Cables From The Diplomatic Frontlines - The Ukraine War's Ripple Effect: Assessing America's Involvement and Its Implications for Deterrence Against China: Part I.

One of the most frequently discussed aspects of the Ukraine war is its impact on America’s ability to deter China in the Pacific. Specifically, many on the right - strategists like Elbridge Colby, (as well as their less intellectual, media hype guys like Tucker Carlson) have argued that helping Ukraine distracts America’s attention and depletes its resources - those that could have otherwise been devoted to deterring China. In these three-part series, we shall first take a look at the costs of America’s involvement in Ukraine (and yes, there are costs, and some direct effects that do indeed impose military costs on America at least in some way - denying this (like many ardent pro-Ukraine politicians have done) is not credible and harms the overall discourse. It is another matter that the overall deterrence is still stronger thanks to involvement in Ukraine-and we will certainly unpack the “how” of it all.) as well as some direct and indirect (and largely unforeseen) benefits of US leadership and active engagement in Ukraine in aiding deterrence in the Pacific.

1) Costs of Ukraine war and their negative impact on deterrence.

• The direct costs of the US leadership in the Ukraine war are significant (even if not all that detrimental in proportion to America’s overall heft): Washington has committed significant aid to Ukraine, surpassing $100 billion, although this amount represents only a fraction (around 1/8th to be more precise) of the Pentagon's defense budget.

• Furthermore, less than half of this aid consists of military assistance, with the rest being humanitarian in nature.

• Nonetheless, Ukraine did indeed receive a lot of weapons systems from the US stockpiles: weapons like thousands of Javelin anti-tank and stinger air defense missiles, 155 mm artillery rounds, HIMARS missiles, and vehicles (like Bradleys - with Abrams M1 tanks to come later this year) - it will certainly take time for the defense industry to replenish these expended resources.

• However, it is essential to place these losses in context:

• a) the Army has prioritized the development of capabilities necessary for the potential conflicts in the Pacific: such as long-range missiles (with more funding now available for advanced tests) and multi-domain task forces.

• And besides, America’s support to Ukraine has had a limited impact on the air and maritime forces - and these are precisely the forces that will play a crucial role in defending Taiwan against a potential invasion. The US military strategy in Taiwan aims at preventing an aggressor from successfully crossing the Taiwan Strait, which spans a breadth of 100 miles.

• And this task does not call for the deployment of conventional artillery, tanks or armored vehicles; rather, it necessitates the utilization of advanced assets such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (and budget for these has now been expanded further), B-2 (and the forthcoming B-21 bombers), nuclear submarines, and long-range anti-ship missiles - and we are certainly not giving any of these to Ukraine.

• b) Much of the weaponry provided to Ukraine is older (like the F-16s that we will (hopefully) end up giving to Ukraine approaching retirement vs the new ones we are planning to deliver to Taiwan) and will eventually be replaced with newer and more advanced equipment, and;

• c) Despite the challenges faced by the Western defense industry, efforts are underway to address the systemic shortfalls and improve munitions production capacity: Congress, along with the Defense Department, acknowledges the need to rectify these deficiencies.

• Overall, while the aid provided to Ukraine certainly does present challenges in terms of replenishing the military equipment, the weapons systems that are most affected don’t particularly affect the balance of power in the Pacific, and in any case, the US is addressing these shortcomings and making progress.

• Moreover, the focus on enhancing the capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region (with weapons systems not affected due to the Ukraine war) demonstrates a commitment and a continuous capability to effectively counter potential threats, particularly in the context of a Taiwan invasion.

2) Psychology of deterrence - how America’s involvement is in itself the strongest deterrent against China.

• As often reiterated in these cables, successful deterrence is the demonstration of capacity and will.

• In other words, deterrence = strong military power x political will to exercise that power.

• That America is still the strongest military power is not in doubt - even the Chinese (in spite of their increasing naval dominance closer to their own shores) are aware that they are not (yet) a match to the US military.

• What is (and has been increasingly in the past 3-4 years) in doubt however, is America’s political will to exercise that power.

• A lot has been said about the botched Afghanistan withdrawal, and how it served as a confirmation bias of America’s decline for both Putin and Xi - both of them thereafter accelerating their expansionist ambitions in relation to Ukraine and Taiwan respectively.

• Although it is indeed a stretch to blame Putin’s whetted appetite for an invasion due to mainly botched withdrawal in Afghanistan (and demonstration of weakness, lack of staying power, and abandonment of an allied government), it certainly could not have helped..

• Neither did it help with deterrence when the US wasted so many months in failing to arm Ukraine ahead of the invasion last year.

• Between October 2021 (when the US first released the intel and announced Putin’s invasion plan), and February 2022, the US had five months to arm Ukraine to its teeth - and thereby 1) signal a strong will to defend Ukraine, and 2) raise the cost of invasion - affecting Putin’s calculus.

• Instead, neither the US nor its allies provided sufficient weapons (Germany even comically offered helmets in January of 2022 - a mere month before the invasion).

• If deterrence requires a demonstration of will to exercise power, this was the very opposite of that - most definitely affecting Putin’s calculus in an unfavorable way.

• With a continuous, significant and hopefully expanding military aid offered to Ukraine, the US is now busy correcting for that failure of deterrence.

• And in doing so, it is helping its ability to deter China.

• Make no mistake - the fates of Taiwan and Ukraine are interlinked.

• Deterrence happens in the mind of the target - if China sees that Ukraine is abandoned after endless promises of backing Kyiv for ‘‘as long as it takes’’ and promises that Russia ‘‘never wins’’ in Ukraine, then Biden’s promise to ‘‘defend’’ Taiwan will also ring hollow.

• And our allies in Asia - those that will play a crucial part in deterring China- understand this rather well.

• For example, (and as previously discussed in these cables), the Japanese PM Kishida parried Xi’s Moscow trip in March with his own to Kyiv.

• At the time when Xi was praising Putin for ‘‘strong leadership”, the Japanese Kishida declared that “Ukraine may be the east Asia of tomorrow” - emphasizing the crucial point that the fates of Ukraine and Taiwan were “inseparable.”

• If anyone is more concerned than Tucker Carlson and co about deterring China, it is the leadership of Japan: a group of statesmen - that have decided to rapidly militarize and arm themselves to counter China - know very well that ensuring Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is crucial in deterring China.

• And in addition to this affirmative case, consider the alternatives..

• What if the US fails to back Ukraine and fails in preventing Russia’s victory.

• What would our allies in the Pacific and East Asia think?

• Here is exactly what they will think: if Washington is not even willing to spend 0.25% of its GDP (comparatively/relatively, multiple times less than Lithuania) to defend Ukraine, how credible is its promise to risk the lives of American troops in defense of Taiwan?

• And consider further downstream scenarios: Should Russia succeed in its conquest of Ukraine, simultaneously brandishing its nuclear capabilities as a means of coercion, it could embolden Beijing to view Taiwan as a viable target for invasion, leveraging its own nuclear arsenal to hinder any intervention by the US and its allied nations.

• Such a scenario may then prompt North Korea to expedite the development of intercontinental missiles capable of reaching American soil, with the ultimate aim of realizing its longstanding aspiration to reunify the Korean Peninsula.

• In the same vein, Iran might perceive that attaining nuclear power status would serve as an effective deterrent against any US intervention in defense of Israel.

• Finally, Japan and South Korea may come to the conclusion that the protective shield of our nuclear umbrella is riddled with vulnerabilities, leading them to contemplate the acquisition of nuclear armaments for their own security.

• In other words, if the US fails to protect Ukraine, if it allows Russia to win, the negative implications to deterrence overall, and against China specifically, would be extremely dire: the costs from the failure to protect Ukraine would pale in comparison to the costs of replacing ammo.