"Signal" Text Chain Leaks Debacle: Early Observations And Questions Around A Major Security Breach And Houthi Strike Discussions.
On March 11, a message pings on Jeffrey Goldberg’s Signal.
Goldberg is the Editor-in-chief of The Atlantic Magazine - the sender claims to be National Security Adviser Mike Waltz—a plausible enough connection in Washington’s fluid journalist-official ecosystem, despite the Trump administration’s habitual disdain for “fake news.”
What followed however, veered into the surreal.
On March 12 - mere two days later, Goldberg is pulled into a private Signal group labelled “Houthi PC small group”, allegedly formed to coordinate a forthcoming military operation against Iranian-aligned Houthi forces in Yemen.
The roster—at least by name—was striking: Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, DNI Tulsi Gabbard, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and others.
The implication: real-time operational discussions among the uppermost echelons of the Trump cabinet—and Goldberg - a journalist outsider - as witness to all this.
The leaks are embarrassing, damaging, and will further erode the image of competence for this administration—an administration already marred by a series of embarrassments and humiliations in its handling of U.S. national security interests.
This is a very big deal. It is not how things should work. A national security team representing the number one superpower in the world should not accidentally involve journalists in war planning.
Fortunately, the journalist involved demonstrated enough decency not to release screenshots of even more damaging and revealing information. And luckily, the precise details of the war plans were not disclosed in that exchange. Still, this incident must be investigated—and, in fact, congressional hearings are already underway.
Nevertheless, the incident itself and the content of the exchanged messages reveal important details and raise some crucial questions.
We begin with a few such questions and observations that are thus far not being asked often enough in the media analysis of this scandal:
1. Why did National Security Advisor Mike Waltz have Jeffrey Goldberg’s Signal Account As A Contact?
Why did Waltz even have Goldberg on his Signal?
Was Waltz frequently communicating with the Editor-in-Chief of The Atlantic?
If so, what else might have been leaked in one-on-one conversations?
Why is Waltz-Goldberg communication taking place on Signal in the first place—why not just use email if the communication was expected to remain open and public?
The use of Signal—an encrypted platform typically reserved for secret or sensitive communication—suggests an intention to keep messages hidden from the public.
That alone raises red flags about whether this was a case of deliberate secrecy, not just a communications mishap.
Waltz will be under pressure to explain himself.
2. What Happens Now In Terms Of Accountability?
What consequences await the National Security Team, and Waltz specifically?
Let’s remember—Waltz was one of the first to mock former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for emailing sensitive information to Hillary Clinton’s private email server.
Yet what Waltz did here may be much worse.
Sullivan’s actions were intentional, perhaps careless, but within a certain system of communication.
Waltz, in contrast, was outright sloppy—inviting a journalist into a sensitive group chat.
Let us be clear here: if a career civil servant or mid-level manager had committed such an error, they would already have been fired.
This is arguably a graver breach of national security protocol.
Will Waltz resign? If not, will Trump fire him? This is undeniably a fireable offense.
3. What Does This Say About Internal Processes And Decision-Making On Issues Of Grave Strategic Importance?
Both allies and adversaries can now clearly see that U.S. national security discussions are not taking place behind closed doors in secure, structured settings.
Instead, they’re happening in group chats—with participants casually offering input on highly sensitive matters like airstrikes.
Just hours before the Houthis attack, conversations on core strategic questions—who to involve, pros and cons, geopolitical consequences—were happening informally.
That is not how decisions on warfare should be made.
This raises further concerns: What else is being casually debated in group chats? Why isn’t the President involved? Is Trump even aware of these conversations?
Or is he playing golf while his advisors handle these weighty matters over Signal?
This speaks to a total abdication of responsibility at the highest level.
4. J.D. Vance’s Comments on Trump’s Contradictions in Messaging.
J.D. Vance made pointed remarks about America’s allies how doing favors for Europe (wherein, Houthi disruptions should matter to Europeans more than to Americans - but this is debatable, more on that later below) while complaining about their passivity is contradictory: “I am not sure the president is aware how inconsistent this is with his message on Europe right now.”
This marks a rare moment of implicit criticism of Trump from Vance.
And, importantly, Vance is actually correct in this observation.
There is a visible contradiction between Trump’s habitual attacks on Europe and the simultaneous complaints by U.S. officials about European inaction.
The Ukraine situation is another example: Vance dismisses NATO peacekeepers as ineffective, yet complains when Europe fails to lead.
MAGA crowd mocks Europe’s dependence on U.S. arms, while also rejecting any attempt they make to procure arms independently as likely to be ineffective.
These contradictions are piling up.
Something does not add up.
There is a fundamental contradiction in the MAGA/Trump Admin narrative regarding Europe.
Either, as Trump Admin claims, Europeans are helpless and impotent without the United States—making it nonsensical to argue they should take responsibility for their own security—or they are in fact capable.
With an economy ten times the size of Russia’s, and purchasing power parity comparable to the U.S. (and even higher when the UK and Turkey are included in the broader European fold), it is clear that Europe has the capacity to act as a major power bloc.
If Europeans are competent and capable—as their numbers suggest—they should not be mocked.
They should be treated as equals, expected to contribute meaningfully, and engaged seriously in transatlantic security efforts.
5. Political Optics vs. Strategic Objectives And Alignment With Allies.
Hegseth wants to appear strong where Biden looked weak.
As a political cabinet figure, that’s not a ridiculous goal.
It doesn’t necessarily mean partisanship is taking precedence over national security.
While it’s fair to criticize Biden’s reactive and tit-for-tat approach—which failed to define a clear objective, such as degrading Houthi capacity to disrupt global shipping—it must be acknowledged that Biden did at least involve Europeans in the last major strike campaign against the Houthis.
UK fighter jets took off from Cyprus and were integral to that operation.
Now, however, Vance is complaining that Europeans should foot the bill, and Stephen Miller is exploring ways to recover U.S. costs—yet none of them have raised the obvious strategic step: ask our allies to join this campaign.
Why not bring in the Brits again, especially at a time when their PM Sir Keir Starmer is politically incentivized to demonstrate UK alignment with U.S. policy and act as a bridge to Europe?
Involving them would build legitimacy, public support, and global buy-in for the U.S. campaign.
Instead, the approach is to exclude allies and later discuss how to divide costs—a strategically short-sighted and alienating model of leadership.
6. Misplaced Complaints on Cost Burden.
Vance and others claim Europeans are bearing more of the costs.
That’s only partially true.
While some direct impacts may hit European economies harder, the indirect global costs—especially from disrupted shipping—are substantial and shared.
Since October 2023, the Houthis have targeted vessels in these waters, leading to increased shipping costs and delays.
Insurance premiums for voyages through the Red Sea have surged, with rates rising from the typical 0.6% of cargo value to up to 2%.
This has then prompted many shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding significant distance, time, and fuel expenses to their journeys.
And when it comes to the U.S. consumer, the higher costs are even more immediate.
Every time a ship diverts around South Africa instead of using the Suez Canal, the costs rise for everyone, including the U.S. consumer.
The need to avoid Red Sea has contributed to container freight costs nearly doubling to $8,000-$10,000.
In addition, major U.S. retailers, such as Target and Walmart, source products from regions affected by these shipping disruptions.
The added shipping costs and delays are often passed down the supply chain, leading to higher prices for consumers.
In addition, the Red Sea's significance in oil transportation means that any instability can lead to fluctuations in global energy prices, indirectly affecting fuel costs for U.S. consumers and businesses.
(side note: Trump’s tariff wars are already likely to drive up inflation considerably. Last thing this admin needs is further snafus in the global supply chain and increases in the cost-push inflation. On the other hand however, it is much easier to blame such an inflation on external factors vs self-inflicted economic woes.)
The Houthis’ campaign has been highly effective in imposing real economic pressure—not only on Europe, but also on the United States.
Let’s not downplay this: American consumers are paying a significant price as a result of this security breakdown.
7. Absent Strategic Framing: Iran and Russia.
Perhaps most alarming is the total absence of strategic-level discourse in the leaked conversation.
In the rush to “hit the Houthis,” to “look strong,” or to simply beat the Israelis to the punch, there was no discussion of how these actions relate to deterrence—particularly in regard to Iran and Russia.
This airstrike campaign could have served a dual strategic function vis-à-vis Tehran: 1) Sending a strong deterrent signal to Iran as nuclear negotiations continue to stall and, 2) preemptively weakening one of its strongest proxies and thus blunting potential Iranian response to strikes that would target its nuclear program (should negotiations fail).
Yet another strategic objective would be to undermine Russia’s leverage in the region and its ability to interfere with or influence U.S. operations by working closely with Houthis.
Russia has previously considered (in late 2024) expanding their assistance to the Houthis (from covert targeting help to provision of anti-ship ballistic missiles) and could have used them as an indirect pressure point against the U.S. in future diplomatic negotiations.
By aggressively degrading the Houthis’ military capabilities, Washington makes any future Russian support less effective and preempts potential leverage Moscow could hold over the U.S (for example: during Ukraine war negotiations).
It preemptively blunts Moscow’s threat of arming/supporting Houthis as a potential retaliation to increased U.S. sanctions/measures/support for Ukraine if Russia continues to resist a ceasefire.
Additionally, if the Houthis’ operational capabilities are sufficiently reduced, Russia loses a bargaining chip.
Moscow can no longer claim that it is restraining the Houthis in exchange for diplomatic concessions if the group is already incapable of mounting meaningful attacks.
None of that was raised however - none of that was discussed.
And yet, these are arguably core justifications for military engagement in this region.
Erosion of Confidence In The U.S. Leadership.
This incident is not just about an embarrassing mistake—it represents a systemic failure in strategic deliberation.
Allies will see this and be further disheartened.
The credibility and discipline of U.S. leadership are again called into question.
And adversaries will take note: critical questions are not being debated in secure, high-level briefings, but in casual group chats, complete with emojis and informal banter.
This is a deeply humiliating moment for the U.S. national security establishment. A bad day for America—and one that will reverberate beyond Washington.