, and given the faulty bases of this deal/framework, avoiding this eventual conflict would have been the real surprise.

What Ukraine stands to gain from its involvement in Sudan.