Russia is becoming more aggressive in the South Caucasus as its progress on the battlefield in Ukraine continues and its willingness to defy Trump grows.
Russia is becoming more aggressive in the South Caucasus as its progress on the battlefield in Ukraine continues and its willingness to defy Trump grows.
Last week, we analyzed how the U.S. refusal to provide weapons to Ukraine—especially Patriot interceptor missiles, other missile systems, and artillery shells critical to Ukraine’s defense—was deeply harmful not just for Ukraine, but also for America’s credibility and the message that it sends to Putin.
Since then, Trump confirmed that he had a conversation with Putin, during which he expressed deep disappointment.
He later had an ostensibly more constructive conversation with Ukrainian leadership.
Yet, the reality remains: we are at a stage in the war where Russia is advancing on the battlefield regardless of cost or casualties.
Despite suffering over one million casualties and losing thousands of tanks, aircraft, and ships, the Kremlin appears confident and unyielding.
Putin’s continued defiance of Trump underscores this mindset—Russia believes it is on the offensive and holds the upper hand.
Consequently, Moscow is acting more aggressively in its periphery.
Russia is renewing its imperialist mindset in the South Caucasus.
One of the most crucial regions for European national and energy security—and for the U.S.’s strategic interests vis-à-vis China and Russia—is the South Caucasus.
This region, encompassing Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, serves as a vital energy corridor from Asia to Europe, a key route in the so-called Middle Corridor linking China to Europe, and a strategic buffer between Iran and Russia.
For instance, Azerbaijan’s refusal to grant ground access to Iranian weapon shipments to Russia significantly hindered Iran’s ability to support Moscow militarily.
All three countries face Russian intervention.
We’ve previously discussed how Georgia’s population is largely pro-EU and pro-West, yet the country is currently governed by a Kremlin-friendly administration.
The situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, is more complex.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are now under increasing Russian pressure.
Tensions between the Armenian government and Russia have been escalating for months.
It’s no secret that Moscow has attempted to overthrow Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, aiming to install a more pro-Kremlin replacement.
And this faction has a domestic message and a promise to “take revenge” for Armenia’s loss of Karabakh - meaning that Russia's success in overthrowing Pashinyan would probably lead to a renewed war with Azerbaijan.
(side note: Karabakh, it should be noted, is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory, and Azerbaijan successfully recaptured it during the wars of 2020 and in a brief 2023 campaign.)
More recently, Pashinyan publicly stated that an alliance of Russian-backed oligarchs, clerical elites from the Armenian Apostolic Church, fascist and revanchist elements within Armenia conspired to overthrow his government.
Numerous arrests have taken place to disrupt this alleged coup plot.
It’s clear that the Kremlin has not abandoned its ambitions and will likely continue to pursue a regime change in Yerevan.
Pashinyan, who is pro-Western and seeks closer ties with the EU and U.S., is a prime target for the Kremlin.
Moscow prefers to restore irredentist leadership in Armenia—forces that would restart conflict with Azerbaijan in a bid to reclaim territory.
This would allow Russia to step back in as power broker, exacerbating instability and tightening its grip on the region via this new coercive leverage.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia has also deteriorated.
Initially, ties began to fray when Azerbaijan continuously reiterated Ukraine’s territorial integrity and provided humanitarian aid—while refraining from military assistance due to its proximity to Russia and its non-NATO status.
Azerbaijan also maintains a close alliance with Israel—arguably the closest Israeli partner in the Middle East and Eurasia—which further complicates Moscow’s regional ambitions, particularly its attempts to establish a seamless weapons corridor with Iran.
However, there were also more proximate triggers for the forcing relations.
Tensions sharply escalated in December 2024, when a flight by Azerbaijan Airlines entering Russian airspace was targeted by a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense missile.
The aircraft sustained serious damage (mistaken, allegedly, for a Ukrainian drone), was jammed repeatedly, and was forced to divert and land in Kazakhstan.
Russia never issued a full apology.
Putin’s statement amounted to a vague acknowledgment of an “unfortunate incident,” while Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded a full investigation, apology, and compensation—all of which were denied.
In protest, Aliyev refused to attend the May 9th military parade in Moscow.
More recently, Russia escalated pressure by conducting a so-called raid on criminal networks, arresting two ethnic Azeris (Russian citizens) accused of belonging to such organizations.
These were, by Russia’s own account, cold cases from over two decades ago with scant evidence.
The detainees were held in reportedly inhumane conditions and died in custody—prompting Azerbaijani investigators to investigate their bodies (which were repatriated for funeral), and accuse Russia of torture in detention.
The timing of the Russian op strongly suggests this was a political signal, not a legitimate law enforcement action.
In response, Azerbaijan has acted assertively.
It arrested agents of Russian state propaganda outlet Sputnik and others accused of cyberattacks and interference.
Baku has also demanded an investigation into the deaths in custody.
Sharp rhetorical exchanges have followed.
Some Russian officials have even floated the idea of invading Azerbaijan—though this talk has yet to escalate to official government channels or Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov.
That said, the signs are ominous.
If tensions are not defused, the situation could deteriorate further.
However, military intervention by Russia remains unlikely.
Azerbaijan maintains a force of over 100,000 well-trained, well-equipped troops with proven combined arms capabilities.
In both 2020 and 2023, they recaptured territory from Armenian occupation rapidly—even in mountainous terrain and heavily fortified positions.
It’s important not to underestimate Armenia’s strength at the time.
The country had Russian-supplied Su-30 fighter jets, S-300 air defenses, and its own drones.
Despite this, Armenian fortifications crumbled under Azerbaijani offensives.
In 2020, 50% of Armenia’s air defenses were destroyed within the first day of the war—a shock-and-awe campaign reminiscent of Israeli tactics.
This is not to claim that Azerbaijan could easily withstand a Russian assault.
But such an invasion would require a significant diversion of Russian military resources while it remains mired in Ukraine.
It would also risk pulling Turkey—a Turkic kin-nation and staunch Azerbaijani ally—into open conflict.
Turkey would almost certainly not tolerate a Russian invasion of Azerbaijan.
In terms of economic pressure, Russia could exploit its leverage: around 3 million ethnic Azeris live in Russia, including at least 1 million Azerbaijani citizens.
Moscow could deport them, generating massive social and economic strain in Azerbaijan - and a pressure on the Aliyev regime.
However, such actions would also damage Russia’s own labor market, which is currently in need of workers.
Imposing trade sanctions is similarly self-defeating.
Most Azerbaijani exports to Russia are foodstuffs and chemicals—products that help keep inflation in check.
Sanctions would likely hurt Russia more than Azerbaijan.
Additionally, Russian oil and gas is often re-exported to Europe through Azerbaijan, giving Baku another card to play.
The West must seize the opportunity to kick Russia out of the South Caucasus for good.
While the likelihood of full-scale escalation remains low for now, the current tensions represent a major opportunity for the U.S. and EU to step in.
With Georgia under a pro-Kremlin government, securing alignment from Armenia and Azerbaijan is essential for Western strategy.
There’s growing momentum toward a trilateral agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey—a development that could reshape the South Caucasus into a stable, Western-aligned region.
This would undermine Russian and Chinese influence and help safeguard the vital middle corridor between the Caspian and Black Seas.
So what can the West do?
First, the EU and U.S. should impose Magnitsky-style sanctions on corrupt pro-Russian officials in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
These actors must be marginalized and removed from political influence.
Second, Armenia—while not a full democracy—is significantly more democratic than Azerbaijan, which is ruled by a hereditary dictatorship.
In Azerbaijan, opposition leader Ali Karimli, whose party is pro-Western and pro-EU, faces relentless repression.
His passport has been revoked, he’s barred from meeting Western diplomats, and opposition members are routinely jailed.
Unlike in Arab monarchies where wealth offsets repression, Azerbaijan’s people have historical experience with democracy.
In 1918, it was a functioning parliamentary democracy (until Soviet invasion) - ahead of many Western countries.
The country only descended into dictatorship after a coup by the current president’s father.
The West must help open democratic space in Azerbaijan so that opposition forces can challenge the dictatorship in free elections.
President Aliyev is not a reliable long-term partner; he will always prioritize regime survival over national interest.
And while Azerbaijan’s strategic interest lies with Turkey and the West, that alignment must be institutionalized through democratization.
This strategy requires a mix of incentives and pressure.
The West should vocally support Azerbaijan in its confrontation with Russia, ensuring the Azerbaijani public sees that Europe and America stand behind them—especially in actions like expelling Russian spies, banning Sputnik propaganda, and demanding accountability for downed flights.
Simultaneously, Western governments must push for democratization and free elections to ensure that pro-West opposition can regain political power, and once tensions ease, Baku cannot simply revert to Kremlin alignment.
In Armenia, the situation is reversed: the opposition is pro-Russian and irredentist, while the current government under Pashinyan seeks Western alignment.
Therefore, the West must help Pashinyan remain in power—offering economic incentives and diplomatic support to show that alignment with the U.S. and EU has tangible benefits.
Otherwise, his pro-Western stance will become increasingly difficult to sustain.
Everyone in Armenia knows that Europe will not fight for it—especially if it won’t even defend Ukraine.
Ultimately, the goal must be the democratization and stabilization of all three South Caucasus countries (similar tactics must be applied to Georgia. We have discussed this in more detail before).
Their populations are overwhelmingly pro-Western.
But only through reform and sustained engagement can the region truly be secured as a strategic anchor for Europe and the United States.