Midweekly Overview
Estimated Reading Time: 4 mins, 54 sec.
Biden’s diplomatic team is on point
So far, every notable appointee dealing with foreign policy/national security issues has delivered reassuring comments in public.
Blinken admitted that Pompeo/Trump policy on China was correct.
He even complained that Trump admin did not go far enough in protecting Hong Kong’s democratic movement [agreed].
Blinken further agreement with Pompeo’s designation of Chinese actions against Uyghurs as a genocide, was just perfect.
China now is in a silly position with a terrible start - it sanctioned Pompeo [and other Trump gov officials] for that designation.
Yet here we are with the future State Sec backing that assessment.
So what will it do now?
How can it reconcile softening its rhetoric against the new administration, without appearing inconsistent after these sanctions on the old admin leaders?
Then there is Jake Sullivan and Avril Haines.
Sullivan responded instantly to Navalny’s arrest demanding an immediate release.
Avril Haines concurred that being aggressive in China policy is the correct approach.
She also promised to release reports on the Jamal Khashoggi murder.
Which obviously was the doing of Saudi Crown prince MBS.
This is great. Not just because it is a good thing to do.
But also because it signals that there is a new sheriff in town to Arab ‘‘allies’’ of convenience.
Arab states relying on American protection and military hardware must not get cocky and dictate terms of the relationship.
Let’s be real. MBS’s calculations before ordering the brazen and barbaric assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, would have been much different if Trump was not grinning in photos holding massive checks for weapon sales..
America cannot and must not tolerate barbaric acts from its allies/partners.
Neither should this sound as overly idealistic.
This is in fact a matter of realpolitik - America cannot successfully prosecute a case against Chinese atrocities, if its own allies are acting like savages.
You cannot successfully/convincingly condemn Iran for executing journalists if Saudi Arabia is doing just that - even with more sadism.
Iran is a sinking ship - yet it insists that the "ball is in the U.S. court"
In a televised cabinet meeting speech, Iranian President Rouhani delivered the following remarks:
“The ball is in the U.S. court now. If Washington returns to Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal, we will also fully respect our commitments under the pact.”
As I have been writing in the previous cables, all of the violations up to this day were aimed at creating the new normal - an anchor point for the negotiations.
A favorable new starting point, where retreat to the old status quo [and by old I mean couple of months] will be presented as a good faith concession.
Going back to 3.67% enrichment levels will be framed as a difficult decision that Iran would no doubt visibly struggle to make.
Idea is to operate within the new ‘‘Overton window’’ of the ongoing negotiations - where it is unthinkable to reintroduce demands around Iranian ballistic missile programs/proxy activities.
Ok, but is it true? Is the ball really in the U.S. court?
Well who really needs an end to sanctions asap?
Contrary to what Rouhani claimed, the maximum pressure campaign was far from a failure.
We can skip on the 2020 Economic KPI figures - partly because COVID-19 undoubtedly had a powerful negative effect on the Iranian finances.
Also because with the current dire conditions, Iran has even more incentive to falsify key statistics.
But even a cursory look at the 2018-2019 data [after Trump’s reinstatement of sanctions] shows how much weaker Iranian economy really is.
Iran's (GDP) contracted an estimated 4.8% and 9.5% in the years 2018 and 2019 respectively.
Unemployment reached at least 16.8% in 2019.
Oil production fell from 3.8 bpd in 2018, to 2.1 bpd in 2019. Only a tiny fraction was being exported [impossible to know accurately - since some % was clearly smuggled in secret]. Iranian Rial [national currency] halved in value.
Living standards plummeted with rising prices - as inflation rose from 9% in 2017 to 35.7% in 2019
No wonder Iranians took to the streets in November 2019 - only an overwhelming violence ended [or rather postponed] these protests.
All of that before COVID-19 too.
Iran must be suffering so bad that it has to resort to a maritime piracy - detaining a crew of South Korean sailors effectively as hostages, in return for its frozen funds in South Korean banks.
How much longer can it tolerate all this pressure and strain on the economy.
Once enough % of the population is vaccinated and out of lockdown, where is the guarantee that protests will not resume? With more fervor and determination? Especially in the election year..
So Iran can claim whatever it wants - real life geopolitics is markedly different from poker.
In poker, you can hide a bad hand.
Here, everything is in the open. We know how badly Iran needs this deal.
Biden administration must not rush into a deal on unfavorable terms.
As I have said before, concessions around the Ballistic missile program + proxy activities must be demanded with decisiveness.
It is reassuring that the future State Sec Blinken said he would not rush into the deal - correct approach.
The ball is and must be kept on Iranian court.
Turkey flirts with Germany
Turkish President Erdogan made some interesting comments when delivering remarks about Turkey’s desire to join the EU.
When addressing EU ambassadors, Erdogan asserted that Turkish membership of the EU could resolve increasing ‘‘uncertainties’’ after Britain’s departure from the bloc:
‘‘Uncertainties that are increasing with Brexit can only be dissipated with Turkey receiving its rightful place in the European family”.
What uncertainties? Who is uncertain?
Sure, there are lots of bureaucratic headaches in Brussels, but if anyone is uncertain about future, then it is probably Britain, not the EU.
Even though I have criticized EU’s policy on China, they did finalize that investment agreement even with heated Brexit negotiations going on in the background.
They did not look uncertain then, nor do they look now.
They don’t look uncertain in their foreign policy, and any domestic issues with Poland and Hungary would have taken place regardless of Brexit.
EU as a bloc, is not suffering from a post Brexit uncertainty.
Inconveniences? More red tape on Trade with the UK? yes and yes.
Uncertainty? no.
So if EU as a bloc is just fine, perhaps there are individual countries that may be facing uncertainties?
Indeed, and that country is Germany.
It is a presumed leader, but it is not certain about its role.
With French President Macron’s recent international activism, Germany is not certain that it can pull the whole bloc behind it on key foreign policy moves.
UK was not just a competitor - it was also a balancer. That counter-balance to France [when needed] is gone.
It is not clear which country could take up that role.
Ergo, when Erdogan says he can help with uncertainties of Brexit, he means German uncertainties.
It makes sense. It is a natural alliance. Turkey’s economy is already much more significantly linked with that of Germany [than with France].
With France, it has new conflicts in the mediterranean - no such conflict with Germany.
Even though Germany and Turkey had some distasteful incidents in the recent past [e.g. when Erdogan threatened to send over three million Syrian refugees], there exists no serious structural geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Germany.
In fact, Turkey’s geopolitical utility within the EU will extend beyond its role as a counter-balancer to France.
It can also provide a reliable support for pressure on Russia.
UK was the strongest anti-Russia ally available to Germany.
Spain and Italy are not sufficiently invested. Greece and Hungary are clearly pro-Russia. France is a mixed bag.
Turkey is on a collision course with Russia in three different arenas: Libya, Syria and South Caucasus / Karabakh.
Erdogan’s business with Putin will never exceed its transactional nature.
Sure it can buy S400s [and their Defense minister recently complained there were no better offers - hint: make a better offer] and other weapons.
But when it comes to long-term strategy, Turkey will always side with NATO and the EU. Its own geopolitical interests demand it.
Your implication that Germany should or would be interested in Turkey joining the EU is silly. The notion that Germany would support the idea of a large Muslim state joining the bloc — yes, it’s “bloc” not “block” — reflects misunderstanding of current European politics and the continuing threat of anti-Muslim populism.