Trump - Zelensky Phone Call, Trump's Offer To Oversee Ukraine's Nuclear Power Plant And Strategic Dilemma Facing Kyiv.

Trump - Zelensky Phone Call: Ukraine Agrees To Energy Strikes Ceasefire.

• Donald Trump and President Zelensky had a phone call a day after he had a discussion with Putin.

• Now, recall that the outcome of the call with Putin wasn’t as grand as Trump presented: even though Putin ostensibly agreed to a ceasefire in terms of airstrikes on the respective energy industries and infrastructure of each country, just an hour after said announced ceasefire, Shahed drones were flying into Ukrainian core energy infrastructure.

• As discussed in the previous post, it is very likely that Russia will reap the benefits of the ceasefire while leaving itself open to violate it as it pleases and then blame it on Ukraine.

• And in this, he will have receptive ears in the Trump administration, a president who is likely to buy any Russian misinformation.

• With that said, a day after the phone call with Zelensky, Ukraine has agreed to a 30-day ceasefire on energy infrastructure attacks.

• Now, obviously, Zelensky was in a bit of a pickle here.

• He knows that Russia is unlikely to abide by this ceasefire, and he knows that if Ukraine forgoes its ability to deep strike Russian oil refineries—a really significant cost to Russia, which drives up the cost of domestic petrol to Russian consumers—if Ukraine does that, Russia will benefit immensely.

• And not only that, Russia will have a whole month to rebuild defenses around these crucial refineries and maintain and repair them.

• But on the other hand, he doesn’t really have much of a choice here, because if he outright declined this offer, he would have, in Trump’s eyes, been the one to violate the ceasefire and not want to negotiate.

• And given that Trump has already largely blamed Zelensky for his unwillingness to be the one party that doesn’t want to negotiate, it’s obvious that any hesitation on the part of Zelensky would lead to further coolness from Trump and potentially pose a risk to military aid and intel sharing once again.

• So in this, Zelensky didn’t have much of a choice.

• The crucial point here is that Ukraine must do everything possible to document and have a direct line to the White House and to Trump himself to show that Russia is violating the ceasefire.

• And a good way for Zelensky to do this is to request the ability to call Trump directly every time Russia violates the ceasefire against energy infrastructure.

• Instead of going only to the global media and playing to public opinion, doing this direct channel route will please Trump’s ego and will help maintain Trump’s love of being in command of the events.

• (side note: and of course, once Trump is informed, Zelensky should then promptly inform the public as well.)

Trump’s ‘‘offer’’ to take over Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and Zelensky’s dilemma.

• One of the most interesting discussions was apparently the suggestion by President Trump that the U.S. take over the control and operation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP)—the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and one of the most important infrastructure fixtures for Ukraine and Ukrainian electricity.

• Ukraine's nuclear energy sector comprises 15 reactors across four plants, collectively generating about half of the country's electricity.

• The ZNPP's six reactors were crucial to this output.

• (side note: and ​Prior to Russia's invasion in February 2022, ZNPP—Europe's largest nuclear facility—played a critical role in Ukraine's energy sector. It supplied approximately 20% of the nation's electricity and represented about 10.7% of Ukraine's total installed power-generating capacity. Since March 2022, Russian forces have occupied the ZNPP, leading to the cessation of its electricity production in September 2022. This occupation has significantly impacted Ukraine's energy infrastructure, as the plant's substantial contribution to the national grid has been halted.)

• Now, this was just a phone call, and obviously, the details of the offer—whether this would include ownership or a license to administer, etc.—remain unclear.

• What is clear however, is that Trump framed it as (just like he did with the minerals deal) that U.S. presence there would be a good guarantee of defense for Ukrainian core energy infrastructure and that U.S. expertise in managing nuclear power plants could come in handy.

• And obviously, the implication here is that Putin would not dare to attack the ZNPP with the U.S. in charge there.

• Now, leaving aside the issue that even in times of peace, giving away control of such a crucial national security asset—such a crucial industrial asset, a lifeblood of the nation—to a foreign power would be extremely reckless to begin with, and no U.S. president, for example, would want to give similar control to a foreign power.

• (side note: Can you imagine if another country - not just a mix of foreign private corporations - had direct ownership and control over 20% of U.S. electricity? We wouldn’t let even our closest allies have that much power over us.)

• How would any president survive that politically, whether it’s the United States or any other country?

• Now, leaving that aside, we also have the issue of the fact that Zaporizhzhia is currently under the control of Russians.

• Now, it is easy to wave this away and say, “Oh, well, this is a moot point since we don’t even have Zaporizhzhia under our control.”

• But this is actually a very risky diplomatic challenge to Zelensky, and there are primarily three main dangers associated with Zelensky’s options in this matter:

• 1) Incentivizing Putin To Extract Maximum Leverage From Trump and Ukraine.

• As discussed earlier, Russia is in control of the Zaporizhzhia power plant.

• This, of course, means that it’s Putin’s to give at this very moment, which also means that Putin would have extreme leverage over the U.S.

• Giving such leverage to Putin over Ukraine’s national asset means that Putin can now further delay any peace negotiations until he decides that he has accrued all the advantages on the battlefield and could further insist on unpalatable maximalist war objectives and demand concessions from Trump.

• For example, in relation to freezing aid to Ukraine, intel-sharing etc.

• He knows that Trump likes a public win, and if he were to secure control of ZNPP and seize it from Putin, that would be a significant prestige boost for Trump.

• Putin knows the price that Trump would be willing to pay—for example, further concessions to Russia or further strategic compromises.

• So the first risk of Zelensky saying ‘‘yes sure if you can take it back’’ is that this would incentivize deal-making with Putin and allow Putin to extract maximum value from Trump, further putting Ukraine at risk.

• 2) Saying An Outright No And Creating Bad Incentives For Trump.

• The second risk is that if Ukraine were to outright refuse and say no, then the negotiation dynamic could shift against Ukraine.

• Trump, who prides himself on being a dealmaker, could interpret a Ukrainian refusal as a lack of cooperation, reinforcing his existing coolness toward Zelensky.

• Given Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, such a refusal could increase the likelihood of him deprioritizing military aid to Ukraine or conditioning it on further Ukrainian concessions to Russia.

• Trump could do this from both a) outright petty revenge and b) deliberately to weaken Ukraine’s hands even further and make the possibility of the U.S.-backed recovery of the nuclear plant as the only viable option for Kyiv.

• This would weaken Ukraine’s strategic position and make it harder for Kyiv to sustain its defense efforts.

• 3) Horrible Precedent To Set.

• The third and perhaps most dangerous risk is the precedent that such a deal would set.

• If Ukraine were to accept U.S. control over ZNPP, it would open the door for Trump to justify similar arrangements elsewhere in the country (and globally too).

• You could bet that Trump would waste no time scanning for other national assets of Ukraine ‘‘to protect’’.

• Ukraine could end up replacing one occupation with another form of diminished national sovereignty.

• Russia in turn, could use this as a precedent to push for international acceptance of its own control over occupied Ukrainian territory, arguing that if the U.S. can take control of a Ukrainian national asset under the guise of protection, why couldn’t Russia do the same in other areas it occupies for the protection of locals from the ‘‘Kyiv regime’’?

• This could lead to the erosion of Ukrainian sovereignty, as Ukraine would be seen as willing to relinquish control over its most vital infrastructure in moments of crisis.

• Moreover, such an agreement could be leveraged by China and other revisionist powers in international disputes, arguing that foreign “protection” of strategic assets is now a normalized practice.

• The long-term consequences of this could be severe, creating a dangerous model for managing occupied territories and strategic resources, particularly in conflict zones where sovereignty is contested.

Zelensky Once Again In A Difficult Position.

• Ultimately, Zelensky finds himself in an extraordinarily difficult position.

• While he may be tempted to see U.S. control over Zaporizhzhia as a protective measure, the risks of conceding such control vastly outweigh any short-term benefits.

• The most prudent course of action would be for Zelensky to shift the conversation toward reinforcing Ukrainian control over its own energy assets while securing firm U.S. commitments to defend them without direct ownership (in return for say ‘‘profit-sharing’’ or a minority share and control in ownership).

• This would allow Ukraine to maintain sovereignty while ensuring deterrence against further Russian aggression.

• In the meantime, the best that Zelensky could hope for is to gradually talk less about ZNPP and evade firm commitments without saying an outright no to Trump.

• Additionally, and more broadly, Ukraine should focus on pressing Trump for clear red lines regarding Russian violations of the energy infrastructure ceasefire.

• Given Trump’s unpredictability and his susceptibility to Russian narratives, Zelensky must establish clear and consistent communication channels, not only with Trump but also with key figures in his administration.

• Direct and constant engagement will be crucial in ensuring that any Russian violations are immediately documented and presented in a way that compels the Trump administration to respond decisively.

• In essence, Ukraine must tread carefully, balancing the need for U.S. protection with the imperative of preserving its sovereignty.

• How Zelensky navigates this complex diplomatic challenge will have lasting consequences for Ukraine’s strategic autonomy and its ability to resist Russian aggression in the long term.