Netanyahu's White House Visit Yield's Mixed Results
Netanyahu-Trump Meeting Overview.
The meeting between Trump and Netanyahu in DC concluded a few hours ago.
This was the Israeli Prime Minister’s second White House visit under Trump’s second term.
Netanyahu’s repeated visits to Washington—the second in ten weeks—underscore the urgency and fragility of his strategic position.
Obviously, you don’t make such trips if everything is going according to the plan on say Iran.
Domestically, revelations by the recently ousted Shin Bet chief, Ronen Bar, highlighted that the continuation of the war in Gaza and other fronts serves Netanyahu’s political survival.
According to Israel’s spy chief:
‘‘The war's continuation, on multiple fronts, was for Netanyahu's personal benefit... a diversion from his trial, used as an excuse for the interminable delays."
(side note: he essentially confirmed what we all knew (and what these cables have been arguing) for a very long time now.)
According to Bar, the war is being used to delay Netanyahu’s political collapse by creating a perpetual state of crisis.
So Netanyahu didn’t come to DC with a strong domestic political wind behind his sails.
With that said, Netanyahu entered the meeting with four main objectives:
1. Iran Policy: His first objective was to dissuade the United States—more specifically, Trump—from continuing negotiations with Iran or offering favorable terms.
Instead, Netanyahu aimed to persuade Trump to back an Israeli strike on Iran.
Given Trump’s general aversion to escalating conflict in the Middle East, particularly with Iran, this was a difficult sell.
Still, this objective was the most strategically urgent for Netanyahu, considering the Israeli perception that the current strategic window may soon close.
Despite his efforts, Trump did not issue strong language or threats against Iran.
Instead, he announced that direct negotiations with Iran are scheduled to take place on Saturday—a significant development, given that Iran has until now resisted direct talks.
2. Syria: The second objective was to leverage U.S. influence to pressure Turkey and Syria, effectively allowing Israel to maintain a de facto buffer zone in southern Syria.
This would allow continued Israeli operations, including indiscriminate bombings, which have resulted in civilian casualties in southern Syria.
Prior to the Oval Office meeting, there were reports that Netanyahu had been lobbying against Turkey receiving F-35 fighter jets from the U.S., as this would erode Israel’s air superiority.
However, Trump maintained his supportive tone toward Erdogan, highlighting their strong personal relationship:
"Well, I have uh great relations with a man named Erdogan. Have you heard of him? And I happen to like him, and he likes me, and I know the press will get very angry, 'He likes Erdogan.' But I do, and he likes me, and we've never had a problem, and we've gone through a lot, and we've never had a problem. We always got uh, we, as you remember, we got our minister back from Turkey, you remember that? And uh, this was a big deal at the time. And we got him back. Uh, and I told uh the prime minister, I said, just Bibi, if you have a problem with Turkey, I really think I'm gonna be able to work it out. You know, I have a very, very good relationship uh with Turkey and with their leader.” [emphasis added]
Netanyahu acknowledged this dynamic, suggesting he would rely on Trump as an intermediary with Turkey.
3. Tariff Reductions: The third goal was to secure the cancellation of 17% tariffs on Israeli imports.
There is, as of now, no clarity on whether progress was made on this front - even as Israel has moved to cancel its remaining tariffs on the U.S.
However, this issue appears less urgent for Netanyahu compared to the Iran and Syria fronts.
4. Continued U.S. Support for Gaza Operations: The fourth objective was to secure continued rhetorical, political, and moral support from the U.S. for Israeli actions in Gaza.
This comes amid global outrage over recent Israeli attacks that killed aid workers traveling in marked humanitarian vehicles, as well as hundreds of civilian deaths from Israeli bombings.
In this context, Netanyahu needed renewed backing, and Trump delivered to some extent, though not in particularly strong terms.
You win some, you lose some.
1) Netanyahu has not yet convinced Trump to strike Iran.
Returning to the Iran issue, while Netanyahu hoped to escalate tensions, Trump’s approach suggests otherwise.
His administration is pursuing de-escalation through direct talks, something Iran has long resisted but now appears open to.
This shift likely stems from Tehran viewing Trump’s threats as more credible than Biden’s.
Still, for Netanyahu, this is a major setback.
He views the current situation as a fleeting strategic opportunity—one that might not come again.
Israel perceives Iran as vulnerable (having destroyed all of Iran’s Russia-supplied S-300 air defense systems in two separate airstrike campaigns in October and April last year) and hopes to act while enjoying full U.S. backing is still possible.
But Trump appears unwilling to risk a costly regional conflict that would endanger Arab allies, disrupt trade, and undermine his domestic priorities.
2) Netanyahu succeeded in securing support for the status quo trajectory on Gaza.
Trump’s comments sums it all:
"You know how I feel about the Gaza Strip. I think it's an incredible piece of important real estate. And I think it's something that we would be involved in. Having a peace force like the US there controlling and owning the Gaza Strip would be a good thing ... you call it the Freedom Zone."
3) Netanyahu failed to secure concrete backing on a Syria standoff vs Turkey.
The dynamics with Turkey reinforce Netanyahu’s limited leverage.
Trump has publicly praised Erdogan, and Netanyahu himself has shown restraint in criticizing Turkey, implicitly acknowledging the strong U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Whether Trump will cancel or delay a lucrative F-35 deal with Turkey is doubtful, especially given current strains on the U.S. defense industry and Lockheed Martin.
(side note: it is highly questionable whether Trump will decline a multiple-billion deal with Turkey at the time when a number of European and other NATO allies like Canada are worried about future use/purchase/adoption of the F-35s, and while U.S. Defense Stocks are declining following cooling relations with Europe.)
Netanyahu’s Claims on Turkey and Regional Frictions.
With all that said, Netanyahu also made an astonishing claim during the meeting—he accused Turkey of using Syria as a base for a potential attack against Israel.
This accusation is clearly false and ridiculous.
The notion that Turkey would launch an attack on Israel from Syrian territory is militarily irrational and unsupported by any evidence.
Logistically, it makes no sense.
The idea that Turkish military planners would transport weapons across the vast open terrain of Syria towards the Golan Heights to stage an attack is implausible.
If Turkey intended to attack Israel—which it doesn’t—it would use more direct methods, such as airpower or maritime routes.
Syria, as it exists today, is not in a position to host such operations, nor is it politically inclined to do so.
Even if the Syrian leadership were willing to support such aggression—which they aren’t—the internal dynamics say otherwise.
In fact, the opposite is true: according to the Economist magazine poll, the HTS leader al-Sharaa enjoys wide public support and trust (north of 70% - uncommon even in well-established liberal democracies) - and this at least partly because of his firm stance that Syria should not be used as a platform for foreign powers to stage attacks.
Relations with Turkey, meanwhile, are positive—marked by neighborly cooperation, particularly on counter-terrorism.
Al-Sharaa has gone out of his way to prevent Turkey-backed factions from clashing with Kurdish forces, as a way of avoiding deeper Turkish military entanglement in Syria.
(side note: and the Kurdish SDF militia is also integrating into Syria’s formal military - another evidence of military consolidation and a reluctance to allow Syria turning into a free-for-all.)
At the same time, Syria is in need of support to rebuild its military, and Turkey is a logical partner for that task due to its proximity and geopolitical interests.
It makes sense for Turkey to play that role in stabilizing a neighboring state - blocking return of Iranian proxies.
In contrast, Israel is the one that continues to seize more territory in southern Syria, reaching up to the Damascus periphery, and regularly bombing Syrian government military installations.
Given that reality, for Netanyahu to accuse Turkey of aggression is exceptionally shameless.
It’s a transparent attempt to justify Israel’s ongoing expansionist actions in southern Syria.
The logic Netanyahu used—expanding military presence under the pretense of creating a “buffer zone”—mirrors Russia’s rhetoric in Ukraine.
Just as Putin justifies territorial expansion by citing defensive needs against NATO, Israel is using similar logic to justify incursions into Syrian territory.
It’s disingenuous and deliberately manipulative.
Netanyahu inserted this claim during the Oval Office meeting knowing full well that Trump—whose attention span is notoriously limited—would not challenge it.
The accusation went unchecked, allowing Netanyahu to broadcast it to a large audience without rebuttal.
That was a strategic move, but a shameless one.
Despite this maneuvering, Netanyahu did not achieve any of his key goals with regard to Turkey.
Trump reiterated his fondness for Erdogan, and Netanyahu was cautious not to offend Trump by criticizing Erdogan too directly.
It’s clear that, to avoid conflict, both Turkey and Israel will eventually need to engage in genuine dialogue and compromises.
There is at least one positive development: deconfliction talks between the two sides are reportedly underway.
But overall, while Netanyahu did manage to secure rhetorical support for Israeli operations in Gaza, he either failed to achieve or received mixed responses on all other strategic objectives.
This meeting cannot be considered a success for Netanyahu—it yielded little of tangible value and left many of his aims unmet.