Washington To Provide Targeting Support To Kyiv, and Russia's Fuel Crisis Is About To Get Worse.
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Finally, some concrete action against the Kremlin seems to be coming from President Trump.
After months of attempting negotiations with Putin—declaring that a deal with him was “very close,” meeting him in Alaska, and giving him a red-carpet treatment—Trump now appears to recognize that without imposing pain and real pressure on the Kremlin, Putin has no compelling incentive to engage in peace negotiations in earnest.
Whether this realization alone prompted the shift, or whether it was compounded by Putin’s recent provocations (testing NATO further with MiG-31 incursions over Estonia and drone intrusions into Poland and Romania) is unclear.
Together, however, they seem to have influenced Trump to push back and signal to Putin that he cannot get away with such blatant offenses without consequence.
One thing is certain: this marks a remarkable situation.
For the first time, the White House is in direct discussions with Ukraine over the possible transfer of the long range Tomahawk missiles.
Even today, Zelensky hinted that, until now, Ukraine had been striking targets deep inside Russia with its own equipment.
But that situation may finally be about to change.
The timing coincides with the Tomahawk discussions, and given that Germany has not shifted its position on supplying Taurus missiles, it is very likely that Zelensky’s hint referred specifically to Tomahawks.
(side note: A transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles would give Ukraine a genuine strategic standoff: a 1,000-mile-class, low-flying, precision weapon with a ~454kg warhead that can strike airbases, rail hubs and energy infrastructure far beyond the reach of Storm Shadow or ATACMS. Fielded most plausibly as ground-launched batteries using the U.S. Army’s Typhon-style launchers, Tomahawks would let Kyiv hit deep fixed targets without risking aircraft or needing naval platforms — the usual way they are launched.)
In addition, even apart from the Tomahawk question, the U.S. has now agreed to provide advanced intelligence sharing and targeting guidance and assistance to Ukraine.
This would allow Kyiv to strike deep into Russian territory with far greater precision.
And that, in itself, represents a monumental change.
For the first time, Washington is not only enabling strikes on military targets but also signaling readiness to provide intelligence for attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, including oil refineries.
This is a significant escalation—an appetite for risk that the Biden administration never displayed.
The White House is therefore moving from mere counterforce targeting toward countervalue strikes against strategic energy assets.
This is exactly the kind of step these cables have long argued for.
If it goes through, it will most certainly represent a monumental shift with potentially decisive consequences.
The impact on Russia could be profound.
Already, there is political grumbling inside the country over the damage inflicted on its refineries—damage that has led to shortages, rising prices, and severe logistical difficulties for the war effort.
Ukraine’s strikes have already caused serious disruptions to Russia’s energy sector.
Now is the time to revisit the full scale of that impact, from the summer (when Ukraine intensified its pressure on refineries) up to the present, in order to understand both the pain already inflicted and how much further it could escalate with U.S. intelligence support and the possible deployment of Tomahawk missiles.
Impact of Ukraine’s Refinery Strikes: The Petrostate Runs Dry
First the queues, then came the rationing and now, export bans (until the end of the 2025 as a minimum: think of all the revenue foregone).
Russia, the petrostate, is running short of petrol.
In just weeks, Ukraine’s drones have exposed a paradox: an oil giant without gasoline.
Since the escalation of this campaign over Summer 2025, at least ten refineries were struck, 17% of refining capacity idled, and over 1.1 million barrels per day offline.
Gasoline output is down 10%: shortfall of 20% of national demand.
One would expect that a country producing 20% more gasoline than it consumes, exporting 31 million tons of diesel a year, with Kirishi and Ryazan among the world’s largest refineries, would not run dry.
One would expect that Moscow could protect its backbone — the refineries, the terminals, the pipelines.
And yet here we are.
Queues are stretching across the Volga.
Rationing is in effect in Crimea — with purchase limits of 30 litres per driver.
The Far East reporting dry pumps.
Wholesale gasoline is soaring too: AI-92 is at 73,000 roubles per ton, a record.
In August, wholesale prices reached 53.5 roubles per liter, almost indistinguishable from retail at 59.5.
Margins across refineries have collapsed.
Small operators shuttered. Drivers lined up for hours.
That is not an accident - this is a deliberate (and highly successful) attritional campaign from Ukraine.
Kyiv is pursuing three strategic objectives.
First: Attrition with purpose.
Every refinery destroyed is diesel lost.
Diesel fuels tanks, trucks, artillery.
Kyiv has made this its priority: 40% of deep strike targets this year were refineries.
The logic is straightforward: Russia can sell oil, but if it cannot refine it into usable product, its war machine slows.
Second: Political pressure inside Russia.
Queues at gas stations are visible in ways battlefield losses are not.
The Kremlin can hide casualty figures, but cannot hide empty pumps.
Every farmer, every trucker, every commuter feels it.
The image of abundance (the petrostate that fuels the world) is inverted into scarcity at home.
Third: Leverage over global markets and Moscow’s ability to profit from refined exports.
By forcing Moscow to ration, Ukraine limits Russia’s exports (and corresponding revenue) as well.
Russia exported 7.3 million barrels/day of crude and products in August, down 70,000 bpd from July.
Product exports fell by 40,000 bpd.
Revenues are already shrinking: June oil + product exports $13.6 billion, down 14% YoY; Q2 fossil fuel revenues down 18%.
Russia’s budget break-even price is $69.7/barrel.
Export barrels fetch closer to $59. That gap bleeds the treasury.
And with the current export ban on gasoline (until at least until end of this year), the dent to Russia’s coffers will be even more pronounced.
Russia’s response is an amalgamation of stopgap measures:
Export bans on gasoline extended.
Partial diesel bans imposed (though pipelines and big producers are exempt, limiting relief).
Imports from Belarus increased to plug gaps.
Price freezes in Crimea and elsewhere.
Rationing at the pump.
But these are temporary emergency measures: they buy time but they do not restore capacity.
Ryazan output is halved. Kirishi, shut down. Samara refineries, burning. Primorsk terminal, shipments suspended.
Each attack chips away at resilience.
In the medium to long term, Russia’s real options to solve this crisis are to:
1) Negotiate and settle on generous terms — with genuine security guarantees offered to Ukraine.
2) Outlast and win outright before crisis bites so hard as to preclude further major advances/success in the war.
3) Improve air defenses or seek & destroy Ukraine’s launch/missile capabilities to such an extent that further attacks on refineries produce minimal results and don’t cause significant impact on Russia.
4) Escalate to de-escalate: introduce some new angle/intensity to the war, to then come to a side-agreement to exclude refineries and energy infrastructure from mutual attacks.
Russia is currently coasting with option two.
Option one is what Trump is pushing for.
Option three seems improbable in the short to medium term; and option four is possible.
Indeed, Russia, at the current scale and production of drones and missiles, could reach a point where it could cause so much devastating impact on Ukraine’s own electricity grid and energy/power generation infrastructure, that it can likely impose a deal where both countries refrain from attacking each other.
However, this comes with a caveat that at that point Russia may even calculate that continuing on with energy strikes is worth it.
And that outlasting Ukraine is a better option, all things considered.
A Devastating Strategy That Washington Is Right To Support.
In the meantime, and as Russia is grappling with longer-term solutions, this is no longer a war only at the front.
It is a war in Russia’s rear.
And once again, let us recall: not by chance, but by design.
Ukraine has identified the Kremlin’s political soft spot.
Striking refineries is not just about fuel. It is about legitimacy.
A state that cannot fill its citizens’ tanks cannot project invulnerability.
It is also about leverage. Russia still depends on energy for ~30% of its federal budget.
Every refinery knocked out is not only a logistical wound but a fiscal one.
Revenues are down 37% year-on-year in July, oil exports sliding, foreign buyers unsettled.
The petrostate is brittle.
In the short term, the Kremlin now faces an unpalatable choice:
1) Keep exports flowing, and let domestic queues grow, or;
2) Protect the home front, and sacrifice vital foreign currency earnings.
Neither option signals strength.
Ukraine has turned Russia’s greatest advantage — energy — into a liability.
The Kremlin may boast of oil, but its citizens see queues.
It may proclaim resilience, but its budget bleeds at $10 below break-even.
It may declare control, but its refineries burn.
This is not collateral damage but a well-thought out and well-executed campaign, and Washington is right to offer its full support in execution of this campaign.