Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Responding to the deadly Iran-backed militia attacks: Biden's options for retaliation.

Iran-backed militia attacks enter a new stage.

• The January 28 terrorist drone strike against the US military post at tower 22 in northeastern Jordan (not too far from Al Tanf garrison in southeastern Syria) has resulted in the death of three American servicemen.

• Dozens more were wounded.

• Tower 22 is a small outpost close to the border with Syria - it houses Air Force and Army personnel.

• Since October 17 2023, various Iran-backed militias have attacked US troops across the middle east at least 158 times.

• But since October 2023, this has been the first attack that has resulted in the death of American soldiers.

• It is also the first known time that US soldiers were killed in Jordan.

• The organization that has taken responsibility for this attack - the Kataeb Hizbollah (part of the umbrella group, Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)) - is known to be funded by the Iranian regime.

• The extent to which this group is controlled directly by the IRGC is however unclear.

• And this is mostly by design - a loose and decentralized network is advantageous for plausible deniability: the leadership in Tehran can pick and choose which particular attacks to back - while disavowing those that could lead to strategically undesirable outcomes.

• In other words, not only is it easier to manage such a network, but Iran can choose to share the upsides and distance itself from the downsides.

• Naturally, this doesn’t mean that the US must play with these rules - on the contrary, it must insist on punishing the regime for the all downstream outcomes associated with the activity of these militias.

• But that is the general state of affairs - what about this particular attack?

• Thus far, there is no credible (available) information that would prove (or even suggest) Iran’s direct complicity in this attack.

• These cables have generally advocated in favor of a tougher stance against Iran - frequently pointing out the desirability of preemptive and general air/missile campaign strikes against core Iranian military targets, logistical nodes, military-industrial production sites, and nuclear research and uranium enrichment facilities (that are on course to be buried so deep as to be out of reach of the US bunker-busting bombs).

• And on this occasion too, it is important to focus on a strong response to this attack and make it truly costly to Iran itself.

• But strategic choices should not cloud clear analytical thinking: not only is there (thus far) no persuasive evidence of Iran’s direct involvement, the overall context in the region, Iran’s general desire to avoid war with the US, and Tehran’s decision to quickly distance itself after this attack, would all point towards the probability that this was an act taken independently by the IRI militia.

• Indeed, it is not a small achievement of US deterrence that Iran was so quick to distance itself from this attack: and to do so so openly.

• Iran was quick to declare having ‘‘no connections to these attacks’’ and maintaining that the clashes were “between the US army and resistance groups in the region, who reciprocally confront each other’’.

• Not only did Iran deny responsibility and connection in the most explicit way possible, but the dispassionate manner in which the “US vs militia” clashes were described was also very revealing.

• Note the absence of any normative language - the language used is so deliberately detached, that it even creates an impression that Iran is not taking sides here.

• In fact, the only word used here that reveals Iran’s ultimate preferences is the label of ‘‘resistance groups’’ - implying a state of injustice and an occupier to resist.

• Iran was one word away from sounding like a totally detached Swedish think-tank…

• And this comes at a cost - Iran is harming its reputation and prestige with militias that look up to their IRGC ‘‘advisers’’.

• By leaving this militia out in the cold, Iran is damaging its reputation for reliability.

• We have frequently criticized this administration’s rather soft and overly patient (to put it mildly) policy towards Iran.

• But it is clear that US deterrence is still in place - Iran is signaling (in no uncertain terms) a strong desire to avoid a direct retaliation from the US.

• (side note: which they expect, having raised their air defense alerts.)

Initial US response and Biden’s strategic options.

• Biden’s first reaction was suboptimal to say the least..

• Promising to respond to the attacks “at a time and in a manner of our choosing”, he reiterated his desire to avoid the war - something also emphasized by the NSC spokesperson John Kirby

• This was an unnecessary addition: since it very clearly limits the scope of US response, and weakens deterrence across the region.

• Ostensibly, the goal is to prevent a vicious cycle of escalation by providing explicit assurances to Iran that the ultimate intent is not to go to war - idea being that this would then decrease the likelihood of Iran lashing out and over-escalating in response.

• The implicit message is this: if you take this hit and absorb it without retaliating any further, then there will be no war.

• But: 1) this is redundant - it can be implied by the manner of attacks - while keeping adversaries on edge and worried, 2) at the very least, it can be relayed through private channels to few key officials in Iran - precluding a public display of pacifism in front of Iranian proxies in the region.

• And avoiding the latter is crucial: if proxies/militias are convinced that there will be no ultimate price to pay, and that there would instead be ad hoc/limited retaliations, then their incentive to not cross the line weakens further..

• Let’s not forget that the awesomeness of the US military power is a strong deterrent in itself - no need to dilute the impact of this deterrent by adopting an unnecessarily conciliatory tone, and constantly signaling disinterest in war.

Biden’s options for retaliation.