Oman Talks On Iran's Nuclear Program: Facing Harsher U.S. Demands, Iran Buys Time with Tactical Flexibility
Last week, even Trump’s softer envoy, Witkoff - long seen as amenable to Iranian conditions - pivoted sharply to align with the administration’s hardliner faction.
In a marked shift, he declared that no uranium enrichment should be allowed within Iran, and that enrichment sites such as Fordow and Natanz would need to be dismantled completely.
This stance represents a fundamental break from all prior negotiations and, if maintained, will effectively end any prospect of a deal.
Iran is exceedingly unlikely to agree to such sweeping demands, which would strip it of domestic nuclear capabilities.
Should diplomacy fail, Trump may shift to Plan B: the military option.
That plan, previously discussed in earlier policy circles, involves the use of B-2 bombers (currently stationed at a base Diego Garcia) to strike Iranian facilities (dropping 30,000 pound GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs) - either as leverage to force Iran back to the negotiating table or as the opening move in a prolonged coercive campaign.
But against this increasingly hardline backdrop, a new, fourth round of talks were once again held in Oman today.
Oman Talks Maintain The Status Quo Of Diplomacy
Commenting on the talks that lasted for longer than three hours, a senior US official said the following :"We are encouraged by today's outcome…Agreement was reached to move forward with the talks to continue working through technical elements."
It is unclear what the U.S. official means here.
Is there an actual reason to be encouraged?
Did Iranians even signal any desire or interest in entertaining U.S. redlines?
Or did the U.S. redlines shift?
Is this just a ploy to keep things moving nicely and making sure that there's no hiccups and that any significant issues are left to deal with for later?
Is this a mere attempt to avoid yet another diplomatic crisis at the time when Trump is about to embark on a Middle East tour next week?
Iran’s ‘‘confidence-building measures’’ gambit
For its part, Iran responded deftly.
Although the Iranian Foreign Minister Aragchi reiterated that “Enrichment is an issue that must definitely continue and there is no room for compromise on it”, he also (and crucially) added the following: “However, its dimensions, levels, or amounts might change for a period for confidence-building.”
This is yet another example of shrewd diplomacy by Iran.
They are not doing everything possible to accommodate the U.S. or rush into a deal, nor are they abandoning their core interests.
They are sticking to their guns, and yet at the same time, they are avoiding a definitive “no.”
As previously discussed, surrendering their domestic enrichment capacity remains a clear red line for Iran.
Still, they are exploring creative ways to delay direct confrontation on this issue by offering confidence-building measures - such as limits on enrichment levels and other related parameters.
And as this happens, a third (and on the balance, riskier to the U.S.) possibility emerges: an interim deal that halts further enrichment in exchange for enhanced international verification and inspections.
But this could become a dangerous delaying tactic.
The U.N. “snapback” mechanism - allowing the U.N. Security Council sanctions to be reimposed if Iran violates the deal - expires in October.
(side note: and good luck getting any new U.N. Security Council sanctions in place at the time of a strong Russia-Iran alliance.)
Any delay past that point could remove the West’s serious diplomatic lever.
What does Iran gain from accommodation and delay of a definitive negotiated outcome?
Most importantly, time - and time serves three critical purposes.
1) Delay until U.N. Security Council Snapback Sanctions Expire in October 2025.
As discussed above, if they can delay long enough (though this remains unlikely), they might push past October, when the U.N. snapback sanctions mechanism is set to expire.
As a refresher: the JCPOA includes a "snapback" mechanism that allows any participant state to reimpose previous UN sanctions if Iran is found to be in significant non-compliance.
(side note: since the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and Russia is not going to trigger these, in practice, only the U.K, France and Germany could trigger the snapback mechanisms. But they are the U.S. allies and have repeatedly expressed willingness and readiness to do just that if Iran was non-compliant.)
This mechanism remains available until October 18, 2025.
That would eliminate a key international lever of pressure.
Provisions Set to Expire in October 2025 are extremely consequential:
1.Ballistic Missile Restrictions: The UN's call for Iran to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons will expire. This includes the prohibition on testing and development of such missile systems.
2. Arms Transfer Controls: The requirement for countries to obtain UN Security Council approval before transferring certain missiles, drones, and related technologies to or from Iran will lapse.
3. Asset Freezes: UN-mandated asset freezes targeting 23 individuals and 61 entities associated with Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are scheduled to be lifted.
4. Comprehensive Arms Embargo: A ban on the supply, sale, or transfer of most combat equipment to Iran, and a prohibition on Iran exporting weapons.
5. Prohibition on Uranium Enrichment: A ban on Iran's uranium enrichment activities, including further development of nuclear reactors.
2) They need time to prepare defensive capabilities.
Recall that only last October, Israel conducted direct strikes on Iranian territory (second in 2024), destroying all domestically deployed S-300 air defense systems.
Iran now needs to rebuild its radar infrastructure and surface-to-air missile networks in anticipation of future attacks.
Complicating matters further, Iran may have erred by supplying Fath-360 ballistic missile launchers to Russia.
While these missiles are short-range - about 75 miles - they could have been used to threaten U.S. naval assets in the region or handed off to the Houthis or other proxy militias to do the same.
(side note: The Fath-360s are more accurate than most of the Houthis' current arsenal.)
In effect, Iran gave away a tool that could have been used for its own deterrence.
The most generous interpretation is that Iran hoped to receive advanced Russian air defense systems in exchange.
But that seems unlikely in the near term, given that Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine and is in urgent need of its own military assets.
Given all this, Iran clearly needs time - to regroup, rearm, and hedge against escalation.
3) Extra time could also shift the regional balance in their favor.
One such possibility is a worsening conflict between Turkey and Israel over Syria.
If that confrontation intensifies and isn’t quickly mediated, Israel may be forced to divert significant military resources to the Syrian theater - stretching its capabilities and reducing the feasibility of launching a successful strike against Iran.
A direct military campaign against Iran would then become increasingly difficult to carry out with full success.
That said, there’s no denying that the U.S. retains the ability to strike and heavily damage Iran’s nuclear facilities, even without regional allies.
But ironically, time is not currently on Washington’s side - it’s on Tehran’s.
Iran will continue to seek de-escalation - not necessarily out of goodwill, but as a strategic maneuver to buy time.
So what does this all mean?
If a deal emerges, it will likely be an interim agreement with its own risks - delaying rather than resolving the core issue.For now, the outcome remains uncertain: U.S. red lines are fluid, shifting from week to week.
It’s entirely possible that in a few weeks, key U.S. actors like Witkoff or Rubio might soften their stance and tolerate limited enrichment rather than insisting on zero domestic enrichment.
But one thing is already clear: Iran is succeeding in stalling.
They are delaying confrontation, de-escalating tensions, and skillfully buying time - all while sticking to their broader strategic objectives.