Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines

Putin goes back on his word, invades Ukraine and challenges all norms of international order: gains, risks, a pretext for something bigger, and how to parry his moves.

• It happened - unfortunately, and as long predicted, Putin started his invasion of Ukraine - shamelessly declaring a special operation to ‘‘demilitarize and de-nazify” Ukraine.

• Kyiv declared a state of emergency, and Russian troops have started their offensive - responding to the separatists’ request for help.

• There are already reports of explosions (most likely, cruise missile strikes) in Kyiv, Mariupol, and Odessa.

• (side note: and as specifically predicted by these cables, the French President Emmanuel Macron got ridiculed by his domestic opposition - for his grandiose shuttle diplomacy optics that achieved nothing of substance)

• In reality however, the invasion was well underway two days ago with recognition of the two breakaway territories in the eastern Ukraine - Putin furthermore recognized the borders of the DNR and LNR as described in their constitutions - meaning the whole oblasts (hitherto controlled by Ukraine).

• As such, a military confrontation with Ukraine was always going to be inevitable.

• And as mentioned in the previous cable, a lot of readers have emailed with questions about Putin’s potential recognition (and implications of) of the DNR and LNR puppet states in the eastern Ukraine.

• Well, it happened (and Putin went back on his word, since only a week ago, the Kremlin reiterated its commitment to the Minsk agreement) - but we will look at why he decided to take this route - what are some strategic losses, and risks that he is willingly undertaking - turning thereafter, to consider Putin’s overall grand strategy in this military campaign.

• Before that, we will take a quick refresher on the Minsk agreement - something that Putin essentially destroyed once and for all.

• Finally, and in light of Putin’s latest ultimatums against Ukraine, we will consider what are his likely next steps and targets - taking a closer look at what could be done to prevent (or at least blunt) his success in a military campaign.

  
  *sanctions keep coming in, and will likely take a more definitive shape later on this week (and in response to the rapid escalation on the morning of Thursday, February 24th) - analysis of these measures will likely take place in the weekly overview.

The Minsk agreement - what was on the paper, what Putin actually wanted, and what are his ultimate grand strategic objectives?

• With Russia’s recognition of the DNR and LNR, the Minsk agreement is in effect dead.

• But what was it? What did Putin want - and why did he ultimately decide to shred it into pieces by his latest move?

• First of all, and although the agreement has been floated by the media a lot, there hasn’t been a great backgrounder that clarified a few crucial realities:

• 1) There were two separate agreements: the first one was signed on September 5, 2014, produced almost no results, and consequently led to the second agreement on February 12, 2015 - which was signed by the Ukrainian President (then, Poroshenko) under conditions of extreme duress - literally, to save the lives of trapped and surrounded Ukrainian soldiers in Donbas.

• Russia was the party to the agreement, and yet pretended to be only a facilitator - insisting that the agreement was in reality between Ukraine and the two Russia-backed separatist ‘‘republics’’: the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR).

• 2) Russia has been violating the Minsk Agreements from the very outset.

• The deal required (under an OSCE supervision and oversight): removal of foreign military forces, dissolution of illegal armed groups (ostensibly belonging to DNR and LNR), and Ukraine taking back control of its eastern border with Russia.

• Russia refused to implement any of these requirements - in fact, it continued to arm and support the two separatist “republics’’.

• Ceasefire was not a default - it was a temporary welcome respite from an otherwise continuous fighting that claimed the lives of approximately 14,000 people since 2014.

• 3) There was nothing else that Ukraine could reasonably be expected to do.

• In accordance with the Minsk agreement, Ukraine passed (and renewed) legislation providing special status to the occupied territories, amnesty for those that committed crimes in the course of the conflict, and provisions for local elections.

• Here were the two main issues:

• a) Certain parts of the Minsk agreement couldn’t have been implemented precisely because of Russian involvement.

• For example, the local elections would have to be held for Ukrainian cities and councils - not for the separatist and fake ‘‘republics’’ of the DNR and LNR.

• b) The agreement required a certain extent of devolution of powers from the central government in Kyiv - Ukraine complied with this too.

• But there was absolutely no provision of the agreement requiring Ukraine to create a Federal State where the DNR and LNR get a say on foreign affairs of the country - which is exactly what Russia desired: an effective veto (via puppet DNR and LNR) on Ukraine’s foreign policy choices.

• Given that Ukrainian acceptance of such wild ‘‘interpretations’’ of the agreement would effectively amount to the forfeit of a national sovereignty, it is no wonder that Kyiv (correctly) ruled out such a possibility.

• It was becoming quite clear that even with a build-up of troops, and an effective blockade of the Black Sea, Ukraine wasn’t going to be compelled into implementing the Agreements in accordance with Putin’s desired interpretation (granting him a veto over Kyiv’s foreign policy).

• Seeing that the Minsk agreement was not going to be implemented (in the way that he wants), Putin decided to instead recognize the separatist states as independent.

• Understanding the whole context and his ultimate motivations requires us to 1) examine the risks that Putin undertook when granting this recognition, and 2) why he chose to do so in spite of the clear downsides and risks - what are his ultimate political, and grand strategic objectives?

• Risks and costs of recognition

• There are numerous downsides to Putin’s decision in favor of the recognition of DNR and LNR - but we shall focus on the main three risks & costs.

• 1) Reputational & strategic risks.

• Who else is going to recognize these territories? Is Syrian support really enough?

• Or is it actually the confirmation of Russia being on the path to becoming a pariah state?

• What if no other major country (as it is almost certain) joins Russia in recognition of these states?

• What about their Chinese allies? Will China support Putin? Will they also recognize DNR and LNR?

• Almost certainly not.

• In fact, just two days before Putin’s recognition, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that the Minsk agreement was the "only way out".

• Will they really reverse this stance? And so soon after Putin’s move?

• In addition, (and as explored in previous cables) China has significant investments in Ukraine - and is one of the primary importers of Ukrainian grain (that is also shipped from the port of Mariupol - a likely target for Russian invasion).

• Is China going to ruin its relationship with Ukraine to prop up Putin?

• Again - almost certainly not.

• And if China refuses to recognize DNR and LNR as independent states, then what does it say about its purported ‘‘no limits’’ partnership (announced only two weeks ago) with Russia?

• Indeed, Chinese neutrality on the issue, would only further uncover the unpleasant (to the Kremlin) reality that Beijing and Moscow aren’t really that close - a significant blow to Putin’s leverage and blackmail capabilities vis-à-vis the West would follow..

• The Kremlin’s traditional blackmail of ‘‘careful about sanctioning us, you will only make us move closer to Beijing” would weaken considerably.

• 2) Geopolitical risks

• The Kremlin is demonstrating a ruthless willingness to violate all international norms and laws in its pursuance for a solid sphere of influence.

• Message received by Russia’s neighbors - those that can, will certainly hedge their bets and move away from dependence on Russia.

• Countries in Central Asia especially, will seek to diversify their geopolitical portfolio and seek closer ties with China (and to some extent, Turkey) - and the US certainly benefits from the possibility of this re-energized geopolitical contest (at least in this theater).

• In other words - by utilizing its extreme hard power, Russia risks weakening its regional soft power.

• 3) Wasting its geopolitical capital vis-à-vis the EU

• Russia benefits from the divided EU - and its inability to guarantee unanimity over the most severe sanctions to be imposed on Russia.

• But a flagrant violation of international norms makes it significantly harder to secure neutrality and passivity of countries that have hitherto shown unwillingness to confront Russia (Italy, Austria, Greece, Cyprus etc).

• It is one thing to maintain (however implausible) deniability over covert operations in Donbas - quite another, to outright support their independence and send in the troops in their assistance.

• Of course, there are some benefits to the recognition that act as counterweights.

• If for example, Russia gets off relatively unscathed from this whole affair, it would have established a very dangerous global precedent - harming the rule-based and US-led (and backed by major allies and the EU) global order.

• The damage to the US power and prestige will be significant.

• But these benefits are mere (welcome) side effects of Putin’s decision - given the costs, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia recognized the DNR and LNR without seeking some higher grand strategic goal.

• Putin’s ultimate grand strategic objectives

• At this point, it is important to recap Putin’s main grand strategic objective in this whole campaign: turning Ukraine into another vassal/buffer state (like Belarus) with a puppet government that would then:

• a) Implement the Minsk agreement in a way that pleases Putin (guaranteeing the Kremlin a veto over Ukraine’s foreign policy);

• b) End all military cooperation with NATO, demilitarize the country, and ensure that Russia has a safe military buffer;

• c) Refrain from a closer economic partnership with both the EU and the US - continue its economic dependence on Russia - making sure that Ukrainians are never richer than Russians (not creating a contrast with the Kremlin’s economic mismanagement), and;

• d) Maintain a managed Potemkin village/theater of democracy, without engaging in any meaningful civic governance, democratic reforms - again to prevent the formation of a successful, vibrant democracy, that would consequently create a contrast with the Russian system of governance: convincing Russians that a true democracy & rule of law need not be incompatible with Slavic culture.

• As a result therefore, Putin had three options for the accomplishment of his strategic and political objectives:

• 1) Conduct a coup without a full-on invasion (perhaps a limited special ops campaign) - install a puppet regime that would then implement all of the aforementioned Kremlin goals;

• 2) Same, but with an outright invasion to ensure the success of the coup - potentially granting Russia options to extend its territorial gains north of Crimea, on the coast of the Black Sea and/or eastern Ukraine, and;

• 3) Recognize DNR and LNR, and thereafter proceed with an invasion to install a puppet regime in Kyiv.

• Note also, how concluding the campaign just at the point of DNR and LNR recognitions is most likely not in plans - since Putin would fail to achieve his grand strategic objectives in return for very little.

• In fact, he now lost the hitherto potential leverage over Ukraine’s foreign policy decisions - with Minsk agreement in tatters, the essential lever of controlling Ukraine’s foreign policy is also gone.

• DNR and LNR are both ‘‘independent states’’ now - as such, they will not get a say in Ukraine’s foreign policy as a unit within the federalized/confederalized state (Putin’s original plans with the Minsk agreement).

• Given this context therefore, it is extremely unlikely that Putin will end this campaign with recognition - or even with a limited war to expand the territories of the newly recognized territories.

• It is better to view the recognition as Putin deciding to go with the third option described above - in other words, this is most probably only the opening shot of Putin’s campaign, and his decision to recognize DNR and LNR is best viewed as intermediary step on the way to his overall objectives.

• But why did Putin refuse to go with options 1&2 ?