Finland displays strong will and seizes Russian ship - additional measures are needed.

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Finland displays strong will and seizes Russian tanker.

• On December 25, 2024, Finnish authorities detained the oil tanker Eagle S, linked to Russia, on suspicion of damaging undersea power and communication cables in the Baltic Sea.

• (side note: the court has now upheld this seizure.)

• The vessel is believed to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" which operates to circumvent international sanctions.

• Investigations suggest that the Eagle S dragged its anchor along the seabed for over 60 miles, leading to these disruptions.

• As a result of Russian sabotage, the Estlink 2 power cable, a critical connector between Finland and Estonia, along with four communication cables, sustained damage.

• This event is part of a series of infrastructural disruptions in the Baltic Sea region since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

• In response, NATO has announced plans to bolster its presence in the area to safeguard critical infrastructure.

• Finnish police and border guards boarded the Eagle S, escorting it to the port of Kilpilahti for further examination.

• The crew, comprising Indian and Georgian nationals, is currently under investigation.

• Finland’s jurisdiction.

• Under the Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), If the damage occurred to cables within Finland's territorial sea (12 nautical miles) or Exclusive Economic Zone/ EEZ (200 nautical miles), UNCLOS explicitly grants Finland jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute under Article 113.

• If the Eagle S was within Finland’s territorial waters, Finland can assert full jurisdiction, especially if the ship's actions breached the principle of innocent passage (e.g., damaging cables).

• Now, the damage to the Estlink 2 power cable and several communication cables occurred in the Gulf of Finland - a part of the Baltic Sea situated between Finland and Estonia.

• This area encompasses both Finnish territorial waters and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

• So there are no jurisdiction issues here.

• Credit to Finland for showing mettle in confronting Russian sabotage.

• As long-time readers are aware, this is not the first time that similar incidents have taken place.

• Yet unfortunately, previous incidents didn’t meet such a muscular response.

• Finland demonstrates the importance of actively cracking down on Russian saboteurs.

• This zero-tolerance approach must remain.

• Additionally, further steps should be taken to confront Russia’s hybrid warfare/sabotage campaigns:

• 1) Impose financial costs and criminal liability on corporate owners.

• As of January 5, 2025, Finnish authorities have not filed formal criminal charges against Caravella LLC FZ, the United Arab Emirates-based owner of the oil tanker Eagle S.

• This should happen - not only should Caravella face civil damages for the destruction caused, the parent company should face criminal liability as well.

• In addition, Caravella should face other U.S. /EU sanctions as well: these could be in the form of denial of financial resources/banking/insurance access in the West.

• And this policy should be adopted in relation to all other parent companies of ships involved in Russia’s sabotage campaigns.

• 2) Adopt a policy of preemptive interventionism.

• Russian shadow fleet ships should face frequent stops and insurance checks.

• They should face operational challenges as long as they are being used to advance Russia’s hybrid warfare objectives.

• 3) Signal to Beijing that NATO intervention could cost a lot to China.

• Xi needs to be given incentives to pull Putin away from future sabotage campaigns against NATO members.

• If he was convinced that NATO’s increasing interventionism could cause delays in delivering oil (and other imports) to China, then he would have that incentive to act.

• It is clear that China has been instrumental during key turning points like when Putin was contemplating the use of (or at least pretending to do so aggressively) tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine - when Xi was involved in dissuading Putin from such a move.

• Here too, escalation could impose direct costs on China and provide new incentives to dissuade Putin from this campaign.

• And even if China fails to dissuade Putin, it will still have to absorb the costs of Putin’s adventurism - further cooling relations between the ‘‘no limits’’ allies.