Midweekly Overview - Putin suffers an embarrassing setback in Duma elections - in spite of all the gimmicks, dirty tricks, and inadvertent Western assistance
Putin suffers an embarrassing setback in Duma elections - in spite of all the gimmicks, dirty tricks, and inadvertent Western assistance
Firstly, even before the actual elections, the Europeans did well (surprisingly) to harm the perceived legitimacy (or remnants of it) of the Parliamentary/Duma elections - where Putin’s ‘‘United Russia’’ party was to be tested after a period of COVID related slump and stagnating living conditions.
OSCE refused to monitor the Duma elections, citing extraordinary (yet wholly unjustified) restrictions - meaning that holding free & fair elections would be fantastically unlikely.
Europeans therefore (very wisely) decided against partaking in Putin’s theatre of democracy - a participation that would have added a layer of legitimacy to the whole Potemkin village.
Furthermore, the Parliament of the EU took a strong critical stance just before the actual elections were to take place.
Calling for a separation between Russian people and its regime (precisely what these cables have been advocating to date) the Parliamentarians reserved a strong label for the latter, labeling them ‘‘stagnating authoritarian kleptocracy led by a president-for-life surrounded by a circle of oligarchs’’.
Then there were very public displays of electoral irregularities and rigging (precisely what led to widespread protests in Belarus just a year ago) - Russian social media is now a repository for endless and extremely blatant ballot-box stuffing videos.
And even then, the official results of this poorly orchestrated theatre pointed to Putin’s weakening grip over his regime - his ‘‘United Russia’’ party.
With even more brazen electoral interference and outright ballot-box stuffing, his party produced a weaker result than in 2016, ending up just about at the 50% of the total vote (as opposed to the previous 54%).
But for Putin, perhaps what mattered the most, was securing 2/3 majority of the 450 person chamber - enabling him to push for the legislation without seeking help from the other parties.
But is this a good return on risk for Putin?
After all, he had a lot of contextual variables stacked in his favor.
Let’s start with the most obvious factor
No real competition
Navalny is in prison - his allies barred from standing as candidates after being banned by the Moscow court and labeled as ‘‘extremists’’.
All other political parties - including the Communist party (that secured a second place in the election) are Kremlin pawns that offer no real opposition.
Furthermore, going into the election period, the media was under total control, Navalny was not able to galvanize the public with his charismatic youtube addresses, and his allies (mostly in exile) didn’t organize any mass protest rallies (like they did back in January).
Orchestrated PR
In order to burnish Putin’s foreign policy prestige credentials, and reposition him as the great leader of all slavs, The Kremlin orchestrated a further public declaration of union state programs with Belarus - concrete steps aimed at securing ever closer integration (with a country that as of today, really is just a huge fiscal burden - but good PR for Putin at any cost…)
Zapad 2021 military exercises on Russia’s Western frontier were also used as an opportunity to demonstrate advanced military hardware - and therefore, Putin’s prowess as a Commander in Chief.
(Side note: As well as to test the Belarusian generals’ appetite and eagerness for cooperation with their Russian counterparts.
A good proxy measure of a future willingness of submitting to the Kremlin’s will in totality - as part of a potential Union State absolute annexation).
Inadvertent Western help
The West missed the opportunity to create pre-election headaches for the Kremlin.
On the contrary, just as the brutal Assad regime was committing more war crimes, the Biden administration thought it prudent to consider lifting sanctions on the despotic regime in order to facilitate a minor foreign policy goal of providing Lebanon with gas (an objective that can be achieved in a far less costly manner).
(side note: such a policy would be devastating to the US credibility and prestige. It would signal to the whole world that it is fine for an authoritarian leader to massacre his own people, use chemical weapons to do so, ally itself with Russia (protector of all Mini-Me authoritarians everywhere) and in return, not only avoid facing any repercussions, but instead, receive a gift of a financial relief (in the form of an energy deal) from the US.
In other words: this policy would have incentivized future war crimes, and an easy dismissal of the US threats and diplomatic pressure everywhere in the world)
Putin of course didn’t miss the chance to capitalize on his (so far) successful investment in the geopolitical theatre in the Middle East - he hosted Assad at the Kremlin, where he used the opportunity to further berate both the US and Turkey - astonishingly, accusing them of violating international law.
At the time when the Western foreign policy establishment was enabling Putin to show off his realpolitik accomplishments with little difficulty, American tech giants provided further assistance to the Kremlin.
Youtube and Telegram restricted the spread of opposition messages from Team Navalny - that called for the utilization of their Smart Voting app (that recommends voters the most likely local candidate to beat the pro-Putin United Russia candidates).
Shockingly, Google and Apple went even further.
Faced with The Kremlin pressure, the American tech giants chose to bend over backwards and appease Putin - deleting the Smart Voting app altogether.
In spite of all of this crackdown, and a favorable context (partly shaped by the Kremlin, and partly a gift of Western appeasement), Putin didn’t succeed in securing a definitive and demonstrative victory.
Clearly, the Kremlin technologists didn’t want to get a 90%+ result either - that level of excess would have only served to highlight the sham that this whole endeavor really was.
But after all that authoritarian control and orchestration, mustering barely 50% is also a warning sign (that the Kremlin would be negligent to dismiss) - apathy and ambivalence is on the rise.
Going forward, even more administrative resources (and more brazen electoral fraud) may be needed - especially if the living standards continue to stagnate.
On the other hand, the results will reinforce the status of the Siloviki/Security apparatus faction of the Kremlin - their model of Andropov style targeted and front loaded repression against Navalny, proved to be successful in preventing the Belarus street protests scenario of 2020.
This reinforcement and affirmation may however backfire - encouraging the Kremlin to resort to similar (previously proven) tactics when the context may no longer be as favorable and amenable to their repeat use.
France is testing out a new post AUKUS strategy
French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, was courting his Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, on a post-AUKUS diplomatic outreach phone call.
On the call, Le Drian called for ‘‘a truly multilateral international order’’.
And soon thereafter, there was a meeting (to presumably discuss the early parameters of their new potential partnership) between the French and Indian heads of state.
In other words, this was an offer to join forces and mutually reinforce leverage against both the AUKUS and China.
This is bad news for NATO - France is choosing to pursue an independent foreign policy in the Pacific.
The French will try to act as a mediating power in the China vs AUKUS conflict.
Sensing India’s hesitancy to commit to either side in this great confrontation, France was eager (and from their perspective rightly so) to recruit a regional ally and increase its own leverage.
Naturally, a corollary task for the US will be to induce India into taking a stronger pro QUAD and pro AUKUS stance.
Providing concrete benefits to Delhi (in the form of similar defense deals that benefited Australia), as well as capitalizing on the border dispute with China (and demonstratively supporting India whenever reasonable) will be good starting points.
Why Russia is mute on AUKUS
The DC foreign policy establishment is anxiously awaiting a high profile Kremlin reaction to America’s new regional alliance, and a plan to build nuclear submarines for Australia.
For many analysts and strategists, Russia’s subdued response is bewildering.
But why would the Kremlin object?
What specifically would the Kremlin find so disadvantageous to its regional interests?
Australia’s new nuclear submarines are going to challenge China not Russia - Moscow has no outright national interest clashes with Canberra.
Perhaps some expected a strong pro China statement simply out of alliance related duties and mere solidarity?
Well as I have previously argued (extensively) in these cables, Russia and China are not allies and the probability of such an alliance taking place is not significant (at least in the short to medium term).
Moscow and Beijing are partners of convenience - and when it is inconvenient to lend support, no such support will be provided.
In order to advance its own national (economic) interests in Ukraine, Beijing refused to back Moscow fully - never formally acknowledging annexed Crimea as Russian territory.
And in this case, it is Russia’s turn - China feeling some additional regional heat is in the Kremlin’s interest.
Since this raises the value (and therefore the price) of Russia’s regional military support.
With GDP 10x that of Russia, China is already the de facto power holder in the Moscow - Beijing partnership.
Anything that adds to Russia’s leverage in this exceptionally unbalanced partnership is good news for the Kremlin.
And let’s not forget that Putin is delighted at the AUKUS / France conflict, and thus the real possibility that the European powers may further drift away from NATO - potentially (even if belatedly) confirming Trump’s comment on the organization’s ‘‘obsolete’’ nature.