Midweekly Overview
Estimated Reading Time: 4 mins, 54 sec.
US should not be taking the first step on JCPOA
I have been saying for quite some time now that US holds an overwhelming leverage on the JCPOA deal.
Iranian FM (once again) proved my point by a demonstrable u-turn.
Just a week after insisting that US should go first with concessions, Javad Zarif now suggests that perhaps there could be a middle ground - simultaneous moves by both parties.
And who should be the one in charge of ‘‘synchronising’’ these moves?
Well, Zarif proposes that (perpetually and conspicuously overeager) EU foreign policy chief, Joseph Borell “can ... sort of choreograph the actions”.
Mr Borell is no doubt unable to sleep at nights from the overexcitement.
US State Department’s initial response was however measured and overall appropriate.
‘‘There are (many) steps in that process ... before we’re reaching the point where we are going to engage directly with the Iranians and willing to entertain any sort of proposal”, said the DoS spokesperson Ned Price.
Quite right.
Though no outward appearance of softening should accompany this (initial) aloofness.
Hence why USS Nimitz leaving the Persian gulf at this very moment was questionable.
France wants to sell more weapons to Saudi Arabia
With Biden admin’s temporary freeze on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, France is vying to fill in the gap.
In the process, Macron is engaging in some rather obvious gestures towards Saudi Arabia.
Why else would France push for Saudi Arabia to be a participant in future Iran nuclear deal talks?
Macron most definitely did not make this suggestion because he believed it is a good policy.
In fact, if the goal was to come to an agreement with Iran, (and if there was no other hidden motive - which there is) this would have been a rather dumb foreign policy proposal.
Firstly, because Iran would never agree to it (and which it did not once again - strongly rejecting this absurd proposal).
Secondly, because even if hypothetically Saudi Arabia was somehow inserted into the negotiations, this would only increase tensions, spectacularly delay the whole process, and ultimately prevent any possible final agreement.
Saudi Arabia would make sure of it - it does not want a deal with Iran.
It wants Iran bombed and weakened instead.
And from their perspective.. quite rightly so.
Putin picks his poison
Putin decided that sentencing Navalny to 3.5 years (with 2 years 8 months to be served custodially) of imprisonment was better than the alternative.
To be clear, Putin faced only bad options - there is no good way out of this mess.
So what was his alternative?
Back in the early Jan, I wrote how releasing Navalny created another major risk -that this would let Navalny to lead (probably quite successfully too) his smart voting campaign against Putin’s United Russia in the September’s Duma elections.
That would then force Putin’s hand - he would have to rely more heavily on state resources.
Consequently, elections would be rigged more conspicuously - possibly leading to bigger protest movements.
You could bet that Navalny’s highly professional team would milk the brazen evidence of electoral fraud - millions of views on social media platforms would be guaranteed.
So, Putin decided to avoid that debacle.
But did he really avoid it? If Navalny’s team performs at even 70-80% without their boss present on the ground, most of the negative outcomes (that Putin hoped to avoid) could still largely materialize.
Instead, it is possible that Putin secured himself a trouble of different sorts - decentralized, spontaneous protests without clear leadership - suppressing those may prove equally (if not more) difficult.
But Navalny’s organizational prowess (in relation to the September elections) was not the only risk Putin had to square with.
There were few other notable risks associated with pulling back and releasing Navalny:
1) Creating a precedent that mass protests can achieve their goal - this is a big risk for Putin.
If 100k people come out to the streets, and succeed in forcing Kremlin to backtrack, would it then not encourage millions more to express other demands in a similar fashion? with even higher enthusiasm and energy? once the success and viability of protests was proven?
Backtracking now would create exactly that precedent, and encourage larger crowds after the September elections (when the weather would also be more agreeable to the protestors).
2) Creating a precedent and an impression that the Western pressure on Kremlin was fruitful.
This would damage Putin’s charisma in the eyes of his domestic, nationalist and Russia, Orthodoxy and conservative values crowd - a large % of Putin’s personal popularity is based on this image (and pro Crimean invasion Navalny also fares quite well on this front - unlike former liberal opposition leaders like Nemtsov).
3) Looking soft and weak and on the decline in the eyes of the siloviki faction - that wing of the military that Putin does not trust too much (not enough to have them participate closely in large-scale corruption projects).
Putin cannot afford to look weak in this context.
Authoritarian regime in Russia is so well-established that a palace coup is far more likely than any popular uprising caused revolution.
At least for the nearest foreseeable future.
4) Looking soft and weak and on the decline in the eyes of other regional autocrats.
If leaders like Lukashenko or those in central Asia, see Putin as weak and indecisive, they are more likely to start hedging their bets.
Some may reduce authoritarianism in the hopes of getting closer to the U.S.
Others may chose to strengthen their ties with China.
This would be a geopolitical disaster for Putin.
So Putin decided to avoid all of these legitimate risks.
But by doing so, he is also opening himself to another serious risk.
That risk is that Navalny could now become a Mandela like figure whilst in prison.
Navalny is still young, 2+ years of imprisonment will not affect him that much (unless there are some nefarious plans for him in prison).
Sure, he would not be at the helm for some time, would not be around to lead the protests, or organize some other creative campaigns like smart voting.
But look at what he is gaining!
The whole world will keep talking about Navalny. Western media will prop him up.
Western sanctions may be introduced - political leaders will make sure Navalny issue is always on the agenda.
Within Russia, Navalny’s popularity will undoubtedly increase - he will solidify his position as the only serious alternative to Putin from the opposition.
Russian authoritarianism is still strong.
But the trends have reversed - declining regime is in conflict with the rising opposition.
Putin provides a fresh distraction for his palace woes.
Putin’s long-term ally (and a former judo partner) Arkady Rotenberg came forward to claim the ownership of the palace.
This is clearly a total BS.
But there is a danger that Navalny’s team, general public, and the independent media would all get distracted by this red herring.
They could get drawn into a rabbit hole of proving that Arkady Rotenberg’s claims are false, and that he does not indeed own the palace.
In the meantime, the narrative would change.
Attention and air time would switch from Putin to Rotenberg.
Given this danger, Russian opposition and the western media must do everything to not fall into this trap and keep the focus on Putin.
Down the line, Navalny’s team can produce another detailed follow-up video, proving that Rotenberg’s claims are pure lies.
But at this very moment, all attention must remain on Putin - making sure he does not escape unscathed with this distraction and disinformation campaign.
European pressure on Nord Stream 2 continues to build up
In the previous cable, I wrote about the perfect timing to kill NS2.
With the imprisonment of Navalny, the pressure on Germany to pull the plug on the project keeps building.
Indeed, French European Affairs Minister Clement Beaune noted how ‘‘Sanctions have not gone far enough’’ and that it was important to halt the NS2 project.
Never let a crises go to waste.
Biden admin must tackle this issue head on, and press Germany to terminate the project.
There is still time to do this.
Nevermind what Gazprom says - a pipeline that is 94% complete is as useful as the on that is at 0%.
If the NS2 project survives the next few months, it is unlikely that Germany would pull the plug on it later on.
Good point about France. In fact, the French and the Southern Europeans in general are more vulnerable to
Iranian nukes than US and are also more reliant on “Arab oil” but were able to free ride on US on the issue as long as the Americans were tough. So their more assertive position now makes sense. Thanks for the good work!