Russia once again rules out genuine negotiations with Ukraine.

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Moscow signals zero appetite for good faith negotiations with Ukraine.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov once again underscored Moscow’s uncompromising stance on peace negotiations - effectively demanding that Ukraine must renounce its sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition for talks.

• This is because in comments made in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS,

  Lavrov declared that Russia would not start negotiations as long as Ukraine insisted on its (most reasonable) position to free its territory up to its internationally recognized 1991 borders.

• This position reflects the Kremlin’s broader strategy of framing Ukraine’s legitimate territorial claims as unreasonable, while simultaneously pressing for concessions that blatantly violate international law.

• (side note: and they may hope that with Trump in power, this can be done. They are probably wrong. Even if there was a bad deal settlement/armistice in place, it is inconceivable that: 1)Ukraine would ever give up on insisting that its internationally recognized territories are freed of occupation, and 2) that the global community would ever recognize/legitimize Ukrainian territory annexed by Russia. In other words, even if fighting somehow stops, the conflict would not end.)

• By insisting on terms that would effectively dismantle Ukraine as a sovereign state, Moscow is seeking to derail any prospects for genuine peace talks.

• Lavrov’s rhetoric also signals an attempt to pressure Western nations into coercing Kyiv to accept territorial losses as fait accompli - losses that would secure Russia’s long-term strategic objectives.

• These cables have long argued that Moscow was not ready for genuine good faith negotiations.

• And the Kremlin’s stance is consistent with its longstanding dismissal of Ukraine’s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a legitimate negotiating position.

• Those still hopeful for a possible deal may argue that the 1991 borders includes Crimea within Ukraine (a red line for Putin’s political survival), and that if Kyiv was to somehow give up on that peninsula, the rest of the internationally recognized Ukrainian territories under occupation could be on the table for negotiations.

• But 1) There is simply no evidence for this - that Putin would somehow revert back on the September 2022 declaration on the annexation of the four regions in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) - that would be so politically damaging and costly, that Putin would need to face a strong incentive to agree to this deal - and unfortunately, the costs imposed on his regime and army are not nearly enough to persuade him to do so.

• 2) If Russia was to find itself in such disastrous conditions that Putin would agree to give up on annexed territories in the east, that would necessarily imply that Ukraine was on the cusp of a total victory- persuading Kyiv to stop fighting and forego liberation of all its territories would then become even a tougher sell: no other country would agree to this..

• As such, currently the only four plausible scenarios in 2025 are these:

• 1) Armistice agreement: freezing Russian gains in exchange for cessation of hostilities and some security guarantees for Ukraine (will likely be a terrible deal for Ukraine - we will discuss details if we get closer to this scenario);

• 2) Continued fighting;

• 3) Total Ukrainian victory - most likely scenario for this is if Russian costs compound and there is a political internal turmoil challenging Putin (similar to Prigozhin uprising of Spring 2023 but on a grander scale) - and that Russia’s military coordination and command suffers significantly - allowing Ukraine to secure a major breakthrough and recapture swaths of its territory.

• 4) Total Russian victory: Ukrainian military faces further attrition and the West fails to step up to the challenge to rescue it, and Russia achieves a major breakthrough on the battlefield: either using the momentum to press further or imposing a victor’s ‘‘peace’’ or capitulation on Kyiv.

• What is not likely at all: a comprehensive genuine peace treaty.

• For that to happen, either Putin is gone from power (whether forced out or else), or he faces total annihilation or unacceptable costs.

• As it stands, neither is likely in 2025.