Special Post: France raising the possibility of Western troops in Ukraine is a turning point in this conflict. Part I: Macron's goals.
Macron’s peak strategic ambiguity - refusing to rule out Western troops in Ukraine.
Two years after the launch of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, allied leaders have met at the Paris conference to discuss the ongoing war and strategy going forward.
The conference included German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and leaders of the Baltic states.
The UK was represented by foreign Minister David Cameron and the US was represented by its top diplomat for Europe, James O’Brien (although this was something probably for Blinken to attend himself..).
As expected, a number of pro-Ukraine statements were made.
But the spotlight was seized by the French President Emmanuel Macron.
In one of the comments, Macron implied that the West could deploy troops to Ukraine:
“There is no consensus today for sending in ground troops, in an official and declared way. But nothing should be ruled out. We will do everything necessary to make sure Russia doesn’t win this war”.
Later on, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Stephane Sejourne added some further context: “We must consider new actions to support Ukraine. These must respond to very specific needs, I am thinking in particular of mine clearance, cyberdefense, the production of weapons on site, on Ukrainian territory…Some of [those] actions could require a presence on Ukrainian territory, without crossing the threshold of fighting. Nothing should be ruled out.”
Later on, Macron explained that he wanted to maintain ‘‘strategic ambiguity”.
(side note: even though one could very well argue that explicating this desire to be ambiguous is probably not the best way to actually be ambiguous..)
A few days later (and to his credit), Macron stood by his remarks: “Every one of the words that I say on this issue is weighed, thought through and measured".
Macron’s remarks (both in not ruling out troops on the ground and a commitment that Russia must not win in this war) are very important - one could even argue that this is the most significant rhetorical event from the West since Western promises to help Ukraine for ‘‘as long as it takes’’.
We will unpack the desired goals and strategic objectives sought by Macron.
We will also look at the potential risks and other implications that could stem from this move.
But first off, let us pause for a second and consider why is this happening now?
Here is a thought experiment: would this statement occur if Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive was successful, Russia was on its backfoot and Ukraine was steadily advancing and freeing one territory after another?
Absolutely not.
In fact, the very opposite would have been happening instead: worried that Putin may lash out from such a loss of face, Western leaders would have been queuing up to offer Putin some prestige-based off-ramps.
In fact, we have an actual precedent for this: back in December 2022, the very French President that is now refusing to rule out troops on the ground, was happy to offer Putin some face-saving off-ramps.
Back then, Macron caused annoyance for the diametrically opposite reason: for his suggestion that Russia’s security needs must be reflected and taken into account in a new security architecture for Europe.
But today, the very opposite is taking place: Russia is advancing (no matter how slowly), and Ukraine is struggling to maintain its defensive lines with an extreme shortage of ammo - offering bleak prospects for the near term.
As such, the realization that Ukraine could lose this war is now very real.
And this is of course sobering for leaders of Europe.
The difference in attitudes to the near-term projections reveal the difference in expectations.
For Macron at least, it is becoming clear that the situation is indeed dire - necessitating a response fit for the current circumstances.
And this doesn’t mean that sending troops to Ukraine is indeed likely or imminent (most probably, neither) but it is clear that at least voicing the possibility is now appropriate for Macron.
In other words, the French President had calculated that it was the right time to blunt Putin’s confidence by warning that at least one country (France) is no longer complacent about Russia’s advance and that consequently, Putin should not relax into thinking that he can continue with his current onslaught largely unopposed.
Macron’s strategic objectives.
1) The first goal was to therefore signal seriousness of intent, and shock Putin into realizing that his advance cannot continue on auto-pilot without incurring a significant backlash from the West.
We have frequently analyzed how Putin’s entire campaign is based on one crucial assumption: that he can outlast the West - both in terms of will and capacity.
Needless to say, Putin has had lots of reasons to reaffirm his prior biases and to reassure himself of being on the right track.
Macron’s statement is therefore a signal that Putin’s theory of the case cannot be taken all the way to its logical end: capture and defeat of Ukraine.
Essentially, Macron was warning that Russia’s further gains and capture of Ukraine wasn’t simply a continuation of the current trend - but a qualitatively different event altogether: a new status quo.
And that this new status quo (of a victorious Russia capturing the entire Ukraine) would be unacceptable to France.
It is a strong signal for Putin to temper his ambitions.
But will he?
So far, there is no reason for him to do so - but we do know that he is also capable of stopping short of going all the way.
When Putin is convinced that costs overwhelm the potential gains, he stops.
The very proof of this is Russia not going all the way in 2014-2015: back when (now jailed) nationalist leader Igor Girkin was calling for a direct Russian involvement in the Eastern Ukraine, Putin refused - the army was in no shape ready for a full-scale invasion, and the gains of few more towns in Donbas didn’t seem worth it (and bigger gains were out of reach due to lack of military capabilities).
What about now? Will it work?
As of today, Macron’s ‘‘threats’’ do not appear credible at all.
A country that is ready to send its troops to Ukraine would first and foremost start with the basics: funding Ukraine like a proper power vs on par with smaller states like the Netherlands.
And according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine aid tracker, France ranks 22nd among the EU’s 27 members in terms of aid commitments to Ukraine as a share of GDP.
Indeed, as of late, Germans send more than 2x funds as the French (€7.1bn vs €3bn)
(side note: so a cynic may also reason that all of this is actually designed to deflect attention away from France’s comparatively meager (given its status) help).
But with all that said, Macron’s statement is also weighty enough to be dismissed out of hand.
Macron puts his credibility on the line by burning the bridges and declaring that Russia cannot be allowed to win in Ukraine.
And in many ways, this may be just what is needed to wake Putin up to the reality that not everything is as smooth as his heart would desire it to be.
An important, sobering counter-signal in the midst of a consistent narrative that 1) Ukraine is losing and 2) The west is tired of supporting it too.
2) Shock the relevant stakeholders to do the bare minimum.
Late last year, Biden switched his rhetoric from ‘‘as long as it takes’’ to ‘‘as long as we can”.
And that was before the Ukraine aid was delayed in Congress for three more months..
In addition, the public sentiment everywhere in the west is gradually changing from “Ukraine deserves our support’’ to ‘‘how much longer can this war go on?’’.
According to recent (and reputable) ECFR polls the public in losing its will to back Ukraine for as long as it takes: the numbers have now flipped, and a larger share (41%) favor Europe pushing Ukraine into negotiations/settlement over backing the country (31%) until it was to regain its occupied territories.
(side note: and a lot of this is 1) due to far-right pro-Putin minions taking the spotlight and advancing false narratives, and 2) Failure of western politicians to advance a proper counter-narrative in defense of Ukraine.)
With all that said, Macron’s secondary aim may have been an attempt to jolt the key stakeholders into action: things are going downhill, and this is the potential future that awaits us - if we don’t stop Russia now with the help of Ukraine, then we may have to send in our own troops at some point.
This is both true and could also be good politics - it is an important reminder of the sacrifices taken by the Ukrainians for all of the West: doing the dirty work of fighting the biggest security threat to Europe, so that the western Europeans can moan about higher fuel costs in the comfort and safety of their homes.
Macron’s warning is therefore a good reminder of what is really at stake here: actually having to fight Russia.
In addition (and even though Washington was ostensibly annoyed by Macron’s remarks), the comments arm Biden with a powerful rhetorical tool: “if we don’t help Ukraine with all that we’ve got, this thing will only escalate going forward - just look at our major allies already panicking and talking about sending troops to Ukraine. We need to defeat Russia now, so that this war doesn’t get out of hand”.
3) Test the waters and know your allies.
Regardless if it was the right timing to broach this subject in public right now, one thing is crystal clear: talks of sending troops to Ukraine are definitely taking place behind closed doors.
And at some point, (that is, if the current trajectory of war continues) this would need to be discussed in public as well.
So Macron’s remarks can be viewed as a way to test all relevant players: who is standing where.
And unfortunately, there was some bad news indeed.
No other NATO leader backed the French President in his assertion that NATO troops on the ground couldn’t be ruled out.
The closest sentiment came in the variations of ‘‘if we do everything now, there won’t be a need for it’’.
Then there were outright embarrassments: like the Putin-appeasing Slovak PM Robert Fico revealing (or rather, snitching on his NATO allies) that “a number of NATO and EU member states are considering sending troops to Ukraine on a bilateral basis”.
But even more damaging was Germany’s strong rebuke of France.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz rebuffed Macron with a declaration that ‘‘there will be no ground troops, no soldiers on Ukrainian soil sent there by European countries or NATO states”.
This was in fact extremely damaging.
It is one thing to deny any current plans, but to rule it out completely is to cede escalation dominance and give up on the ultimate deterrence.
Reassuring Putin that the worst that can happen to Russia would never be as bad as Russia could have itself expected is a strategic malpractice.
Not only is it a total abdication of strategic ambiguity, it is in fact the very opposite: unstrategic reassurance.
(side note: and all Russia had to do to ‘‘earn’’ this reassurance was to keep on making gains in Ukraine. So then, why stop at all?)
It is also rather strange for the German chancellor to speak on behalf of all NATO and EU states - this is not his place to do so.
It would be far better if the German command would instead focus on doing its fullest part in helping Ukraine - and that includes provisioning of Taurus missiles (which are in effect very similar in range to the British Storm Shadows and French SCALP-EGs - yet somehow Germans still worry about ‘‘escalation’’. And never mind that Ukraine itself has drones that are regularly used to strike inside Russia than any of these cruise missiles).
But that was not the end of it - the German air force chief revealed presence of UK troops in Ukraine (and how these troops help with targeting/cruise missile operations).
We shall discuss this internal NATO discord and other major downstream implications (both very foreseeable and less so) in the Part II of this post.
Of course, part of this is the fear of Trump's return. At this early date, I imagine you cannot predict what Trump back in power would to with regards to Ukraine. It would depend on the status that exists in January of 2025.