Rebutting Vice President JD Vance And The Utter Nonsense Of an ''Unwinnable'' Ukraine War.
Current outcomes In Ukraine Reflect Paltry Allied Support.
A week into Trump’s unilateral concessions to Putin, calling Zelensky a dictator and refusing to call Russia an aggressor in the G7 statement, we are now seeing attempts to provide intellectual justification to this politically and strategically horrendous conduct: the claim that the war against Russia is unwinnable and that Trump’s conduct will bring about the necessary end to this war.
Indeed, this was the thrust of VP Vance’s ‘‘realist’’ approach: “Russians have a massive numerical advantage in manpower and weapons in Ukraine, and that advantage will persist regardless of further Western aid packages.”
But only the first part of this statement is true.
It is in fact true that Russia has an advantage in manpower and weapons in Ukraine.
But here too there are a number of caveats:
1) Russia indeed enjoys a 3 to 1 manpower advantage on the 1,200km line of contact (approximately 580k vs 200k) but, a) Russia’s attrition/manpower loss is much higher at 1,500 per day vs 475 per day (implied through total figures - or 1k per day if double the figures allowing for possibility of an exaggerated/lower casualty rate), and b) Russia has already tapped into a major pool of voluntary recruits and is struggling to recruit much further - in spite of rising bonuses. So Russia will either need to engage in another wave of mobilization (comes with political risks to Putin’s regime) or somehow get more of the North Korean troops.
2) Manpower or even hardware advantage is not everything in this war.
Indeed, a crucial recent finding is that tactical drones are inflicting roughly two-thirds of Russian losses.
This means drones inflict twice as many casualties as every other weapon in the Ukrainian arsenal put together.
This is obviously remarkable for weapons which didn’t play any significant role at the outset of 2022.
And production of drones is an area where 1) Ukraine already excels in and 2) Ukraine can further scale up with additional industrial and monetary support from the EU NATO members - for example: no reason why more drones should not be produced across factories in Germany and Poland.
3) Disparity in hardware advantage is decreasing as well: Between 2022 and 2025, the disparity in artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles between Ukraine and Russia has notably decreased due to substantial losses and lower rate of replenishment on the Russian side.
Russia has especially experienced significant tank losses, with reports indicating over 4,400 main battle tanks lost since the invasion began in February 2022.
Indeed, if at the outset of the war, Russia had 5 to1 or 10 to 1 advantage in most of the important hardware, it is now closer to 3/2 to 1 in most categories.
But crucially, and more important: this advantage need not persist regardless of further aid that the West could collectively provide for Ukraine.
This part is pure nonsense, pure erroneous assumption that underpins these desperate calls for Ukraine to stop pushing for better terms.
Everything that underpins the pressure on Ukraine to settle and give up 20% of its currently occupied territory to Russia and reward the Kremlin for its unjustified invasion of a sovereign nation is based on this faulty assumption that things cannot change on the battlefield.
Far from it: things can, and with the help of the West, will change if only Ukraine is finally allowed to fight to win instead of fighting to survive.
Remember, this is the same country that the West collectively was very close to waving its hands on and declaring that it would not last a week against Russia in February 2022.
Well, not only did they last three years, but they also inflicted more than 700,000 casualties and have taken a chunk of Russia's own territory and successfully held it for six months now.
So it is pure nonsense that without proper backing, Ukraine cannot win.
The truth is, up to this date, Ukraine was never given enough support, enough help to demonstrate decisive advantage on the battlefield.
It was only given enough aid to survive in a drip-drip manner.
In fact, up until 2024, Ukraine didn't even have a proper air force, and air power is the crucial advantage to fight with.
Up until 2024, Ukraine didn't even have the ability to use Western weapons to strike Russian targets in Russia before they crossed the border.
There were all sorts of delays, all sorts of political infighting, all sorts of unjustified and ridiculous restrictions imposed on Ukraine.
And yet, with all that, and against all odds, and fighting with its one hand tied behind its back, Ukraine not only survived for three years and has blunted Russia's onslaught, (where Russia is essentially gaining a few kilometers every month), no, not only that, but Ukraine has now even demonstrated ability to get into the Russian territory, seize a significant chunk of it, and defend it against both Russia and a foreign Russian ally, North Korea.
So the truth is, Ukraine was never given a chance to win.
Hesitation and erroneous risk assessments led to incomplete support.
A number of reasons (some more legitimate than others) have led to a perpetual delay in (still inadequate) military support offered to Ukraine:
1) Majority of Western leaders were genuinely scared of crossing Putin's red lines.
Putin successfully blackmailed the West to delay key transfer of weapons, key milestones in provision of tanks, in provision of missiles etc.
Every time there was something that the West was ready to give, Putin would throw around statements that he might go nuclear - and it worked…
To be fair to Putin, it really did work.
Every time Putin did that, there were months of delay and hesitation surrounding the Western support.
2) Western fear that crushing victory against Russia would prompt an asymmetric response in all other theatres by the Kremlin.
For example: potentially arming Houthis, or conducting sabotage on Western territories, cutting undersea cables, etc.
And yet, all of this happened anyway - in fact, this has been happening for a long time: from GRU sabotage/explosions in Czech munitions plant, to assassinations in Berlin and attempted Novichok poisoning/assassination against Sergei Skripral in 2018 in UK, Russia was already engaging in hybrid warfare, and the idea that this would not escalate with the ongoing war - no matter how little help the West offered to Ukraine - was a miscalculation on the part of leaders in Washington and Brussels.
3) Fear that by punishing Russia too hard, they would cause too much dependence on China.
Yet this happened too, Russia is fully dependent on China, and in spite of the Trump admin’s possible attempts to revert this outcome, this is not going to change anytime soon (as discussed in the previous post).
So then, for all sorts of reasons, whether that's hesitation or misguided appreciation of various risks (that were going to materialize anyway), or the folly of not letting Russia get too close to China, there was a perpetual delay and limit to the support offered to Ukraine.
And in fact, as of today, Russia has spent 40% more on the war effort than the West combined.
And this is when the combined GDP, whether purchasing power parity or absolute terms of the West, dwarfs Russia completely.
If the EU, NATO, the West, the United States all joined together and provided solid support to Ukraine and armed it, Ukraine could have gotten back the territories lost after 2022.
(side note: and we're not talking about the territories lost after 2014, the Crimea. That's a different discussion altogether, but the idea that the territories lost after 2022 are irrecoverable is just pure nonsense, not based on facts. And right now, it's not too late to help Ukraine win if solid support is finally provided to Kyiv.)
Countries worldwide have allocated $280 billion in aid to Ukraine, or roughly $84 billion per year.
The United States remains the single most significant donor, yet European countries—including the EU—have collectively surpassed its contributions, with $138 billion in allocated aid compared to $119 billion from the U.S. (though Washington still leads slightly in military assistance - to date, the U.S. provided $65.9 billion in military assistance to Ukraine).
When factoring in additional commitments yet to be delivered or specified, Europe’s lead widens further.
However, nearly 90% of the EU’s financial aid has come in the form of loans—albeit under highly favorable terms—whereas approximately 60% of U.S. financial support has been granted outright.
(side note: these figures also rebut Trump’s false claims that "Zelenskyy talked the United States of America into spending $350 billion." Not only has the EU overall spent more than the U.S. (though nowhere near enough), but the U.S. has spent approximately 3x less than claimed by Trump.)
Even though current European NATO members have a GDP of $16.5 trillion in nominal terms and $23.5 trillion in PPP (so around 10x (nominal to 3.5x (PPP) that of Russia), the Kremlin and its not so rich allies still outspend Ukraine and its richer western backers: around 40% more is spent on destroying Ukraine than the combined Western expenditure on helping Ukraine defend itself.
Ukraine made some mistakes - but the ultimate handicap was the lack of adequate and timely Western support.
None of this is to say that it was all purely West’s fault - Ukraine had its own shortcomings.
As these cables have argued for several years now, at crucial points, Zelensky was not ruthless enough and delayed the mobilization of younger men - to this day, the age of mobilization is at 25, and this simply cannot not remain so - Ukraine desperately needs to mobilize all men above 18 to try to alleviate the manpower disadvantage on the battlefield.
(side note: RUSI military expert Jack Watling has written an excellent analysis of the current situation on the frontlines and has also given credit where it is due. President Zelensky has in fact begun addressing Ukraine’s manpower strains with a structural shift—halting the formation of new units in favor of consolidated army corps. These formations, designed to oversee multiple brigades, will allow battle-hardened units to rotate off the front, integrate fresh recruits, and undergo essential retraining before returning to combat. Equally crucial is the opportunity this reform provides for Ukraine’s veterans to recover from relentless attrition.)
But Ukraine’s shortcomings notwithstanding, the overall point stands: with proper western support, Ukraine can take back the territories lost after 2022.
It is a very damaging myth, and pure nonsense that somehow, this war is unwinnable for Ukraine.
Bravo!