Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - Niger coup: fallout, national interests, and US policy options.

Niger’s coup matters more

• More than the previous West African coups.

• This is because 1) ECOWAS has threatened military action, and its (and mainly Nigeria’s) credibility is on the line, 2) Niger now has backing of two other neighboring and coup-flipped African states (Burkina Faso and Mali), and 3) Wider, and even global implications are much more significant this time around: jihadism is on the rise, another huge refugee crisis may take place, and outside interests (like Russia/Wagner) are involved - and this is happening at the time of an ongoing, and largest scale post-WWII European war.

• There are of course unique proximate reasons for this coup: we don’t know the precise temptations and balance of incentives/disincentives that were facing the coup leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani when deciding to remove Niger’s democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum.

• As a facade for legitimacy, Tchiani claims that he will do a better job at defending Niger from jihadist insurgents.

• But, on a personal level, and as an agent conducting this coup, Tchinai was as motivated by personal incentives - as any other coup leaders before him.

• However, and regardless of precise motivations, the opportunity was there for him to take.

• As such, on a grander level, the root cause of this coup is all too familiar: weak state institutions, and a tenuous civilian grip on the power structures.

• Now, President Bazoum has done a decent job at governing the country since coming to power in 2021: economy has improved, modernized special units were formed to fight jihadists (with US investment and training), and Bazoum did a pretty good job at brokering ceasefire between rival power factions.

• But, (and this is a good reminder for the policymakers in the US) the first order of business is to secure the resilience and security of a democratic government.

• The US invested approximately $500mln into campaigns against Jihadists, and into training new units from Niger.

• But, clearly, the formation of units in charge of protecting the democratically elected President and securing his rule was not a priority…

• And nor did it matter that many of the establishment generals were closely mentored in the US.

• In fact, one of the coup leaders was Brigadier General Moussa Barmou - an officer (apparently, one who was extremely popular with the US officials) who had attended the National Defense University in Washington and has dined with American officers at his home

• (side note: just like Putin is investing heavily into strengthening a National Guard personally loyal to him/in charge of protecting the Kremlin, other democratic African states (and their Western backers) must take a page from this playbook - first order of business is to coup-proof a civilian government)

• Now then, situation is tense and the union of West African states - ECOWAS (led by Nigeria) had previously issued an ultimatum with a threat of direct military intervention and use of force to restore democratic government if the coup leaders didn’t backtrack and the coup itself was not reversed by last Sunday.

• That deadline has passed, and the coup leaders have not only refused to restore previous constitutional order, but have in fact announced their intent to resist any external military intervention.

• Add to that, Mali and Burkina Faso have declared that they would see any use of force by ECOWAS as an attack on themselves as well.

• (side note: and this is rational - for if ECOWAS was to succeed in Niger, appetites for a region-wide restoration of legitimate political order would surely grow, and Mali/Burkina Faso could end up being next on the list)

• Although the deadline has passed, ECOWAS is yet to make a move - their credibility is now on the line.

• The union will meet on Thursday to discuss the next steps - but they are clearly biding for time.

• The reality is that none of the ECOWAS states are in position to invade Niger.

• There is a huge capability-rhetoric mismatch.

• Nigeria itself can barely contain its own jihadist insurgency - Boko Haram.

• As an invading force, the country would need to expend significant resources to maintain any offensive advantage.

• In addition, there have not been any significant reallocation/movement of forces within Nigeria.

• There are no satellite images/open source intel (OSINT) indicating that Nigeria or any other ECOWAS state has taken any serious steps to fulfill their threats.

• And leaders in Niger are of course aware of these lack of ‘‘honest signal’’ indicators too - hence why it was easy for them to call this bluff.

• Regional and global interests and implications.