From Archives: Taiwan Invasion Indicators.
*cables is off for Presidents’ day, and will resume as usual on Thursday. In the meantime, I am sharing one of the most liked and engaged posts from last year. Posted in November 2022, this was originally only open to paid subscribers. However, with recent rise in tensions and high-level Pentagon - Taiwan talks in focus, this is a good time to re-share and make it open to all subscribers.
Indicators of an impending invasion of Taiwan.
As discussed in previous cables, there are many good reasons to expect that Beijing will escalate on Taiwan sooner rather than later.
First, there were comments from senior U.S. military officers that senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers were directed by Xi Jinping to be prepared to invade the island by 2027.
Then a new report claimed that many in the US intelligence community now assess that China could attack as soon as 2024.
Adding credibility to this assessment, Admiral Mike Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations, confirmed this very timeline.
(side note: for context, Taiwan will hold elections in January 2024 - it is unclear whether the possible attack is expected to come before or after elections. Presumably before: before the new government has a chance to secure a renewed mandate from the public.)
Finally, there was Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s comment that China decided to embark upon the path of confrontation on Taiwan.
Of course, there is also the changing context that incentivizes this very strategy of escalation: as discussed in previous cables, Beijing sees how the US is going to choke its tech industry with export control on chips, and how America and its allies in the Pacific are ratcheting up their military posture.
And with a slowdown in the domestic economy (removing a crucial pillar for the legitimacy for his rule), Xi Jinping may very well conclude that the time is working against him.
It is therefore plausible that Beijing will make a move - and do so much sooner than expected.
And a lot of readers have written emails expressing concern that this might catch the US by surprise - when DC is already mired in conflict with Russia and the war in Ukraine (and possibly, with Iran too in the very near future).
It is indeed true that a confrontation with Beijing may come at a point where the war in Ukraine still continues (turning into a long war of attrition), and that the nuclear deal/JCPOA fails definitively, and there is a possibility of military action against Iran in 2023 or early 2024 (especially if Netanyahu is back in power, as it is very likely (according to exit polls) at the time of writing).
What is not likely however, is the possibility of China’s invasion of Taiwan taking the US by surprise.
To be clear, there will be a number of indicators (depending on which precise strategy China adopts) of an impending invasion well in advance.
The PLA is clearly a modern fighting force, but the last time that they fought a major war was against Vietnam in 1979 - a military confrontation that revealed major logistical difficulties.
Of course, one cannot compare the army of 1979 to the present day capability of the PLA.
But access to modern hypersonic weapons and missiles does not preclude the possibility of major failure in fundamentals: like coordinating logistics of combined arms operations.
Case in point: Russia - a country in possession of modern stealthy fighter jets, and hypersonic missiles like Kalibr, Kinzhal and Zircon, yet still failing to deliver fuel to its frontline army after facing a dozen or so HIMARS launchers..
In addition, an invasion of an island is a much harder undertaking vs conventional and limited military operations (for example, compare America’s embarrassment in the invasion of vastly inferior Grenada in 1983 vs astonishing success in the operation Desert Storm 1990-1991).
And Taiwan is not a poor Caribbean island either.
Moreover, PLA’s planning will have to account for the possibility of direct involvement of US/Allied forces: something that Putin did not have to worry about too much.
Finally, even if the initial beach landing/opening salvo is successful, the PLA would have to achieve a decisive victory in the shortest amount of time possible.
Beijing would be in a rush to establish a new compelling status quo - so that there is a chance that US and its allies can be dissuaded from entering the ‘‘lost cause’’ conflict.
The longer the war drags on, the more pressure will there be on the US to act and help its slowly sinking ally.
In other words, a delayed/stalled invasion would probably compel even a reluctant American President to enter the war directly.
For all these reasons, the PLA will need to prepare really well for this operation, and there will consequently be a number of clear signals and indicators of an upcoming invasion.
Before delving into these specific indicators however, it is also important to note that the following indicators are valid mainly for an outright invasion only.
As discussed in the previous cables, there are a range of other military operations (short of an outright invasion) that Beijing could resort to: blockades, gradual escalation, gray zone tactics of extreme cyber attacks/strikes against Taiwan’s infrastructure, declaring no fly zones, or simply invading smaller islands - forcing Taipei to respond.
These would be measures under the powerful compellence strategy.
And in fact, the strategy of ratcheting up pressure and compelling Taiwan into submission and reunification may actually work better.
Once again, the war in Ukraine is an instructive example: what would have happened if Russia simply enforced a total blockade in the Black Sea?
What if Russia engaged in targeted air strikes against Ukraine’s infrastructure, factories/industry, and military HQs without an outright land invasion?
Kyiv was already ready to offer significant political concessions in the form of a commitment not to join NATO.
With further pressure tanking Ukraine’s economy, Putin could have forced further political concessions.
For example: further constitutional amendments to provide autonomy to Donbas, so that the ‘‘ethnic Russians” could be “protected”.
Under this scenario, Russia would have also faced lesser sanctions and the Ukrainian army would definitely receive significantly lesser military support: the arguments against forcing Russia’s hand into an outright invasion (by over-sanctioning it and removing incentives for restraint) would have most likely won the day in the Western capitals.
But that did not happen, and instead, Putin trapped himself into a direct military invasion by recognizing the independence of the breakaway regions in Donbas.
This is an instructive case study for Beijing: after taking a close hard look at the correlation of forces on the ground, they may still conclude against an outright invasion (this is why America’s rapid militarization and deterrence by denial is so important).
But with that caveat out of the way, let’s now unpack the indicators we should expect to observe if an invasion was in fact about to take place.
And for this exercise, we can divide these indicators into three broad categories: Political/Social, Economic, and Military/logistic.
Political Indicators.
a)Propaganda.
Approximately 6 -12 months prior to the invasion, Chinese propaganda will be on steroids.
A rhetorical groundwork for invasion will be laid well in advance of the military operation.
Messaging and framing around the inevitability of an invasion will be advanced.
Recent cracks in totalitarian control (e.g. housing protests/refusal to pay mortgages, and the solo demonstration at the time of the CCP Congress) mean that China’s urban middle class -especially its youth - will need to be convinced of the necessity of this war.
Even though an outright public resistance is extremely unlikely (since, a) the public is broadly on the same page about Taiwan, and b) totalitarian control is too strong), nothing can be left to chance at the time of war - especially if a major escalation with the US/allies is also a possibility.
The tone of propaganda will also change: less about the overall “shared” destiny of China/Taiwan, and more about the urgency of acting now - how rapid militarization in the Pacific is forcing Beijing to act in defense of national security/interests.
b) Political purges.
There will most likely be a preemptive wave of purges.
Again, here too, the war in Ukraine is instructive.
Xi can see in real-time how damaging the infighting could become at the time of an ongoing war.
He sees how Kadyrov and Prigozhin are criticizing Russia’s military, and surely does not want something similar taking place at home.
The CCP’s Standing committee is firmly within his grip - next up, expect further preemptive purges in the PLA and regional/local government.
c) Geopolitical plays: freezing conflicts & breaking up US-led coalitions.
Focusing on Taiwan, China will want stability and guarantee of peace in its periphery and backyard.
Increase in goodwill gestures/courting states that China is currently in conflict with, is going to be a good (although slightly under the radar) indicator that Beijing is willing to freeze all other tense relationships on hold - foregoing the usual policy advancing a maximalist foreign policy.
For example: Beijing will want to ensure that there is little possibility of border clashes with India or maritime disputes with the Philippines.
A marked increase in goodwill gestures in relation to these two countries is going to be a good sign that China is now seeking space for an exclusive focus on Taiwan.
In addition, Beijing will want to dissuade ASEAN and many countries in the global South from joining in the US-led sanctions that will be triggered as soon as it makes a move on Taiwan.
Once again, out of the blue gestures and concessions will signal geopolitical “shaping operations”.
Economic indicators.
a) Military production ramp up.
China’s production of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as anti-air, air-to-air and long-range precision guided munitions (PGMs) (for beach/naval bombardment) will surge.
And this surge will surely escalate to such an extent, that there will be many visible, observable indicators - vulnerable for capture by the commercial satellite imagery.
A good example: the visual satellite evidence of new silo fields for China’s expanding nuclear-armed forces captured last year.
Similar indicators will most certainly be captured going forward as well: new production facilities, logistical depots, storage facilities etc.
b) Stockpiling.
This goes beyond medium to long-term economic decoupling, and goals of self-sufficiency in crucial semiconductor production.
China will stockpile on vital civilian materiel: from medicine to first-aid kits, search & rescue equipment, crucial crops/food stuffs, and of course oil & gas.
Sudden increase in China’s stockpiling on energy resources will be a powerful indicator.
c) Capital controls and preparing financial markets.
Beijing will want to ensure liquidity of its financial markets & prevent exodus of Western capital (a scenario that could then lead to a crash of the rest of the economy, and lead to a plummeting national currency, Renminbi).
In addition, China has witnessed first-hand what happened to Russia when its assets left in the West were quickly frozen.
As such, repatriation and liquidation of China’s foreign assets is likely - yet another strong indicator.
d) Controlling human capital.
Once again, the mass exodus of Russia’s tech sector employees is a powerful lesson to China.
Ahead of a probable war, China is likely to shut down its borders, impose travel restrictions on its citizens, and also attempt to repatriate its scientists currently in the Western states.
Military & Logistics.
a) Budget.
Will be redirected towards the PLA Naval ops at an unprecedented level.
Most of the spending and focus will be on long-range PGMs and amphibious landing gear.
b) PLA-wide stop loss policies.
One must expect that demobilization of enlisted personnel and officers will be halted - just as this happened back in 2007, when Beijing amped up the pressure on Taiwan ahead of its elections.
c) Troops deployment & field logistics.
Recall field hospitals, mobile depots, and ad-hoc logistics hubs ahead of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Back in late 2021 and 2022, these cables paid particular attention to those indicators.
Unlike the Spring of 2021, late 2021 and early 2022 troop deployments were accompanied with all of the fuel & logistical aid that they may have needed in combat.
This was a powerful indicator back then, and will play a similar role as evidence of an imminent invasion here with Taiwan.
And unlike Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the sheer volume and size of troop deployments will be at least 4-5x.
Eastern and Southern Theater Commands opposite Taiwan will lead the way in this.
Field hospitals & mobile logistics depots will be established close to airfields and embarkation points.
Meaning that, Western intel agencies will have at least 3-4 months of advanced notice of an imminent invasion.
d) Specific drills.
Most of the regular PLA training will halt, and there will be specific drills taking place at least 9-12 months ahead of an invasion.
There will be a sudden increase in maintenance inspections across all major equipment.
In addition, it is very likely that there will be city and region-wide civilian drills - and those will surely be accompanied with visible signs of disruptions, like it happened in Guangdong province (across Taiwan) last April.
Civilian corps will be established to guard key local infrastructure, and search & rescue drills will see a marked increase in volume and realism involved.
Miscellaneous indicators.
There will be a plethora of indirect indicators accompanying all of these preparatory measures outlined above.
For example, as the manufacturing base redirects to better serve the war effort, Western companies (clients of local Chinese contractors) will start to experience significant production delays and shortages.
Or yet another example: with the PLA’s increasing use of air space and airports/airfields, commercial air travel disruptions will become more commonplace.
Overall then, and taking all of the indicators into account, the US and its allies will have at least 6 - 8 months of advance notice of an upcoming invasion.
Of course, with better intel, the timeline can be further extended.
Regardless of precise timeline however, this is not something that will catch Washington by surprise.
The question now is, whether the US and its allies will rise up to the challenge of preparing sufficiently for any eventuality, without triggering anxiety (in Beijing) of a preemptive move/strike by Washington.
Balancing deterrence by denial (capacity x will to act) against sending the wrong signal of preemptive moves will be crucial.
Looks like the tragic earthquake plus Russia’s constant protection, will keep the criminal Assad regime in power in Syria. Meanwhile, Israel’s political turmoil and lack of will and fear of Russia prevent them from helping Ukraine.