Trump's first major action against Russia.
After months of threatening to take action against Putin only to back down, Trump has finally announced his first significant measure targeting Russia.
During a meeting with the NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in the Oval Office, Trump expressed his dissatisfaction with Russia and outlined upcoming economic and military actions that the United States intends to pursue.
There are two components to this announcement.
Economic measures:
First, economic costs will be imposed on Russia if it does not end the war within 50 days.
This is yet another arbitrary deadline from Trump, offered without a sound strategic rationale.
(side note: It is also important to note that the latest announcement made the Russian stock market go up, not down. Clearly, Russia was preparing for worse and already was pricing in for a more detrimental outcome, but that didn't materialize—and the market estimates that the announcement today from Trump isn't going to be as negative as they were worried about.)
There is absolutely no reason to waste another 50 days—especially considering he has previously given Russia numerous ultimatums and failed to follow through.
All this delay accomplishes is giving Russia time to prepare, allowing its stock markets to price in the potential impact and maintain domestic stability.
Moreover, since Trump suggested that the measures would include secondary tariffs, the additional delay also gives those targeted by the tariffs time to adapt, find workarounds, and continue doing business with Russia—particularly in purchasing Russian oil.
Notably, Trump failed to clarify the details of these secondary tariffs.
It is incoherent to declare a “100% secondary tariff” without specifying the mechanics.
If he means what Senator Lindsey Graham previously proposed (and it is a legislation currently in the pipeline)—that buyers of Russian oil should face a 500% tariff—then even a 100% rate would be a significant step.
However, the 500% figure was never realistic, especially considering that some of Russia’s key oil buyers include countries like India, with whom the U.S. has no interest in provoking diplomatic tension.
So it remains unclear what Trump actually means.
Could he be referring to secondary sanctions rather than tariffs?
Many such sanctions are already in place.
Would this entail expanding the list of sanctioned entities?
Presumably, other U.S. officials will have to clarify Trump’s intentions.
Still, anything involving a “100%” figure should be assumed to carry weight—except, once again, for the fact that Russia now has ample time to prepare.
We are likely heading into another scenario in which Putin feigns cooperation or openness toward Trump to delay punitive action even further.
After all, why wouldn’t he?
Putin successfully stalled any serious measures during the first seven months of Trump’s administration.
There’s little to stop him from doing so again with more empty gestures.
On the other hand, there are some encouraging signs that Putin may be reaching the limit of how far fake gestures can go.
For instance, over the past several days, Russian officials—including Putin himself—have signaled that Russia would be open to a new nuclear agreement with Iran that requires zero uranium enrichment.
It’s striking how quickly Putin appears willing to throw Iran under the bus, despite all Iran has done for Russia.
Not only did Iran refrain from helping Russia during its conflict with Israel, but now Putin is aligning with the U.S. and Europe in supporting a zero-enrichment policy.
Part of the calculation may be that Putin wants to position Russia as the only credible nuclear partner Iran can work with.
Presumably, he envisions Rosatom taking the lead in a consortium to manage enrichment on Iran’s behalf. In the short term, however, this is also a symbolic gesture toward Trump—an attempt to say: “Look, I’m cooperating on Iran, maybe hold off on sanctioning us.”
Thankfully, that gesture did not succeed—and rightly so: it was empty.
Iran will never accept a zero-enrichment deal in any case, and it’s plausible (though a speculation only) that Russia and Iran may have even coordinated this performance.
If I were a Russian diplomat, I would have advised Iran that this provides us with plausible deniability and political distance—allowing us to continue helping them without facing additional Iran-related sanctions ourselves.
Returning to the main development: despite the distractions, Trump did take action.
The economic measures remain vague, but more importantly, for the first time, the U.S. is committing to significant military aid in support of Ukraine.
(side note: Naturall, Trump was careful to re-emphasize that this was a "business deal" where Europeans would pay for the weapons. In other words, no cost to U.S. taxpayers—only benefits for U.S. businesses and jobs.)
Military aid.
This is undeniably the most meaningful step taken by Trump on this front.
According to senior officials, the U.S. will lead a $10 billion weapons package executed through NATO.
Crucially, the plan may include long-range missiles capable of striking targets deep within Russian territory—including Moscow.
While we don’t yet know which missiles are involved, ATACMS is a likely candidate.
If Moscow is indeed within range, more advanced systems would be required.
It’s early to speculate, but the signal would be strong.
This would also mark a clear break from the Biden administration’s overly cautious posture, which often prioritized de-escalation over decisive support.
Providing long-range weapons capable of striking inside Russia is a crucial signal that the era of strategic hesitation may be over.
It’s equally important that this aid will be delivered through NATO, most likely via the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) program, launched in 2024 to streamline coordination.
NSATU currently handles more than 6,700 tons of equipment per month through logistics hubs in Poland and Romania.
This delivery infrastructure will help bypass bureaucratic delays—potentially enabling Ukraine to receive weapons with both speed and precision.
If confirmed, this would be very positive news.
However, there are also reasons for concern.
Still nowhere near enough to win.
The aid package may not be as game-changing as initially hoped.
For instance, there is still uncertainty surrounding the supply of Patriot missile systems.
Trump has reiterated that the U.S. will supply them, and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has indicated that he discussed a plan with U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth to allow Germany to purchase two Patriot batteries from the U.S. for Ukraine.
Norway may contribute a third battery.
Three batteries are useful—but still insufficient.
It’s also troubling that Pistorius continues to reject sending Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine.
As we’ve discussed in previous analyses, Taurus missiles offer long-range capabilities, substantial payloads, delayed detonation features, and the ability to destroy hardened targets like bunkers.
These are critical for striking Russian command posts or fortified airbases used to launch glide bombs and long-range missile strikes from positions deep within Russia—well beyond the reach of Ukraine’s air defenses.
Patriot systems alone aren’t enough.
The numbers don’t add up.
Ukraine needs to strike the archer, not just intercept the arrows.
Russia will outproduce the West in terms of ballistic and cruise missile volume, which means that if Patriots are all Ukraine receives, some Russian missiles will inevitably get through.
If we want Ukraine to win—not merely survive—more comprehensive aid is needed.
That’s why the potential delivery of long-range missiles is so significant.
And it would highlight, once again, the gap between the U.S. and Germany in terms of willingness to take risks in supporting Ukraine.
It recalls the Biden era, during which Germany was often the more hesitant actor.
Since Trump took office, some U.S. allies have become more assertive - including the new German Chancellor Mertz himself, who made it clear that Germany will stand by Ukraine, even if U.S. hesitates
Yet now, we are once again facing a scenario in which Washington appears ready to escalate support—while Berlin hesitates.
If Germany can’t even bring itself to send Taurus missiles to Kyiv, how can it expect to deter Russian aggression, whether conventional or hybrid?
Not good enough - this must change.
Ukraine must be empowered to win, not merely to delay defeat or absorb losses.
Europe—not the United States—must lead in accepting the risks necessary to help Ukraine prevail.
Anything less signals weakness.