Evaluating Leaked Ukraine - Russia Ceasefire Proposals: Part II - European/Ukrainian counterproposal.
(*see here for part I on the U.S. proposal.)
The Ukrainian and European counterproposal (according to Reuters)
Ceasefire
Commit to a full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea.
Both sides immediately enter into negotiations on technical implementation with the participation of the US and European countries. This is in parallel to preparation of the agenda and modalities for a full peace deal.
Ceasefire monitoring, led by the US and supported by third countries.
Russia must unconditionally return all deported and illegally displaced Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners of war (the principle of "all for all"). Russia must release all civilian prisoners.
Analysis:
The first part is not an issue.
Both the U.S. and Ukrainian sides want an unconditional ceasefire.
It’s Putin who’s dragging his feet, as discussed yesterday.
The part about the U.S. leading ceasefire monitoring is a bit vague.
What does this mean exactly?
Does this mean the U.S. would use its reconnaissance tools and satellites to determine if there have been breaches or movements across the front lines?
Or does it actually mean U.S. troops on the ground to monitor and enforce the ceasefire?
Depending on the answer, wildly different outcomes emerge.
We can tell for sure that Trump will not agree to send U.S. troops to monitor the ceasefire.
He simply is not going to do that.
At a time when Pete Hegseth, Trump’s Defense Secretary, said that even European troops monitoring the ceasefire would not receive Article 5 guarantees, the idea that the U.S. would send its own troops is a pie in the sky.
So why include it, unless the real intent is a lesser form of involvement - where the U.S. simply uses its reconnaissance and satellite assets to aid European troops on the ground?
If that’s the case, then fine.
But otherwise, this is going to be a major area of friction between Europeans and Americans.
The final point about Russia unconditionally returning illegally displaced children is an absolutely valid, just, and right thing to demand.
But it’s also something that Putin will never agree to - simply because, in his justification, he claims he was evacuating them, saving their lives from a war zone, and protecting them from so-called “genocide.”
Agreeing to return the children would completely crumble Russia’s facade and undermine its entire justification for intervention. So this provision - if it remains a precondition for a durable ceasefire - would either need to be removed and pursued separately through legal and international mechanisms, or it should be kept in to expose Russia’s refusal to comply and make clear who the aggressor is.
Security guarantees for Ukraine:
Ukraine receives robust security guarantees including from the US (Article 5-like agreement), while there is no consensus among Allies on NATO membership.
No restrictions on the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
The guarantor states will be an ad hoc group of European countries and willing non-European countries. No restrictions on the presence, weapons and operations of friendly foreign forces on the territory of Ukraine.
Ukraine pursues accession to the EU.
Analysis:
Washington and Kyiv are fortunately on the same page on limiting the size and strength of Ukraine’s military.
This was the most worrying aspect of negotiations: could it be that Trump was so willing to appease Putin into any ceasefire that even this line would be crossed and Ukraine would be left to remain a weak threat to be recaptured later on by a rejuvenated and recouped Russia?
Luckily, this did not happen, and the American negotiation team has made it clear that as a sovereign nation (let alone one facing Russian invasion) there could be no limits on Ukraine’s army and defense industry.
Perhaps we need to thank some few clear-eyed advisors in Trump’s circle for preventing this travesty.
(side note: but with National Security Advisor Mike Waltz’s departure, the ‘‘normal’’ foreign policy staffers have been shrunk even further. It is now essentially Rubio and Keith Kellogg who could advise Trump against the worst foreign policy missteps. One can only imagine the sheer stupidity (including that would ensue if they too were gone and it was essentially up to Trump, his isolationist VP and his real-estate developer friend Steve Witkoff.)
The part about guarantor states being an ad-hoc group of European countries and willing non-European countries seemingly contradicts the previous section, where it was supposedly the United States that would be the primary caretaker in monitoring the ceasefire - supported by third parties.
But now we have the claim that instead, it’s going to be European countries and willing non-European countries acting as guarantors.
Now, obviously, there have been some bilateral security partnerships signed between Ukraine and major powers - including non-European ones like the U.S. -but none of these come close to an ironclad, Article 5-like guarantee.
And this is where the proposal becomes problematic.
An Article 5-like agreement implies NATO-level commitment.
From Russia’s point of view, why would they ever agree to a ceasefire where NATO’s primary powers - such as the U.K., Germany, France, and possibly even the U.S. - commit to defending Ukraine, while Ukraine itself remains outside NATO?
That makes no strategic sense from their perspective.
It’s not countries like Romania or Albania that worry Moscow - it’s the big powers.
If those same powers now step in to provide Article 5-style guarantees outside the NATO structure, the logic of NATO enlargement is effectively bypassed.
That undercuts the rationale for excluding Ukraine from NATO in the first place.
It’s also implausible.
Trump has ruled out Ukrainian accession to NATO precisely to deny Kyiv equal status to existing NATO members.
Without U.S. involvement, it is nearly inconceivable that any other European country would extend an Article 5-like guarantee.
No European power will do so without an American backstop. So including this idea in any peace proposal is a serious friction point - it would irritate Trump, and it’s fundamentally a non-starter, as Russia would never accept it.
If Ukraine were to receive unilateral security pledges from countries like the U.K., France, or Germany, and then sign a ceasefire agreement that doesn’t mention them - that might be a different story.
But that’s not what’s being proposed here.
What’s being offered is explicit and collective - and therefore, unacceptable to Russia, and likely also to the United States under current leadership.
Then there’s the clause about “no restrictions on the presence, weapons, or operations of friendly foreign forces on the territory of Ukraine.”
On this point, Washington is unlikely to object - in fact, it would be beneficial for the U.S. if the Europeans took the lead on deterrence and stabilization.
However, as of today, it remains the case that the U.S. would not extend Article 5 protections to any foreign troops in Ukraine, not even those monitoring a ceasefire.
But again, this is a red line for Russia.
Moscow has repeatedly and explicitly ruled out any foreign military presence in Ukraine.
If the West insists on such a presence, the timing is critical.
Delaying this issue until the ceasefire phase would guarantee failure for two reasons.
First, Russia would never agree to foreign troop presence as part of a ceasefire agreement.
Second, if countries like the U.K., Poland, Germany, or France were to deploy troops after the ceasefire is agreed to, Russia would weaponize the situation.
They would threaten to restart the war, accuse Europe of breaking the agreement, and blackmail European publics.
After three years of brutal warfare, European societies will be exhausted and politically fragile.
Governments would face intense pressure not to escalate again.
Putin would once more resort to nuclear threats and apocalyptic rhetoric -claiming NATO is now openly at war with Russia.
Many voters would see this and ask: Why restart the conflict? Why risk World War III, when we finally have a ceasefire?
(side note: people like Tucker Carlson would have a field day with that content)
That’s why the sequencing is crucial.
Western forces - if they are to be deployed - must be sent before the ceasefire is negotiated.
Their presence needs to be treated as status quo.
Otherwise, any deployment afterward will be used by Russia as a casus belli.
If these troops are on the ground beforehand, Russia has no new pretext.
The deterrent effect is locked in.
If that sequencing is ignored, then the probability that Western forces will ever be deployed meaningfully in Ukraine drops significantly.
And with that, the likelihood of renewed conflict rises - because credible deterrence will simply not be there.
Territory:
Territorial issues will be discussed and resolved after a full and unconditional ceasefire.
Territorial negotiations start from the basis of the line of control.
Ukraine regains control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant with US involvement, and also the Kakhovka Dam
Ukraine enjoys unhindered passages on the Dnieper River and control of the Kinburn Spit.
Analysis:
Smart move to include U.S. in oversight of ZNPP and Kakhovka Dam.
This echoes Trump’s own previously expressed desire to oversee the ZNPP.
But such a move would bring in Americans right to the likely location of future conflict.
And this is precisely the point: Putin would reject this, and in doing so he will have soured his rapport with Trump even further.
In relation to the desired control over the Kinburn Spit - this would involve Ukrainians crossing the Dnieper river and establishing a beachhead on the Russian side.
Once again, Russians are unlikely to agree to this.
The only part that Russia could agree to is a ceasefire alongside the current Line of Control: now that they have finally pushed out the bulk of the Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region.
(side note: that it took Russia almost a year (and help from North Korean troops) to push out Ukrainian forces from its own territories, is once again a great reminder that the claim (frequently promoted by the Vice President Vance) that Russia cannot be beaten on the battlefield is pure nonsense. If only Ukraine was supported with enough fervor and material, then the rest of the Russian troops could have been kicked out from Eastern Ukraine as well - even if not by now, then still in likely future.)
Economics:
US and Ukraine implement economic cooperation/minerals agreement.
Ukraine will be fully reconstructed and compensated financially, including through Russian sovereign assets that will remain frozen until Russia compensates damage to Ukraine.
US sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 may be subject to gradual easing after a sustainable peace is achieved and subject to resumption in the event of a breach of the peace agreement (snapback).
Analysis:
The first part is done - we analyzed the minerals agreement in a separate post.
Russia would never agree to compensation - especially to its sovereign assets to be used for that end.
Remember that they see this war as just and caused by the West - it was the West that forced Putin to declare a ‘‘special military operation’’ that lasted for three years now.
So the only practical outcome is that Europeans will keep the frozen assets and use the generated interest to pay Ukraine (unless they seize it all - which looks less likely with every day.)
The part about suggesting that the U.S. could gradually reduce sanctions on Russia is very unfortunate - these are costs tied to Russian invasion and should be removed when Russia ends its invasion (or at least begins the process of withdrawal).
Otherwise, rewarding Russia for just stopping the hostilities is not logical or just or good strategy.
But it is unfortunately a pragmatic reality for Ukrainians and Europeans: Trump wants to move forward with economic normalization, and wants more ‘‘deals’’ with Moscow.
As such, Europeans want to get ahead of the inevitable process.
(side note: with all that said, one hopes that Trump would actually stick to the ‘‘gradual’’ part and be very careful about removing sanctions on crucial military-defense production industries and on parts like transistors, semiconductors etc. But as of right now, that hope is not really justified.)
Bottom line:
This is an unrealistic proposal that is far from the one proposed by the U.S. delegation.
The Article 5 like security guarantees and America’s role in peacekeeping are likely nonstarters.
But that doesn’t matter much for now: Russia doesn’t seem to want to settle anyways, and Moscow currently insists on impossible maximalist demands like 1) formal recognition of all occupied territories (a stretch for even Trump), 2) No foreign peacekeeper/observers, and 3) No military sales to Ukraine (translation: keep Ukraine vulnerable while we prepare to launch our next bite)
As long as Putin doesn’t feel real costs, Russia will continue to insist on these ridiculous demands.
And until that pain is inflicted by Washington and Brussels, all Western proposals are largely irrelevant.