Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines

*note: cables will be off for the 4th of July, and will resume as per usual next Thursday. Happy Independence Day!

NATO’s rebirth. Part I: Europe and Russia.

• NATO had its work cut out for it at the Madrid summit: as an organization, they had to announce stronger measures and commitments than the immediately preceding G7 summit (that promised to back Ukraine for “however long it takes”. And this happened within the context of Russia’s irrational strikes against a civilian shopping mall - which gained nothing other than a show of resolve from the general public to continue the war).

• In addition, there were challenges around forward presence and security of the Baltics (recall Estonian PM’s public, untimely and self-defeating hysterics that Russia could wipe out her country with ease), and intrigue around Turkey potentially blocking Sweden and Finland from joining the organization.

• But NATO handled all of these challenges and more - the organization is no longer experiencing ‘‘brain death” (per the French President Macron) - and neither can it be called ‘‘obsolete” (Trump).

• (side note: and credit to the Biden administration for demonstrating leadership and setting the right tone for the entire conference. The US a) designated 70 entities and 29 individuals, including targets linked to State Corporation “Rostec” — which the Treasury says will “strike at the heart of Russia’s ability to develop and deploy weapons” ; b) Declared an increase in the number of destroyers based in Rota, Spain - from four to six and deploying two more squadrons of F-35 fighter jets to Britain. The US will furthermore deploy an additional rotational team of 5,000 ground troops to Romania - same in the Baltic states (although precise number is not yet available); c) Announced the establishment of a new permanent military base in Poland - this then prompted the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister comment that the move was a “clear signal to Moscow”; d) There will probably be a further announcement confirming the transfer of NASAMS air defense system to Ukraine. These advanced weapons currently guard high-value areas of NATO states (including DC itself). There are rumors that Ukrainian soldiers have started the training on this system.) 

• In future cables, we shall look at how South Korea and Japan’s attendance signals a shift and an implication of a new role for the organization in the Pacific (we will also take a closer look at the published “Strategic Concept”).

• But for now, let’s unpack how the organization has evolved and adapted to Russia’s threat in Europe.

• 1. Forward presence and change in nature and purpose of NATO’s joint forces.

• Estonian PM’s hysterics had paid off (although a similar outcome could have been achieved without public displays of weakness), and NATO will establish a stronger forward presence closer to the Russian border.

• Secretary-General Stoltenberg promised that NATO’s deployments would be geographically targeted and close to Russia - “shifting the focus from deterring any invasion to a full defence of allied territory”.

• (side note: in addition, the UK pledged forward presence in Estonia specifically - following the example set by the US).

• The number of high-readiness forces will increase by more than 7x: from 40,000 to 300,000 troops.

• But the shift is no longer reflective of the size of NATO presence only - the purpose and role of these troops have also changed.

• If previously, NATO forces were acting as a “tripwire force” serving the purpose of deterrence, (i.e the threat that attacking NATO troops would lead to an organization-wide response), now their presence is to actually defend and fight back.

• In other words, the often-cited scenario that Russia could (relatively quickly and with minimum bloodshed) capture any one of the Baltic states (like Estonia) and impose the burden of counter-attack on NATO, is now much less likely.

• Such quick victories are simply not going to be possible against NATO’s 300k troops.

• (side note: the key of course is to deploy them in true proximity to Russia and protect the Baltics and Finland/Sweden)

• This is a monumental historic shift of NATO’s role: from deterrence to defense.

• 2. NATO members adopt a more comprehensive Geopolitical look.

• Hitherto passive and rosy-eyed NATO members are now taking on a tougher muscular approach - adopting a realpolitik lens to analyze European security holistically.

• Germany finally caught up with Boris Johnson’s rhetoric: Olaf Scholz declared that ties with Russia cannot return to pre-Ukraine war status.

• In addition, the German Chancellor announced major increases in military spending: €70 - 80bn a year.

• This means that if the UK and France don’t increase their own spending to catch up, Germany is bound to become the biggest military force in Europe - a European giant reawakens..

• (side note: France already declared an increase in expenditure. But both France and the UK will have to invest much more to preserve their dominance in relation to Germany).

• But this summit also demonstrated much more than mere reflexive increase in defense budgets.

• Countries are now taking a much more holistic geopolitical approach to containing Russia.

• Spain, for example, announced a shift and focus on Africa: warning of Russia’s growing nefarious presence in Africa and how it leads to destabilization in the Sahel.

• This means that Moscow will now have to compete against yet another (as a minimum) NATO member in Africa (in addition to France and Turkey).

• And if history teaches one thing about Russia, it is that forcing Moscow to overextend itself (and take on more political objectives than its economy allows) is the most reliable way of defeating it.

• 3. Sweden and Finland to join NATO.

• These cables have previously argued that although Turkey’s grievances against Sweden and Finland were rooted in legitimate security needs (after all, it was never tenable for either of these countries to maintain ambivalent relationship with the PKK, when both the EU and the US considered it a terrorist organization. Same with YPG - even if strategic convenience precluded the very same treatment and labeling), the timing was bad - causing internal divisions and playing straight into Putin’s hands.

• But as previously argued in these cables, the resolution of this issue need not be overly complex - and that a proper solution entailed Sweden and Finland accepting all of Turkey’s legitimate demands (rejecting those that violated principles of due process).

• And fine diplomacy prevailed.

• All three parties to this issue played their hands well.

• a. Sweden and Finland agreed not to provide any support to Kurdish-led fighters in Syria and declared their recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organization (finally aligning with both the US and the EU).

• Both countries also confirmed there will be no arms embargoes against Turkey.

• (side note: perhaps hitherto the most untenable position. NATO members by definition cannot impose arms embargoes on each other. That defeats the whole purpose of the alliance).

• Finally, there was an issue of extradition requests - Turkey already provided such a list.

• In relation to this sensitive issue, both Sweden and Finland committed to ‘‘address Turkey's pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects expeditiously and thoroughly, taking into account information, evidence and intelligence provided by Turkey [emphasis added]”.

• Note how this is an undertaking to address - whilst considering Turkish evidence provided to the Swedish/Finnish authorities: this is not a promise to extradite suspects.

• In other words, in the most sensitive issue of due process, neither Sweden nor Finland committed to anything that would undermine the rule of law in their respective countries.

• And such a refusal to trade cornerstone values for strategic gains (raising standards for all other international players), is something that must be acknowledged and celebrated.

• b. Turkey played its hand rather well - they knew when to stop.

• Pushing any further would lead to their tactics rapidly reaching the point of diminishing return.

• Turkey started the negotiations with maximum leverage - but this would inevitably flip.

• If this disagreement was dragged on for much longer (especially after Swedish/Finnish concessions/commitments), Turkey would risk losing its soft power gains (rightly secured for its steadfast support of Ukraine), and would increasingly risk being seen as a spoiler of internal unity.

• c. The US also played this rather well.

• President Biden took on a minimal public role - preventing an opening for the US to become a party to the negotiations (and consequently a target for concession demands).

• But it is also clear that privately, the Biden admin did exactly what these cables have previously advocated for: offering to close the F-16 fighter jet modernization deal.

• Indeed, the very next day of the announced agreement, the Defense department recommended (to Congress) that the sale shall proceed.

• This whole drama ended rather well - with gains secured by all parties.

• The Biden admin must now use this new political capital and goodwill to resolve the remaining (major) issue with Turkey: the Russian S400 problem.

• (side note: we have previously taken a detailed look on the possible ways to resolve this long-standing sticky issue).

Putin signals further nuclear posturing, tightens his grip on Belarus, and restricts Lukashenko’s options.