Transponders Off, Message On: Russia’s Deliberate Challenge to NATO
Supported by our friends at Chart API: banks, lenders, fintechs, wealth & tax advisors, and background checking companies use Chart’s real-time API to retrieve customer tax records in seconds: all done in real-time online and with full customer consent — enabling faster underwriting and income & background checks.
Three Strikes in Nine Days: Russia Tests NATO’s Red Lines
Third time’s a charm—or at least, not a coincidence.
In just nine days, Russia has violated NATO airspace sovereignty three separate times.
One would expect that a country supposedly careful not to provoke a crisis, careful not to create issues with NATO, and careful not to violate NATO airspace, would have learned its lesson from the first incident, when drones intruded into Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus, and would have done everything possible to avoid similar situations.
If the country’s leadership—if Russia’s leadership—did not discipline its commanders after that, then we find ourselves in the present situation: first drones crossed into Romanian borders, and now three MiG-31 fighter jets intruded into Estonian airspace for twelve straight minutes, with their transponders switched off, failing to respond to radar, and only leaving after being escorted by NATO F-35s.
That is indicative of one of two most likely possibilities:
First, extreme carelessness and indifference to the outcome—because, for some reason, Russia is not concerned about a confrontation with NATO and believes that whatever costs NATO could impose would not justify taking extra precautions;
Second, and more likely, a deliberate attempt to challenge NATO.
At this point, it is very difficult to interpret the incident as anything other than a deliberate provocation by Russia.
It is one thing to claim ignorance or lack of awareness when drones stray into foreign airspace—such cases can always be explained away by poor command and control or by erroneous navigation of unmanned systems.
But it is another thing entirely for professional fighter pilots, flying advanced MiG-31 jets in the Gulf of Finland (a very familiar airspace for Russian aircraft) to repeat the same “mistake” by crossing into Estonia’s airspace for twelve consecutive minutes.
And once again, let us recall: transponders switched off, no radar response.
This is a significant escalation against NATO.
It is now the third such escalation in just nine days.
Estonia has once again called NATO into action, triggering Article 4 consultations.
This marks the shortest back-to-back sequence of Article 4 triggers in NATO history—the first having been invoked by Poland only a week and a half earlier.
Estonia chose to trigger Article 4 despite the fact that, in response to the earlier consultation, NATO had already deployed forces to the eastern flank under Operation Eastern Sentry, including including additional deployment of three French Rafales, two Danish F-16s (and an anti-air warfare frigate), and four German Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets.
The fact that Estonia still sought another Article 4 consultation suggests it considered the prior measures insufficient and demanded a fresh, specific response to this incursion—and rightly so, because it was indeed a significant violation.
Before discussing NATO’s response, however, it is crucial to ask why.
Why would Putin do this?
Analyzing Putin’s Calculus And Likely Objectives
And here, there are a number of possible explanations—some more persuasive than others.
First Possibility: Escalate to De-Escalate / Compellence Strategy
The first possibility is that Putin is deliberately pursuing a strategy of “escalate to de-escalate,” or more comprehensively, a compellence strategy aimed at NATO.
The objective would be to force Ukraine into submission (by raising costs on its NATO backers and adding pressure on Kyiv to settle) and to deter NATO from providing additional strong support.
Indeed, this interpretation aligns closely with the recent Bloomberg report that quoted officials close to the Kremlin, who revealed that Putin’s thinking after Alaska (after his meeting with Trump) was that he could escalate, put pressure directly on NATO, and that Trump would do nothing in response.
One question, then, is whether Putin’s assessment of Trump’s likely inaction is objectively correct
(side note: and one could certainly find enough evidence to argue that case in the affirmative. Indeed, Reuters recently reported that in late August, Pentagon officials met with European diplomats to deliver a stark message: the United States intended to scale back certain security assistance to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—NATO members bordering Russia. More broadly, Pentagon official David Baker told the group that under President Donald J. Trump, Europe should reduce its reliance on Washington, noting that the U.S. military would be redirecting its focus toward other priorities, including Homeland Defense… So, given all this, Putin wouldn’t be arriving at this conclusion for no good reason.)
But perhaps more importantly, (and more pressing for the current situation) the real question is whether Putin genuinely believes this to be true (even if he is miscalculating).
Unfortunately, the evidence to date strongly suggests that he does: Putin seems to genuinely believe that he can get away with a lot — without getting any meaningful response from Trump.
His actions since Alaska in mid-August line up perfectly with that assumption.
Since Alaska, Ukraine has been subjected to record numbers of drone and missile strikes, at levels far beyond anything seen during the earlier months of the Trump administration.
Since Alaska, there have been three NATO crises—back-to-back airspace incursions in rapid succession.
Since Alaska, the Kremlin has doubled down on its political messaging, repeatedly emphasizing that maximalist war aims remain unchanged: Putin will not drop his insistence on subjugating Ukraine, nor on seizing Ukrainian territory without offering concessions in return.
(side note: This is in direct contrast to Trump’s Special Envoy Witkoff’s earlier reassurances to Trump, which now look like misrepresentations.)
Since Alaska, the Russian Foreign Ministry has explicitly reiterated that it would never accept NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine, declaring they would be considered legitimate targets in Putin’s own terminology.
In short, not an inch has been given—on the battlefield, in diplomacy, or in rhetoric.
The result of Alaska has thus been a fiasco for stability.
It has emboldened Russia to increase its aggression militarily, while also stiffening its political resolve.
All available evidence indicates that Putin genuinely does believe Trump will not intervene—hence his pursuit of a compellence strategy: raising the stakes, increasing pressure on NATO, disabusing the alliance of the notion that it can provide Ukraine with credible security guarantees (that exclude Russia), and forcing Ukraine into submission on unfavorable terms.
This interpretation aligns exactly with what Kremlin insiders told Bloomberg.
Second Possibility: Rally Around the Flag and Domestic Distraction
The second possibility is that these provocations serve as both a distraction from Russia’s own growing costs and a mechanism to rally domestic support.
Since Alaska, one major shift has been Ukraine’s escalation in striking Russia’s critical oil infrastructure.
This escalation from Ukraine may have come with an explicit green light from Trump, or at least an implicit understanding that the Trump administration would not object—unlike the Biden administration, which repeatedly urged Zelensky not to target Russian refineries out of concern for global oil prices.
Trump, by contrast, seems unconcerned about oil-price volatility.
In fact, he may even see higher prices as politically advantageous, since they bolster his “drill, baby, drill” campaign narrative by stimulating U.S. shale production.
(side note: serious economic analysis disputes this logic. Energy economists note that U.S. shale is already near capacity, and prices would need to rise significantly before new drilling could be incentivized to ramp up. By then, the immediate effect would already be sharply higher global prices and inflationary pressures—an outcome probably more harmful to the U.S. economy than more oil pumped in shale.)
Nevertheless, Ukraine has relentlessly targeted Russia’s refinery network, with two major consequences.
First, the domestic price of refined products such as petrol is climbing, causing public frustration.
Second, diesel supplies essential to Russia’s military operations are being disrupted.
Meanwhile, social media has amplified the visibility of these attacks, demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to hit deep inside Russia, thousands of kilometers from the front lines.
New weapons developments worsen this vulnerability: for example, Ukraine’s Flamingo missiles, which reportedly carry 2,000-pound warheads and have a 3,000-kilometer range, are expected to scale to a production rate of seven per day starting in October.
If Ukraine achieves that capacity, Russia’s oil infrastructure will face severe long-term risks.
These dynamics create real political pressure for Putin.
Escalating against NATO could therefore serve a dual purpose: first, as another form of compellence, pressuring NATO to restrain Ukraine’s long-range strikes; and second, as a way to rally the Russian public.
By reframing the conflict as not Russia versus Ukraine, but Russia against the entirety of NATO, the Kremlin strengthens the “siege mentality” and rally-around-the-flag effect.
It becomes easier to explain away domestic failures and shortages by presenting them as sacrifices in a struggle against the West, rather than admitting Ukraine’s growing capacity to devastate Russia’s energy system.
Third Possibility: Leverage Against NATO and the EU
A third possibility is that these provocations are designed as bargaining leverage—an attempt to pressure NATO and the European Union not to escalate sanctions further, not to tighten restrictions on allies such as India and China, and not to fully seize Russian state assets.
Indeed, all of this is happening as Europe, after three years of hesitation, finally appears ready to mobilize Russia’s frozen assets—up to €170 billion held in Euroclear accounts—to finance Ukraine.
From Russia’s perspective, of course, this is an unacceptable outcome.
Moscow has long threatened the EU over such moves, with former President Medvedev once again issuing threats couched in his usual aggressive rhetoric.
This latest escalation could therefore be interpreted as a form of leverage: Russia signaling through brinkmanship and back-channel diplomacy that, “You are clearly not ready for a direct confrontation with us, Trump is not going to help you, so your best course of action is to back off from seizing our money, stop pressuring our allies in India and China, and avoid further headaches.”
Whether this is the primary motivation or simply one factor among others, the underlying truth remains: Putin clearly believes that whatever goal he is pursuing (whether compellence, distraction, or leverage) is worth the costs.
Fundamentally, these incidents are happening because the Kremlin calculates that the risks and costs remain low enough to justify reckless behavior.
In fact, from Putin’s perspective, it may not even seem reckless at all.
Comparison to Turkey vs Russia 2015 incident.
Before turning to NATO and EU responses, it is crucial to distinguish between the earlier drone incursions and the MiG-31 incident.
The MiG-31 is a highly advanced fighter jet flown by trained pilots.
Shooting down a MiG-31 is categorically different from shooting down an unmanned drone.
The destruction of a drone is politically manageable; the destruction of a fighter jet would mean killing a Russian pilot and destroying equipment worth tens of millions.
MiG-31s are not easily replaced, nor are the lives of their highly trained pilots.
The reputational and political consequences in Russia would be far greater.
For this reason, criticism in European and NATO media that the alliance “backed down” by not shooting down the MiG-31s the very first time they violate Estonia’s airspace, is a little over the top.
It is not a given that escalation to lethal force was the wisest immediate response.
Many commentators cite Turkey’s November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24, which violated Turkish airspace for mere seconds, as evidence that NATO could and should have acted similarly.
They argue that Putin did little in response back then, so he could be expected to back down again now.
That comparison, however, overlooks context.
Before the November 2015 shootdown, Russia had violated Turkish airspace on at least five occasions during October of the same year.
Each time, Turkey issued warnings, escorted Russian jets, and signaled to the Kremlin that any further violations would be treated more seriously.
When the Su-24 was finally shot down, Ankara had already established a clear deterrent ladder: repeated incursions had been tolerated, but the Kremlin was also warned that the next one would be treated differently.
This context is crucial.
NATO’s decision not to immediately shoot down the MiG-31s can therefore be understood as a measured first step.
What is necessary now, however, is escalation in signaling: Russia must be warned publicly and explicitly that any further incursions will carry the real risk of its fighter jets being shot down.
If such a warning is issued and made public, the burden of responsibility shifts to Moscow.
Next time, it will be Russia—not NATO—that must explain to its own domestic audience why it chose to repeatedly violate NATO airspace and in doing so caused the loss of its pilots.
Thus, NATO’s immediate goal should be to reverse the burden of escalation risks, ensuring it is Moscow that risks being blamed for losses, not the alliance.
Once the warning is issued, however, any subsequent violation must be met with decisive action.
At that point, the credibility of NATO’s deterrence would require that such incursions are not tolerated again.
Russia’s Likely Reaction To a Muscular NATO Response
What, then, could Russia do in response?
At one extreme, there is always the unknowable possibility of full escalation, up to and including outright conflict with NATO.
While this is theoretically possible, it remains highly unlikely; it is an outcome no side has an incentive to pursue, and which Russia knows it cannot win.
Russia is currently struggling in Ukraine, advancing only at a snail’s pace while incurring enormous casualties.
Its air defense systems are already over-stretched and incapable of fully protecting Russian skies even against Ukraine’s relatively unsophisticated drone fleet.
The idea that Moscow could sustain an air confrontation against NATO (whose air forces would immediately establish dominance over Western Russia) is unrealistic.
Russia’s stockpile of S-300 and S-400 air defense missile systems is already thin, tied up in point defense of key sites, and struggling even against Ukraine’s aging MiG-29s, Su-24s, and older F-16s.
A direct clash with NATO air forces would be devastating.
On the ground, Russia’s forces are also tied down in Ukraine.
At most, it might have 50-100k troops available immediately for redeployment, but these would be quickly overwhelmed once NATO countries mobilized.
For these reasons, Russia is likely to avoid a full-scale confrontation.
Yet to save face, it will feel compelled to respond in some form.
The most likely scenario is therefore a limited, symmetric retaliation—designed to signal defiance and resolve without risking outright war.
What could Russia’s actual realistic reaction look like?
One option is something akin to Iran’s response to U.S. strikes on its Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan facilities in June of this year.
In that case, Iran struck Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar with up to 19 ballistic missiles, but crucially warned the U.S. in advance so Patriots could be readied to intercept nearly all of them.
The result was little to no damage.
Russia could pursue a hybrid variant of that approach—except without warning.
For example, Moscow could publicly threaten retaliation against the NATO air bases or missile sites that participated in shooting down Russian fighters, and then launch hypersonic or ballistic strikes aimed at shelters and runways at those bases.
Such an attack could cause physical damage and would constitute a direct attack on NATO territory.
While it would clearly escalate the situation, Moscow might try to calibrate it as a limited, painful demonstration rather than an all-out war.
Alternatively, Russia could employ clandestine methods: leveraging GRU capabilities to conduct arson, sabotage, or bombing attacks against NATO airbases.
Moscow has used sabotage operations for years, and those operations have intensified; what could change is making them overt—publicly releasing footage of special-ops teams destroying an air base or a logistics depot far behind NATO lines.
All of these options are possible, though a full-scale assault on NATO remains unlikely.
For all of Russia’s bluster about eastern NATO states and the Baltic countries, it lacks the resources and wherewithal to sustain a conventional war with the alliance—and Putin understands that well.
So what should NATO do?
First, they should not back off from the plan to mobilize frozen Russian assets for Ukraine; if anything, they should double down on financial and military support.
Second, NATO should publicly warn Russia that any future airspace incursions will be treated as deliberate provocations and that fighter jets violating NATO airspace will be shot down.
That warning must be explicit and visible.
Third, NATO should commit to supplying long-range precision missiles—JASSMs, Tomahawks, Taurus-style systems—that would enable Ukraine to strike deep into Russian logistics and drone-production networks.
Germany’s continued reluctance to provide such weapons is politically embarrassing (and does little to establish the country’s deterrence of Russia); a serious effort requires overcoming that hesitation.
The high payload, delayed explosion, and stand-off range of missiles like Taurus or advanced Tomahawks would allow Ukraine to target manufacturing facilities, supply depots, and logistics hubs that support drone production, even if they cannot always reach the deepest factories in Tatarstan.
While Ukraine’s own Flamingo missiles may theoretically reach some of these sites, their reliability, accuracy, and resilience to electronic warfare remain in question.
What Ukraine needs from NATO are proven, high-payload, long-range systems that will reliably damage the production, storage, and distribution nodes that enable thousands of drones to be produced each month and overwhelm Kyiv’s defenses.
Finally, NATO should stop hesitating and escalate its provision of air-power assistance and long-range strike capabilities to Ukraine.
It should also move to establish a NATO training and peacekeeping presence—backed by air defenses—in western Ukraine.
We have discussed this in previous cables: if NATO remains fearful of deploying forces to Ukrainian soil and refuses to underwrite air-defense shields for any deployed contingents, then its promises of security guarantees after a ceasefire are hollow.
That hesitancy (and sending peacekeepers only on condition of a full ceasefire first) would also incentivize Putin to prolong the war indefinitely until he either achieves a decisive victory or extracts a maximalist settlement on his own terms.
That is a risk NATO must not allow.