U.S. strikes nuclear sites and how Iran's response will determine the trajectory of this conflict.
It happened.
Shortly after U.S. B-2 bombers were observed flying westward across the Pacific toward Guam, it became clear that a major decision had been made.
Just one day after Donald Trump publicly contradicted Tulsi Gabbard (and the broader U.S. “intelligence community”) on their assessment that Iran was not building a nuclear bomb, Trump authorized a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Trump announced the strikes via a Truth Social post, declaring that nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow were hit.
This came just a day after what appeared to be a final European push (more on that later - it wasn’t all that genuine, and likely served other motives) to pursue a diplomatic resolution by meeting with the Iranian delegation in Geneva and attempting to find a peaceful path forward on the nuclear issue.
But once again, Iran dismissed the demand for zero enrichment in Friday’s Geneva talks, and a mere day later B2s were in action
In his statement, Trump emphasized that no U.S. bombers remained in Iranian airspace.
This is a critical addition to his message: Trump is signaling that the strikes were limited to those three nuclear sites and that the operation has concluded from the U.S. side—for now.
There are multiple layers of meaning here.
First, it serves as reassurance to his domestic audience, especially the MAGA base, that this is not a protracted invasion and that there are no boots on the ground.
This is likely a deliberate counter to concerns raised by figures such as Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon, who have warned against deeper involvement.
Second, it serves as a message to Iran: there is still a way to avoid further escalation.
(side note: And he will likely emphasize this in his address to the nation tonight, and will probably repeat his offer to have peace with Iran, to have good relations with Iran. He will likely emphasize that he doesn't wish them ill will—but that he was forced to take military action in these particular and narrow circumstances.)
The U.S. is not currently engaged in ongoing operations over Iranian airspace, and that fact—if it holds—could allow Iran to de-escalate without appearing to capitulate.
It also leaves open the possibility that this was a calibrated strike, not an entry into full-scale war.
Trump concluded his message by reiterating that “it was time for peace.”
This is also a softer signal, designed to indicate that he is not seeking a prolonged or widening conflict, and that he remains open to dialogue—at least rhetorically.
However, whether this remains the case—whether U.S. involvement stays limited—depends on several serious questions that naturally arise from the decision to strike these nuclear facilities.
1) How effective were these strikes?
The first and most critical question is: how much damage was actually done to these sites?
Were the strikes cosmetic or symbolic, or were they genuinely effective in degrading or destroying the core infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear program?
A major part of answering that question revolves around how many GBU-57 bombs—also known as Massive Ordnance Penetrators—were deployed.
We don’t know the precise number in operation.
We only have historical data on total stockpiles.
It is generally estimated that the U.S. has over 100 GBU-57s in inventory.
Considering that the actual enrichment tunnel at Fordow is deeply buried under a mountain ridge, and that most experts estimate these bombs need to penetrate 50 to 60 meters of rock to reach the tunnel, it becomes a question of both physics and supply.
It’s important to remember that success doesn’t just depend on punching through rock.
The tunnel itself is reportedly fortified with reinforced concrete—not just soil or loose sediment.
In addition, these bombs must hit precisely the same coordinates multiple times to burrow deeper and deeper.
That level of precision can be affected by wind conditions, terrain, or even Iranian GPS jamming capabilities.
Furthermore, soil and rock from previous detonations tend to collapse back into the crater, which makes each successive drop less effective.
In practice, it is not at all simple to “drill” through a mountain with bombs - though to be clear, it is still doable.
If the U.S. genuinely aimed to destroy the core of Fordow’s underground enrichment facility, and if expert estimates are correct, it would have required dozens of GBU-57s.
That would mean committing between 20% and 30% of the total U.S. inventory of such weapons.
With a possible confrontation with China looming in the Indo-Pacific, how prudent is it to deplete such a strategic stockpile?
We don’t yet know the answer to that.
There is also the possibility that the U.S. was not trying to destroy the tunnel itself, but rather targeted the entrances, access points, and surrounding infrastructure to render the tunnel inoperable.
That could accomplish the short-term objective of halting operations at Fordow without having to breach the core structure.
Such an approach would delay Iran’s progress but wouldn’t necessarily eliminate it.
With time, cleanup crews and engineers could reestablish access.
So, if that was the goal, it could still be considered a success—but it would be a delay, not a definitive end to Fordow’s capabilities.
We do know that facilities at Isfahan and Natanz—which are believed to be less well-protected than Fordow—were also targeted.
It’s possible that more damage was done there, and that the cumulative impact on Iran’s nuclear supply chain was sufficient to create a significant delay of many years—even if Fordow was not totally destroyed or rendered permanently inoperable.
Depending on the extent of damage, another question naturally follows: What happens if this only delays Iran’s program for one or two years? Or even three to four years?
Then what?
Will Trump continue to insist on a zero-enrichment policy? Will the demands remain maximalist?
If so, Iran is almost guaranteed not to agree—especially not under the current regime, and not so soon after suffering a high-profile military attack that inflicted substantial damage and injured national pride.
In such a scenario, it becomes very difficult to imagine any diplomatic re-entry point.
Iranian leadership, already humiliated and under attack, would not easily re-engage under the same conditions.
And if the U.S. continues to demand total capitulation—zero enrichment, full inspections, and dismantling of missile programs—then the only likely outcome is further standoff, and potentially a wider war.
2) How will Iran respond?
Will Iran respond in a smart way—one that avoids further entanglement with the United States, one that avoids escalation, one that ensures U.S. bombers stay out of Iranian airspace?
Or will Iran lash out?
Will it respond with escalation, with attacks that kill Americans or destroy critical U.S. interests in the region—thereby inviting even greater retaliation and further American involvement?
Iran faces a clear choice.
It could opt for a calculated, strategic response—or it could choose to go all in and escalate massively.
That escalation could take the form of shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting the global flow of oil, triggering an energy crisis, and sending oil prices soaring—thus causing inflationary pressure and putting immense political stress on Trump.
And if that were to happen, you can bet Trump would be compelled to respond forcefully in order to make the crisis go away.
Similarly, Iran could choose to attack oil fields in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE—achieving the same effect by targeting vital nodes in the energy supply chain.
Alternatively, Iran could launch strikes on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar or other major U.S. military installations in the region that host significant numbers of American personnel—potentially resulting in heavy casualties.
Or they could attack U.S. naval vessels within reach of the Iranian Navy, speedboats, or undersea drones.
Any of these options would be an extremely dangerous path for Iran.
Because Iran must remember that if it truly wants to avoid a larger confrontation with the United States, it still holds a few key cards.
First, now that Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan have been hit, the U.S. no longer has a direct or official justification to extend or escalate its air campaign—unless Iran hands them one.
The U.S. no longer has a legitimate reason to increase military involvement, unless Iran gives them that reason by escalating first.
Second, Iran should not overlook U.S. public opinion.
Thus far, and before today, the American public was already overwhelmingly against striking Iran.
And this isn’t just the MAGA base, where figures like Steve Bannon and Tucker Carlson lead a vocal contingent warning against entanglement and playing into Israel’s long-term strategic plans.
No—the broader American public, across party lines, is largely opposed.
Around 60% of Americans were against even the limited strikes.
That includes a majority of Republicans, let alone Democrats.
That level of opposition will not change—so long as Iran does not lash out and cause large-scale American casualties.
In fact, that opposition could very well strengthen if Iran exercises restraint.
If Iran refrains from further escalation, public sentiment will harden against any further U.S. involvement—because there will no longer be a compelling reason to stay engaged.
So then, what is a smart way for Iran to respond?
From the perspective of the regime in Tehran, there are at least two options.
Option One: Iran could privately and indirectly warn the U.S. of specific sites it intends to target in a symbolic, face-saving manner.
There is precedent for this.
In 2020, after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani—then head of the IRGC’s Quds Force, by Trump’s order—Iran launched ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq.
But critically, a warning was leaked in advance, and as a result, no U.S. personnel were killed.
Though many suffered traumatic brain injuries while sheltering in bunkers, the attack allowed Iran to save face without escalating the conflict further.
That playbook could be repeated today—only this time, with even more advanced warning, ensuring full evacuation prior to any attack on U.S. assets.
If there are zero casualties, the U.S. could—if it wishes to avoid escalation—absorb the destruction of material infrastructure as the “cost of doing business”, the cost of launching this campaign.
After all, a response from Iran is expected.
And let’s be real here: many American leaders understand that.
Option Two: This is a more peculiar path—one that only an authoritarian regime can really pursue.
For decades, Iran has maintained that the root of its conflict is with Israel, not the U.S., and that the U.S. is simply the puppet of a more masterful Israeli manipulation.
In this scenario, Iran could decide to focus its retaliation entirely on Israel.
It could increase the intensity of its attacks on Tel Aviv or other cities, launching more aggressive missile barrages, and then publicly state that there is no reason to attack the United States—because everything that’s happened stems from Israeli instigation.
Iran could frame its entire narrative around blaming Israel and intensifying the conflict exclusively in that direction.
Of course, that would be a tragic outcome for Israel.
Israeli civilians would be placed in harm’s way.
That much is undeniable, and unfortunate.
But for the sake of this analysis, we are considering it strictly as a strategic exercise—from the perspective of the Iranian regime, seeking to avoid deeper war with the United States.
So, to reiterate: not all is lost for Iran in terms of avoiding further escalation. There are options.
Symbolic attacks with advance warnings, or redirecting the full blame and retaliation onto Israel—both of these provide avenues for the regime to at least appear to respond forcefully while avoiding a wider war with the U.S.
3) Will Trump continue and pursue regime change?
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