Iran's Response and how Israeli vs U.S. objectives may start to diverge again.
Iran responded to U.S. strikes on its nuclear production sites on Monday, two days after the United States dropped GBU bombs on Fordow and launched Tomahawk missiles at the Esfahan base and other targets at Natanz.
We will assess the extent of the damage and the current risks posed by Iran’s access to highly enriched uranium in a separate post.
For now, let’s focus on what transpired in the 48 hours following the strikes and how Iran’s response can be interpreted to understand its intent.
First of all, on the day of the strike, it’s important to note that President Trump reiterated that this strike package could have been a one-off.
He emphasized that the B-2 bombers had exited Iranian airspace and, in his address to the nation, warned Iran against retaliating or harming U.S. personnel, stating that any future strikes would be even more severe.
The next day, several key figures—Senator Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, and Vice President Vance—gave interviews to the media and held press conferences, consistently underscoring how regime change was not the objective.
The stated goal was the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program by force, now that negotiations had, so far, failed.
That same day, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel was close to achieving its objectives and would no longer be interested in engaging in a war of attrition.
However, later on Sunday, Trump posted on Truth Social, re-introducing the idea of regime change.
He wrote that although it may not be politically correct to call for regime change, there was no reason not to pursue it if the current regime was failing the Iranian people—ending his post with “MIGA,” or “Make Iran Great Again.”
This is, to date, the most explicit suggestion from Trump that regime change is a possible outcome that the U.S. may seek.
Naturally, questions follow: Does he genuinely intend to pursue regime change with military force, or was this a strategic warning to the Iranian regime—a way of signaling that this topic is no longer taboo for him, and that (if pushed) he may eventually pursue that goal as well?
This distinction is critical.
By becoming the first U.S. president to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, Trump already sent a clear message to the Iranian leadership that he is serious - and is not shy about use of military force.
Whether or not the strikes inflicted sufficient damage on Iran’s nuclear program, the key takeaway is that Trump followed through on his threats and demonstrated a willingness to escalate if provoked.
And now, just a week after publicly stating he knows the whereabouts of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Trump is openly discussing regime change.
If the goal is to intimidate the Iranian regime and pressure them into adopting a more conciliatory stance toward the United States, this was not ineffective messaging—especially considering it was issued before Iran’s anticipated response on Monday, providing the regime an incentive to avoid causing serious harm to U.S. interests.
Iran responds by striking U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq
What we witnessed from Iran today was both unprecedented and, in many respects, a welcome de-escalation.
It was unprecedented because, for the first time in history, Iran attacked a large U.S. military base located in a Gulf monarchy—Qatar.
This marks the first instance of a U.S. base in a Gulf state being directly targeted.
The al-Udeid Air Base, which was the target of these missile barrages, is one of the largest U.S. military installations in the Middle East.
On Saturday, shortly after the initial U.S. strikes, we discussed how Iran’s response would shape the next phase of the conflict.
Among the options Iran had to respond without causing further escalation, one involved emulating its playbook from January 2020—after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani—when it targeted U.S. bases in Iraq but gave enough advance warning to ensure that no American lives were lost.
Iran employed a similar strategy this time.
According to multiple sources, Iran provided ample notice to Qatari officials about the impending missile strikes.
Qatar, in turn, shut down its airspace and prepared accordingly.
As it turns out, no casualties occurred, and the majority of incoming missiles were intercepted by U.S. Patriot systems.
This made the strike as symbolic as possible.
For domestic Iranian audiences, it registered as a retaliatory act—especially since al-Udeid is such a significant symbol of U.S. military presence in the region.
By attacking a key U.S. base in the Gulf for the first time, Iran signaled its willingness to escalate if necessary.
And yet, the strike was designed to avoid American fatalities or substantial damage. It was, in effect, a calibrated show of force.
Additionally, although there had been concerns that Iran might escalate further—by closing the Strait of Hormuz or laying naval mines—such actions have not materialized.
Following an initial spike in oil futures, prices actually dropped by 7% on Monday.
This suggests that the market is now pricing in a de-escalation, at least for the immediate future, and does not expect a broader regional conflict to unfold—at least not yet.
And in his Truth Social post, Donald Trump made it clear that he treated Iranian strikes as a signal—as purely symbolic and as a strong signal that Iran wants to de-escalate.
Even though Trump taunted Iran for their "very weak response," to ‘‘obliteration’’ of their nuclear facilities, He did confirm that there were no American lives lost. He thanked Iran for advance warning and expressed hope that there would be no further “hate”.
He also expressed hope that Iran could now "proceed to peace and harmony" in the region and that Trump was willing to encourage Israel to do the same.
Needless to say, Trump's response probably led to a huge sigh of relief for the leaders of Iranian regime - let alone to millions of Americans and Iranian civilians who didn’t want a further escalation.
But this doesn't necessarily mean that further escalation will not occur. This is because Israel is still active in Iran, and its goals will now increasingly diverge from those set out by Trump.
Israel is pursuing a regime change: will the U.S. and Europe support this objective?
Another pressing question is the extent to which Israel is truly willing to forgo regime change as an objective.
While Israeli officials have been careful to repeat that they are not pursuing regime change per se, they frequently add that regime change would be a “welcome outcome” of their current actions.
But the conduct on the ground stands in stark contrast to those statements.
Even though Netanyahu has said he does not want to extend the conflict into a war of attrition, there is no clear indication that he’s not actively pursuing regime change.
In fact, virtually everything Israel is doing right now signals that it is attempting to collapse the Iranian regime.
Israel is striking highly symbolic regime targets—such as Evin Prison, notorious for its role in suppressing domestic political dissent, imprisoning activists, and torturing opponents.
It is one of the most infamous symbols of the Islamic Republic’s internal repression.
Israel is also targeting internal security structures tied to the IRGC and central police command centers—facilities primarily concerned with maintaining regime control rather than defending against external threats.
This is not a campaign limited to air defense systems, missile launchers, or production facilities.
Instead, Israel is now also actively going after the internal machinery of the regime.
As of today, there’s even a report in The Washington Post noting that Israeli covert operatives have been directly contacting second- and third-tier IRGC commanders and generals, warning them that they are next in line to be assassinated unless they defect or flee the regime.
The clear goal is to sow fear, disorganization, and eventual collapse within the regime’s leadership structure—making it more difficult to replace those already eliminated.
This is not something Israel would do if regime change were not the underlying objective.
Of course, Israeli officials will argue that during wartime, weakening the regime’s ability to retaliate is a necessary step.
But the reality is: if regime change were Israel’s declared, open objective, how would their current actions look any different?
They wouldn’t.
Israel would still be targeting regime officials.
Israel would still be striking symbolic institutions of internal control.
And they would still be working to intimidate lower-tier officers into fleeing or defecting.
So there is, in effect, no real distinction between what Israel says it is doing and what it actually is doing on the ground.
As a result, the Iranian regime likely sees the Israeli campaign (correctly) as an active attempt to overthrow it.
And that perception matters greatly.
If Israel continues making progress in this campaign, we may soon approach a scenario in which the Iranian regime has almost no incentive to restrain itself, hold its temper, or act strictly in accordance with Iranian national interest—as opposed to focusing exclusively on regime survival.
If Israel’s campaign gains further momentum and begins to threaten the regime’s very survival, Iran may calculate that it must do something drastic to disrupt the momentum, create chaos, and pressure the West to reconsider regime change as a viable or desirable outcome.
At that point, we could start seeing declarations that Iran is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or we could see the actual closure or mining of the Strait of Hormuz—leading to massive spikes in global oil prices and placing political pressure on Trump to resolve this crisis as urgently as possible (leading to the likely further use of American military force.)
We could also see direct, unannounced attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq, Qatar, or other Gulf monarchies—this time with the intention of inflicting real damage and casualties.
In short, if Israel approaches the point of toppling the regime and does not stop, the Iranian regime may very well shift from a strategy of calculated national interest to one focused solely on survival.
At that stage, we could start seeing the kind of high-risk escalation designed to break Western resolve.
So now, the real question becomes: at what point—if any—will Trump tell Netanyahu to stop?
Is Trump waiting a few more days, or possibly even weeks, to see if Netanyahu can complete a successful regime decapitation without provoking the kind of Iranian backlash that spirals into regional war?
Is Trump watching from the sidelines, hoping Netanyahu succeeds in finishing the job—without forcing U.S. involvement?
Or, alternatively, will the U.S. pivot back to diplomacy and offer Iran a reset—an opportunity to come back to the negotiating table to discuss the remnants of its nuclear program?
As of now, the latter path looks unlikely.
That’s because Europe—especially France and the U.K.—are now aligning more closely with the U.S. position, openly insisting on zero enrichment.
Not the approximately 3.67% enrichment limit allowed under the JCPOA, but full elimination of enrichment capacity.
With the Iranian regime now weakened, reeling from successive strikes, and holding a deteriorating strategic position, the Europeans appear to be hardening their stance alongside Washington.
But zero enrichment is a red line for Iran—especially after suffering such humiliating strikes.
It is highly unlikely they would agree to such terms now, particularly without a diplomatic face-saving offer.
So it remains unclear whether the West’s plan is to pressure Iran into a corner, provoke its refusal, and return to regime change as Plan A—or if, at some point, the U.S. and its allies will soften their terms and offer Iran a realistic off-ramp to avoid full collapse.
As things stand, however, there appears to be no such offramp on the table.