Midweekly Overview
Estimated Reading Time: 4 mins, 55 sec.
A ridiculous defense of Nord Stream 2
German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier entered the NS2 debate with a loud bang
Or maybe a different sound - what do you call a noise caused by millions of simultaneous facepalms.
Since anyone with an IQ of above 100 that was reading his comments was doing exactly that.
Mr Steinmeir believes that Germany owes Russia NS2 over WW2 atrocities…
No need to delve in too deep to reveal sheer absurdity of this reasoning.
But.. by that logic, what about a debt owed to Britain then? For bombing London?
How about Germany convinces the rest of the EU to offer London’s banks and financial services behemoths full EU wide passporting rights?
Or how about you owe US for saving West Germany from Soviet/Stasi rule? Is there any doubt that Germany would not be the economic power that it is today if all of it was ruled by GDR?
How about you repay that debt to your current ally by cancelling this project and strengthening your own energy security and independence from an adversarial Russia?
How about a win-win?
Iranian outbursts on JCPOA must be ignored
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared that US must make the first concessionary move on nuclear deal - before Iranian compliance would become a reality.
He furthermore demanded the removal of all (JCPOA related) sanctions.
Khamenei also added the following: "This is the definitive and irreversible policy of the Islamic Republic, and all of the country’s officials are unanimous on this, and no one will deviate from it."
Clearly, this contradicts the prior suggestions from the Iranian FM that ‘‘synchronous’’ actions could potentially be a way forward from this impasse.
It was telling that Khamenei had to add that all officials were unanimous on this.
They clearly are not. So either:
1) The Supreme leader is facing a challenge in holding the reins over his officials (who are far from unanimous) and public reiteration of his authority is aimed at projection of unity to the general public (this was a televised appearance).
2) This is a classic good cop/bad cop situation with FM Javad’s role being that of a mediator.
3) A bit of both.
It is probably the third scenario - I will further clarify in future cables.
In the meantime, US must remain unequivocal in its insistence that Iran go first.
America must not however resort to minimalism - giving up its strong leverage on the issue.
In this context, Biden’s stance was reassuring - but his team’s clarification was damaging to the US leverage.
Biden himself (in his interview to CBS), confirmed the prior position that Iran would have to stop its JCPOA violations.
In the meantime, Iran is not doing that at all.
In fact IAEA confirmed (on Feb 10) that Iran is indeed developing Uranium metal.
Uranium metal can be used to make the core of an atom bomb - a clear violation of the JCPOA.
Against this context, an anonymous US official clarifying Biden’s statement (to the CBS) added the following line: ‘‘There is nothing changed in the U.S. position. The United States wants Iran to come back into (compliance with) its JCPOA commitments and if it does, the United States will do the same.’’
Really? absolutely nothing has changed?
How about a powerful leverage over Iran? How about you don’t reveal all your cards?
What incentives are there for Iran not to play hardball when US is being so minimalistic in its approach?
Biden team must remember that the upcoming June elections in Iran, favor their position - not that of Iran’s.
Iranian leaders are desperate to avoid further large scale (post electoral fraud) protests - they need to show a promise of rising living standards.
Something that would not be possible with sanctions remaining in place.
Anti-Putin protests stall - Navalny team’s erroneous strategy
Mass arrests and police brutality has secured a breathing space for the Putin regime.
Large scale protests did not occur this passing weekend, and team Navalny wants to now delay further large scale protests until spring.
Supposedly, more time and warmer weather will help to rally larger crowds.
Imprisoned Navalniy’s key ally, Leonid Volkov (currently abroad and facing Kremlin’s international arrest warrant) is essentially pushing for a two pronged strategy:
1) Western sanctions on key Russian leaders/statesmen and the regime elite.
2) Postponement of large scale protests.
Both, on the face of it, have some merits - but are ultimately self-defeating.
Let’s unpack why.
1) Issues with sanctioning the Russian elite.
In my January cables, I noted the importance of sanctioning mid-level repression implementers.
These are judges, police department chiefs, Rosgvardia (riot police/national guard) commanders, state media liars.
Why not the ruling elite?
Well for starters, most of them are already under sanctions.
Further sanctions would escalate matters significantly - not bad in itself. But what would this policy achieve?
Volkov suggests that this would cause infighting and anger towards Putin.
Yes it might. But what would be the outcome?
I did previously explain that authoritarianism in Russia is so strong, that Putin is more likely to be removed by a coup rather than a popular uprising.
Don’t overestimate the charismatic and overwhelming presence of Putin - other charismatic leaders (like Mubarak and almost with Erdogan) have been removed from power via well-organized coups.
The problem with Volkov’s strategy is that either it will have unpredictable outcomes( more on that below), or it could lead to removal of Putin and replacement with someone equally as bad (if not more).
Who could successfully pull off this coup? certainly not FSB, with its personal loyalty to Putin.
Any move like that would come from a wider circle of siloviki faction.
Probably lead by the Defense minister Sergei Shoygu.
And what then? he is also corrupt and definitely invested in authoritarian superstructure.
What then? is he really going to release Navalny and hold free and fair elections?
If anything, Putin is softer - at least for a long time he was engaging in managed democracy (under leadership of former chief strategist Vladislav Surkov).
Manipulation, and not outright force, is his preferred choice.
Secondly, I mentioned the possibility of unforeseen consequences ruining everything.
What if instead of in-fighting, the Putin elite decided to get rid of Navalny?
A lot of political operatives in Russia believe that a large part of the electorate is apathetic, that Navalny mainly appeals to middle/upper middle class Russians (a small part of the electorate) that will be silenced if Navalny is removed.
There is a belief in Russian elite circles, that the assassination of Navalny could have a chilling effect on the Russian opposition - at least for some time.
Time enough for Putin to find his footing again.
Are they necessarily wrong?
They are wrong in underestimating generational and demographic trends.
Also, the future of the economy and how technology changes state monopoly on propaganda.
But all of these are longer term trends.
The pressing danger (and cause for sanctions) would be Navalny - remove him and you have solved the problem for at least several years.
After all, that is exactly what was attempted last year.
So why would Russian elite not try that out again?
Navalny will be in prison for more than 2 years. Is it really inconceivable that they could fake a prison yard fight where Navalny gets killed? They could wait for few months (for protests / attention to dwindle) and then go on with this plan.
They have engaged in far more outrageous plans before.
2) Issues with delaying large scale protests
For starters, this solidifies the popular perception that Putin is in control.
That only after two attempts, Navalny and his team needed a break.
What better gift to Vlad the aqua disco lover?
Putin benefits in many ways:
a) get to show to his elites that he is totally in control,
b) demonstrates the same control to other authoritarian leaders that depend on him (reducing the risk that they would hedge their bets),
c) his propaganda that Navalny and his team are foreign agents without popular support, gains some steam. Surely if this was a large popular movement (as team Navalny claims) there wouldn’t be a need to take a breather after only two organized protests?
The biggest threat is to the morale of dissatisfied Russians.
In one of my previous cables, I talked about how viability of success was one of the main drivers of a popular street resistance movement.
I also said that this was lower in Russia from the very outset.
Russians already thought it impossible to remove Putin through street protests.
And that was back then - when Navalny bravery/Putin palace shock effect were at the highest level.
Those effects are getting diminished with every passing day.
So a pause to protests now, would cause even more significant injury to the viability of this project - and with that, lead to a further reduction in morale.
Sure, spring is warmer - but will it offset reduced morale? We shall see.
There are furthermore some lesser risks:
a) Putin can now benefit from a break in protests, and engage in conciliatory steps without appearance of him being pressured into them.
So Putin can go ahead with large (for Russia) spending plans aimed at social problems - without looking like Navalny’s street protestors forced him to do this.
Public anger goes down, and team Navalny gets little credit
b) harassment and arrests of local Navalny organizers.
Team Navalny have HQs in 45 Russian cities (with some presence in further 35).
When people closest to Navalny (his brother/wife etc) get arrested, a large media exposure/foreign diplomatic intervention follows.
This will not be the case for local organizers. If many of them get some sort of ‘‘prophylactic conversation invitations’’ from the police, not much in the form of media/diplomatic help is to be expected.
If enough of them are deterred from leading local protests, well.. then the nationwide protests are doomed - it will only end up being held in 3-4 large cities.
That would surely be a huge blow to the credibility of the protest movement - further confirming Putin’s propaganda of ‘‘coordinated and western supported limited public nuisance events’’.
c) change of narrative
For example, opposition in-fighting (like Yavlinkiy attacking Navalny for his nationalism)
With less focus on the protest movement, secondary issues (including many that are unfavorable to Navalny) will gain more prominence and the corresponding media attention - further sucking the energy and momentum from the street protests.
Team Navalny should not be waiting for Spring.
They must keep up the momentum.
If they are too weak to maintain large nationwide protests, then as a temporary measure, they could switch to semi-weekly flashmob style disruptive street protests.
All focus must remain on maintaining momentum and keeping the pressure on Putin.