Trump Removes Sanctions On Syria And Signals Divergence From Israeli Goals.
Donald Trump has undertaken a monumental and highly consequential foreign policy initiative in the Middle East.
He recently met with Syria’s new interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh—an encounter arranged at the joint request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
As outlined in our earlier post covering Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, this meeting was one of Riyadh’s top foreign policy priorities.
Saudi leadership was eager to ensure the removal of crippling U.S. sanctions on Syria, now that the brutal Assad regime has been removed and the country has a chance to rebuild from the ground up.
Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are highly motivated to support Syria’s reconstruction—not just to gain geopolitical influence, but to fortify Syria against foreign interference, particularly from non–Middle Eastern actors like Russia and, most importantly, Iran.
Geopolitically, Syria’s recovery was most important for Saudi: for over a decade, Iran has exploited Syria’s institutional weakness to expand its influence by embedding militias across Syrian territory, effectively surrounding Saudi Arabia with Iranian-backed forces in both Syria and Iraq.
With the expected lifting of U.S. sanctions, companies from Qatar and Saudi Arabia will now be able to invest in Syria without fear of facing secondary sanctions or punitive measures from the U.S. Treasury.
This marks a pivotal shift in the regional balance and opens the door to a new phase of political and economic engagement with post-Assad Syria.
Announcement and Meeting Syria’s New President al-Sharaa.
A decision he revealed during a high-profile speech in Saudi Arabia that caught even many of his aides off-guard.
The announcement was immediately welcomed across the region.
In Syria, spontaneous celebrations erupted as people responded with optimism to Trump’s pledge to give the country “a fresh start and a chance at greatness.”
The very next day, President Trump met with Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.
In remarks following the meeting, Trump described Al-Sharaa as “a real leader,” calling him “pretty amazing,” and praising his character: “Young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Fighter.”
Trump then added that he told al-Sharaa to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel: , “I think they have to get themselves straightened up. I told Al-Sharaa, ‘I hope you’re going to join when it’s straightened out.’
According to Trump, Sharaa agreed and said, ‘Yes.’ “But they have a lot of work to do.”
Additionally, and according to a statement from the White House, President Trump urged Interim President Al-Sharaa to commit to the following priorities:
Join the Abraham Accords with Israel
Expel all foreign terrorist fighters from Syrian territory
Deport Palestinian terrorist elements operating within Syria
Collaborate with the United States in preventing an ISIS resurgence
Take full control of ISIS detention centers in northeastern Syria
Now, on the matter of principle, Syria’s new government doesn’t have any issues with any of the aforementioned points.
This is based on previous pronouncements and recent gestures.
It has been reported that al-Sharaa even offered to let Israel keep the Golan Heights (by offering to demilitarize it) in return for normal relations with Israel and an end to airstrikes.
This is very shrewd and pragmatic from al-Sharaa: Syrians don’t really need that small piece of land right now - neither can they enforce their claim over it.
It is far better to concede something in return for normal relations with Israel.
With that said, some of the measures - like removing all foreign terrorists from Syria - are likely not within the new government’s capabilities as of now.
And neither should they be held accountable for and expected to conduct immediate full cleanup of all the territory without external help.
As such, and in order to: 1) attain the goal of removing all ISIS and other terrorists, 2) help the new Syrian government stabilize their hold over power, and 3) maintain U.S. influence in the country, it would be prudent for Washington to assist the new government with anti-terrorism operations.
This will also help to build trust between Washington and Damascus.
A Fresh Start For Syria And A Boost To U.S. Influence In The Region.
This development is not just good news for Syrians—it also marks a major advance for U.S. national security interests in the region.
For the first time in over a decade, Syria is poised to unify under a single leader.
According to The Economist, Al-Sharaa enjoys approval and trust ratings exceeding 70%, bolstered by support from key groups, including the Druze communities in the south—previously targeted by Israeli covert influence efforts—as well as the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The SDF has formally agreed to dissolve and integrate under Syria’s newly established Central Ministry of Defense.
And with the PKK now announcing full disarmament (and thus imposing less pressure on the YPG elements of the SDF to continue confrontational and militant policy against Turkey), the prospects for national reconciliation and integration have significantly improved.
Syria is on the cusp of forming a centralized and stable government, one that may still allow for regional autonomy through a federal model—similar to what exists in northern Iraq for the Kurds—but under a unified national authority with monopoly over the use of force.
With sanctions lifted, foreign direct investment is expected to flow from countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar.
President al-Sharaa has also invited U.S. involvement in Syria’s vital oil and gas sectors and in building out essential public infrastructure.
This marks a turning point.
A stabilized and prosperous Syria means diminished influence for Iran, reduced leverage for Russia—particularly in its quest to maintain a naval foothold in Latakia—and far fewer opportunities for extremist groups to exploit governance vacuums.
The future of Syria, once a byword for war and ruin, now holds the potential for lasting peace, economic renewal, and geopolitical recalibration in the heart of the Middle East.
US and Israel Are On Track To Butt Heads.
Now, the issue still remains that the current policy of the U.S. is in direct contradiction to the interests of Israel as defined and pursued by Netanyahu’s government.
If the U.S. is interested in Syria being strong enough to repel Iranian and Russian influence—strong enough to prevent terrorist activity in power vacuum areas, and strong enough to protect American business interests—then this is directly at odds with Israel’s current objective.
American companies are likely to be invited by al-Sharaa to invest in and develop Syria’s gas and oil fields.
And that vision of a stable, economically functional Syria is fundamentally incompatible with Netanyahu’s strategy, which seeks to keep Syria weak and fragmented.
We’ve discussed this before: Israel, under Netanyahu, is pursuing a “divide and conquer” policy.
The goal is to ensure that the Syrian government never becomes strong—so that Israel can continue manipulating various factions against one another.
In the long term, however, this is a deeply misguided approach.
Israel would be far better off surrounded by stable, wealthy neighbors with robust institutions—rather than by failed states plagued by poverty, violence, and sectarianism.
Just look at Lebanon and what that vacuum allowed Iran to build through Hezbollah.
Or look at Syria before al-Sharaa, when militias freely controlled vast swathes of territory.
Yet Netanyahu isn’t focused on the long term.
His strategy is all about short-term tactical advantage through instability.
That policy ignores important developments—such as the Kurds agreeing to integrate into Syria’s formal Ministry of Defense, and even the Druze community in southern Syria distancing itself from Netanyahu and criticizing Israeli airstrikes.
At the end of the day, this Israeli approach is going to clash directly with American interests.
Now that Trump has granted legitimacy to al-Sharaa by publicly praising him, Israel will no longer be able to pursue a policy aimed at the total destruction of the Syrian government—at least not without risking serious tension with Washington.
And let’s not forget: Israel sent a very clear signal just weeks ago when it targeted the presidential palace in Syria.
This will become a top friction point between Trump and Netanyahu.
The situation is already strained—Netanyahu was blindsided when Trump negotiated directly with Hamas to release an American-Israeli hostage and chose not to stop in Israel during his Middle East tour.
And now, with Syria, the fault lines are widening.
And this is by far not the only point of conflict that will persist between Washington and Israel.
Another major issue is the unprecedented $142bn agreement for the sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia—the largest arms deal in history.
While the full details are yet to be disclosed, early reports suggest that it includes high-end hardware, and there is speculation that even F-35 fighter jets may be part of the package.
If this turns out to be true, it would be nothing short of monumental—a complete game changer.
It would fundamentally challenge Israel’s long-standing demand that it maintain a qualitative military edge over any adversary in the region.
That principle has historically guided U.S. arms sales policy in the Middle East.
The question now is: will the Trump administration uphold this tradition, or will it press forward with the sale regardless of Israeli concerns?
If it chooses the latter, that would open yet another front of tension between Netanyahu and Trump.
The friction is growing on multiple levels.
One can only hope that cooler heads prevail—and that Netanyahu refrains from any rash action that could put the long-standing strategic alliance between Israel and the United States at risk