The latest U.S. policy shift—appearing to adopt elements of Kremlin war narratives while sacrificing leverage over Russia (via Trump’s grant of unilateral concessions)—raises troubling strategic questions.
(side note: the latest troubling development is the Trump admin’s refusal to call Russia an “aggressor” in the G7 statement on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.)
As discussed in yesterday’s post, the most charitable interpretation of this move is that it is a calculated attempt to peel Moscow away from Beijing by offering significant concessions in Ukraine.
However, as we analyzed yesterday, this strategy is most likely doomed to fail for three key reasons:
1. No Significant Structural Tensions to Exploit.
Unlike the 1970s Sino-Soviet split, which followed years of ideological and border conflicts culminating in the 1969 Ussuri River clash, there is no equivalent rift between Russia and China today.
On the contrary, we are witnessing an unprecedented level of Russian dependence on China.
No modern historical precedent exists where a major power has become as reliant on another as Russia is now on China.
2. The U.S. Cannot Replace China’s Role for Russia.
China provides Russia with broad diplomatic cover, economic support, and—most crucially—industrial backing for military rearmament, including semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and defense technology.
The U.S. cannot and will not fill this role.
Even if Trump were to appease Putin rhetorically, U.S. government institutions and Congress would never allow a policy shift that entails actively rebuilding the Russian military.
Without a credible economic or security counteroffer, Washington lacks the tools to pry Moscow from Beijing’s embrace.
3. Putin Cannot Bet on U.S. Reliability.
Even if the above obstacles were somehow overcome, Putin would not gamble Russia’s strategic future on Washington’s goodwill.
Trump’s foreign policy unpredictability, coupled with the inherent volatility of U.S. administrations, makes such a shift untenable.
The Iranian nuclear deal stands as a case in point—scrapped by one administration, restored by another, and likely to change again.
Russia sees the same risk: today’s friendly overtures could easily give way to tomorrow’s renewed containment strategy once Trump exits and a more conventional administration—Republican or Democratic—takes charge.
Steelmanning the Case for a “Reverse Kissinger” Strategy.
Despite these flaws, some strategic thinkers argue that attempting to recalibrate Russia’s behavior—if not fully detaching it from China—is a goal worth pursuing.
In addition, a lot of readers have emailed asking to consider the strongest case for such a move - and so we shall.
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