Weekly Overview
China uses the Ukraine war to advance its own narratives
Usually preferring crass and declarative statements to sophisticated frame game, China (under Xi Jinping) hasn’t been too adept at seizing opportunities to advance its own narrative.
But in this particular instance, Beijing pounced on the opportunities presented by the Ukraine crisis very shrewdly.
To date, primarily in two ways:
1)The Quad as an “Asian NATO” frame.
The Chinese Foreign Minister attacked the partnership between the US, Australia, Japan and India - known as the Quad.
He described the partnership arrangement as America’s attempt to recreate NATO in Asia.
He then warned that such a military alliance has a potential to cause a “disaster that disrupts regional peace and stability”.
(side note: an almost perfect rhetorical attack if only Wang Yi replaced “regional” with “global”)
Now, given that there is already a military alliance between the US, Japan, and Australia, Wang Yi’s comment had two main tactical objectives:
1) Warn India about the potential perils of a closer military cooperation with the rest of the QUAD members.
2) Warn the US, Japan and Australia (and their publics, & even the global public as well), that India’s closer military cooperation & integration with the rest of the QUAD could trigger a response from Beijing - and although no formal threats were made (a la ‘‘military-technical response’’ per the Kremlin’s preferred parlance) the warning that such a move would cause a disruption to the ‘‘regional peace and stability’’ amounts to an implicit military threat.
Now, the effectiveness of the ‘‘Asian NATO’’ frame is due to the associations that it creates in the minds of the target audience.
Just as the flawed idea of ‘‘NATO expansion caused the war in Ukraine” (as opposed to Russia’s desire for creation of a vassal state/empire 2.0) is entering the collective public conscience, Wang’s use of the term was deliberate - to create a significant worry and create public calls for ‘‘not repeating the mistake made in Europe once more, and with an even more dangerous adversary”.
Here is a prediction: certain US-based talk show hosts and media pundits will start to parrot this talking point: “Look, when are we going to learn from our mistakes? look what happened when we poked the bear before - this is going to be a bigger disaster with China”.
Naturally, Wang’s hope is that enough ordinary citizens (not interested in/capable of deeper strategic thought) would buy into this line - putting pressure on the Western leaders to back off.
One expects China to crystallize this narrative and repeat it ad nauseam.
The US leaders must therefore take a proactive approach in publicly articulating the grand strategy in the pacific, and how our military alliances actually work to produce a different outcome: containing China and deterring it from temptations to dominate the whole region with hard power.
2) Biolab conspiracy theory.
China’s decision to enter the fray, and prop up totally baseless conspiracy theories about the US/Ukraine cooperation on biolab-focused military activities, was surprising to many DC strategists.
After all, to date, China has tried to distance itself from the war - attempting to insulate its reputation from the negative associations.
Why suddenly jump on a conspiracy theory bandwagon?
First off, the Chinese government may have calculated that this particular conspiracy theory would have some legs to stand on.
They are undoubtedly encouraged by certain Western media pundits’ attempts to tarnish the US government - by implausibly linking Russia’s current military biolab claims to NIH’s gain of function research - that, given the USG’s propensity to experiment with ‘‘biotech’’, perhaps this particular allegation shouldn’t be ruled out.
Naturally, they have probably miscalculated - those most likely to buy into these conspiracy theories are also most probably (at least in most cases) the very same individuals that blame Ukraine and/or ‘‘NATO expansion” for the current war.
But setting aside the obvious reputational risks caused by adding credence to Russia’s fantastical claims, what was China going to gain from aligning with the Kremlin on this particular narrative?
Beijing was likely seeking two objectives:
a) Justifying its ambivalent stance by adding moral confusion to the war.
By sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and refusing to vote with Russia (at the UN), China is already trying very hard to protect its reputation on the international arena.
But similar efforts are made when it comes to the domestic audience.
Trying very hard to free itself from the stain, China is already censoring media reports of Russian atrocities committed against the civilians in this war.
Adding a further dose of moral relativism into the mix wouldn’t hurt either.
Essentially, this is the current domestic narrative pushed by Beijing: “look we don’t know exactly what is going on in Ukraine - just look at the reports of the US military biolab facilities - maybe there is something to say about Russia’s need to defend itself? Let’s not jump to conclusions here!”.
b) Protecting its reputation from the Wuhan Lab Leak theory.
It was always China’s strategy to respond to the Wuhan Lab Leak theory by pointing back at the US: at one point, even actively spreading malicious and unsubstantiated rumors that the leak could have actually been spread by the US Army.
This is now round two of the same claim.
Here is the relevant statement of the official spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian :
“I would also like to stress that, the biological military activities of the US in Ukraine are merely the tip of the iceberg. Using such pretexts as cooperating to reduce biological safety risks and strengthening global public health, the US has 336 biological labs in 30 countries under its control. 336, you heard me right. It also conducted many biological military activities at the Fort Detrick base at home’’.
Tip of the Iceberg….
This is some uncharacteristically opportunistic and shrewd public diplomacy from Beijing - since their disinformation campaigns are usually advanced without due regard to the overall context.
And make no mistake: plenty of conspiracy theory-minded uneducated masses all over the world, will happily buy into this narrative - unfortunately, with the aid of certain media pundits, the theory will also take hold here in the US.
And this is precisely why simple dismissals will not suffice.
The US leadership must attack China for irresponsible conspiracy-theory promotion - and it must do so in tandem with all allied leaders.
The leaders of the UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, and all of the NATO/EU member states, must join the US in condemning this Beijing-promoted baseless narrative - the State Department must put a significant effort into creating this coalition.
Fundamentals unchanged.
China’s opportunism in using the Ukraine war for its own interests must not be confused with its support for the Kremlin.
Fundamentals have not changed: China is still very much unhappy with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Leading Chinese diplomats have numerously called for the end of hostilities, frequently expressing how ‘‘disconcerting’’ it was to watch civilian casualties in Ukraine.
And of course, the expressions of displeasure went beyond those of mere statements.
China has now refused to supply Russian airlines with much needed aircraft parts.
With debilitating Western sanctions imposed on its airline industry (Boeing and Airbus halting supply of critical parts), Russia was hoping for some relief from Beijing.
This did not happen - clearly then, the ‘‘no limits’’ partnership was an extreme hyperbole having little basis in reality (and these cables have repeatedly warned against exaggerating Russia-China alliance).
The extent of Chinese displeasure can be best described by the negative implications arising from their decision to withhold supply of critical parts - the overall state (and safety in particular) of Russia’s commercial passenger flights is now under a significant threat.
Beijing was naturally aware of this, and yet still refused to help out - this is perhaps the most powerful indirect signal - one that undoubtedly shook the Kremlin.
The war in Ukraine is quickly approaching the strategic crossroads.
As we are entering the third week of this war, Russia continues to stumble forward, and admirable (and so far, highly competent) Ukrainian resistance continues to successfully repel the major attacks.
Due to the failure to agree around the basic facts on the ground, the Turkey-mediated Ankara talks between the respective foreign ministers (where the Russian FM Lavrov stuck to fantasy talk about Russia not being the aggressor), were predictably fruitless.
Against this backdrop, Russian troops continued to disperse around and encircle Kyiv (and within 15 miles from the city center), push towards Odessa in the south, tighten their grip around Kharkiv in the northeast, and Mariupol in the southeast.
In addition, Russia has finally taken steps that military science would expect it to take a long time ago: attacking Ukraine’s military bases in the West of the country, damaging facilities that were used as a training camp for new fighters, and as a hub for transfer of crucial supplies from the Polish border.
With its finances tanking, ruble continuing its slide, stock markets remaining closed for yet another week, and corporate exodus (accompanied by a significant ‘‘brain drain’’ and mass emigration of intellectually capable class), the Russian economy cannot afford this war to go on for too long.
Putin must understand this - at least instinctively, even if not on a forensic macroeconomic level.
And so, it is not surprising that he decided to not waste time and double down with renewed attacks to end the war sooner than later -since time works against Russia.
It was not surprising therefore, that (combined with the latest military moves), all indicators point to a preparation for renewed Russian offensive.
With his original strategic objective of a regime change all but dead (even if Zelensky is successfully assassinated/toppled, there is no way Putin could maintain a puppet regime without a long-term, costly, and bloody occupation of Ukraine - something that he probably wants to avoid) ,Putin is doubling down on compellence strategy: he wants to secure face-saving concessions either before a renewed assault (via threat displays of the carnage he is about to unleash), or with an actual offensive to further degrade the Ukrainian military, and demoralize its civilian population via extensive sieges reminiscent of Russian campaigns in Syria.
We have therefore reached strategic crossroads: Zelensky essentially has two options: 1) take a risk and wait out/try to repel the new offensive, or 2) agree to some concessions prior to the upcoming onslaught.
It is important to note that both choices will necessitate some sort of an agreement with Putin.
Although a lengthy war of attrition is not in his interests, Putin (unless toppled) will simply not stop this war without securing some settlement enabling him to save some face.
But it is essentially up to Zelensky to decide the timing of this settlement: he may (very reasonably) calculate that repelling another attack on key cities will shape the conditions in his favor - allowing him to make the minimal concessions.
Whichever option Zelensky ends up choosing (and correspondingly, the extent of gains/concessions that Putin would have to settle for) will depend on the actual, as well as perceived BATNA (Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement) of each party.
Battle of BATNAs.
1) Russia’s BATNA.
Russia’s alternative to a settlement is nothing short of a maximal pursuit of military escalation to achieve its (at this point, almost completely untenable) original strategic goals.
With these come corresponding risks:
a) A Longer than expected timeline leading to further costs and military demoralization (social media is already saturated with evidence of abandoned Russian hardware) that render future military success unlikely;
b) Inability to cut-off Ukraine from external military aid - that then leads to a significant unfavorable change in the balance of powers on the battlefield;
c) Further public expressions of displeasure from China - demonstrating Russia’s isolation and reducing its leverage even further;
d) Increasing financial costs (the cost of the first week of war was already 7$bn - with more than half of its Central Bank reserves frozen, the costs are unsustainable - especially when a renewed offensive would require more investment into supply chains and logistics), and sanctions leading to a significant economic damage - where further resources cannot be effectively allocated to a continuous war effort;
e) Popular uprising due to an extreme plunge in living standards, and/or regime change from a disgruntled and united elite intent on ending the war.
Naturally, Russia is taking steps to actively alter the perception of its BATNA - by creating an impression of a Russian momentum, demonstrating a switch towards tactics (Syria Playbook) that will be less costly (and thus more sustainable), and displaying willingness to take actions that would change the facts on the ground decidedly in its favor:
a) Pursuing a Syria playbook strategy of choking-off cities from essential supplies and targeting the critical civilian infrastructure.
Russian troops are actively targeting residential buildings, communication towers, and even hospitals.
b) Another tactic from Syria: besieging major cities, denying them basic amenities like water, and even targeting civilians that escape these cities.
Taken together, the tactics aim to render these cities unlivable and therefore, ultimately ungovernable - taking over chaotic cities is much easier.
Denied of both basic utilities, and battlefield victories, the civilian population also becomes demoralized - increasing the pressure on the Zelensky government to offer significant concessions.
It is likely that Russia will allow for more evacuations of women and children - reducing the moral outrage of indiscriminate shelling (whilst avoiding street combat for as long as possible).
c) Syrian mercenaries - to convince skeptics of its willingness to sustain urban warfare casualties, Russia has resorted to the recruitment of mercenaries from Syria (in addition to those currently being recruited by Wagner). Ostensibly, Bashar Assad is going to send up to 16k Syrian soldiers to join Russian forces in Ukraine - although, the number is highly suspect: for it is unlikely that a regime reliant on Russian and Iranian military assistance is going to send such a high number of troops to Ukraine
(side note: contrast this monetary motivation with tens of thousands of international volunteers signing up to defend Ukraine out of pure will to defend liberty in Europe)
d) Threats against NATO’s military aid columns.
Russian deputy FM Sergei Ryabkov warned the US ‘‘that pumping weapons from a number of countries it orchestrates isn’t just a dangerous move, it’s an action that makes those convoys legitimate targets.”
The objective here is to demoralize the Zelensky government - your lifeline is about to be cut-off.
Nonetheless, the statement isn’t as menacing as it may appear at a first sight - since Russian FM left two important leeways for his own side.
First off, ‘‘makes them a target’’ isn’t the same as ‘‘Russia will retaliate‘‘ and is certainly far from ‘‘they will be targeted’’.
Such passive language was not chosen by accident.
Secondly, the statement doesn’t clarify where precisely the convoys could turn into targets: Once they cross into Ukraine?
Or is Russia going to target them on NATO’s territory (almost inconceivable at this point).
For there is a night and day difference between the two.
But such ambiguity was also a calculated measure to add uncertainty to the threat that is far from biting.
Overall then, this was a bluff - one surely encouraged by NATO’s weakness on the MIG-29 delivery.
e) Chemical warfare.
There was naturally no open threat to utilize chemical weapons.
But the US/NATO warnings that Russia may do just that (after advancing the narrative of US/Ukraine joint biolab conspiracy) adds some credibility to such threats.
It is highly unlikely that Russia would resort to such measures - for one thing, it would encourage further sanctions - this may even become a red line that pushes the EU to sanctions Russian oil & gas.
(side note: and the US must keep pushing its allies to jump on the oil embargo bandwagon - otherwise, the increase in oil prices will more than compensate for the US/UK embargo on Russian oil - since at this rate, Putin will likely make a profit)
Moreover, China would be forced to further distance itself from Russia, and the use of such extreme measures (undoubtedly resulting in catastrophic civilian death toll and suffering) is not going to fly with the domestic audience in Russia.
But the mere threat of such measures (however unlikely) may become just as effective in affecting the calculus of the Zelensky government, as their actual grim implementation.
f) Further extreme measures.
There are now allegations that Russia has abducted at least two Ukrainian city mayors.
Such measures (in addition to demoralizing the local populations) are aimed to compel local government leaders to hand over cities willingly.
This idea is likely to crash against the reality: even if certain local government leaders are forced to appease the invaders, whether or not the actual civilian population would follow (very unlikely) is a completely different matter.
In the short-term however, such measures could indeed produce some capitulation - creating a perceptual momentum of the inevitability of the Russian invasion.
All of these measures, in addition to actually serving as shaping operations for a renewed invasion, aim to convince Zelensky, that his best alternative to a negotiated agreement, is a renewed and even more gruesome Russian onslaught.
(side note: and in fact, Russia is increasingly hopeful that such an agreement may be possible - Putin is already laying a rhetorical groundwork for a settlement by declaring that he witnessed a ‘‘positive shift’’ in the talks with Ukraine)
Naturally, most of these threats should not be taken at face value - and Ukraine has demonstrated serious competence and bravery in resisting and even actively repelling Russian attacks.
On the other hand, it is also imprudent to dismiss the upcoming Russian campaign as a total Potemkin village.
Certainly, if the reports of Russians asking China for help with weapons are true (so far, not acknowledged by China), then perhaps the state of the Russian army is much worse than we have all expected.
(side note: there are many more questions around this report. Ordinarily, one might expect Putin to make such a request to further pull China into taking sides in the conflict, and prevent Russia’s isolation. But how prudent is it to make such appeals when Beijing is refusing to help with even lesser requests for civilian aircraft parts? It is a big ask, and China agreeing to help our Moscow would in fact be monumental: for it would create the first major proxy war between the US and China in the 21st century).
But even this would still not negate the basic facts that most of the Russian firepower is still operational and available to renew a massive assault.
Ukraine’s BATNA
Ukraine has a good chance of prevailing in repelling further Russian invasion and defending the core seat of power in Kyiv.
But risks to cities like Odessa and Kharkiv are substantial.
In particular, there is a risk that a southern Russian assault produces strong results for Moscow: cutting-off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea.
Ukraine’s BATNA is obvious: repel further attacks and negotiate a settlement from a position of strength - perhaps reaching a point where Putin seeks some symbolic concessions in the form of non-binding declarations of neutrality (foregoing the maximalist demands around the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia, and independence of DNR and LNR).
Crucially, further success could enable Ukraine to insist on its EU accession and only compromise on the issue of joining NATO - tactically delaying the matter to a period in time when Putin is no longer in power/alive (at which point even if a unanimity required for acceptance into NATO is not achieved, Ukraine should still be at a position where it is richer and even better equipped to protect itself independently - a new US/EU-led Marshall plan will be needed to achieve this).
There is however worry that Zelensky may have conceded too much too soon - his rhetoric about turning ‘‘cool’’ towards the idea of joining NATO is undoubtedly designed to create a rhetorical groundwork for concessions.
Perhaps Zelensky was also trying to incentivize Putin to ease-off on attacks - a deceptive wartime tactic to secure some short-term relief.
But such tricks are risky - for they may reduce public morale to resist further attacks - ‘‘if we are going to concede anyways, why prolong this further?’’ may be a legitimate question asked by many Ukrainians.
Such statements would also reduce the intensity of international public support, decrease the flow of foreign volunteers ready to fight for Ukraine (why travel all the way, leave behind so much, and risk lives, if a concession-led ceasefire is imminent), and would inadvertently legitimate the frequently floated (yet wholly erroneous) argument that Ukraine must make some concessions to end this conflict.
(Thankfully then, Zelensky’s adviser reduced these risks by later reiterating that not a ‘‘single inch’’ of Ukraine will be conceded to Russia)
The Ukrainian President has also raised the bar with his remarks delivered in the UK’s House Of Commons.
As the first ever foreign leader to deliver a speech in the UK’s parliament, Zelensky echoed Churchill and promised to ‘‘fight in the forests, in the fields, on the shores, in the streets’’ and to ‘‘not give up’’.
So what would Churchill do? He would fight on - and would certainly not accept any of the concessions currently demanded of Zelensky.
Having said all that, no matter what path Zelensky chooses to pursue, one thing is crystal clear - Ukraine must firmly reject Putin’s maximalist sovereignty-denying demands:
1) Capitulation / agreement to demilitarize.
2) Recognition of Crimea (and possibly, newly invaded lands) as a Russian territory.
3) Recognition of DNR and LNR as independent states.
4) Agreement to not pursue EU membership.
One hopes that Zelensky will not agree to such extreme concessions and that Ukraine will continue to fight on.
In the meantime, the US and NATO must do their utmost to help Ukraine in creating a more favorable BATNA (both actual and perceived).
These cables have long advocated for delivery of S300 SAMs/air defense systems currently under NATO’s possession (the systems are already in use in Ukraine, and thus require no further training) - and there are now reports that the US is indeed working on their delivery.
After the MIG-29 debacle, this is the least that NATO can do.
Further help must be offered as well - more funds, more Stingers, Javelins, anti-ship missiles, Switchblade 300 loitering missiles (particularly helpful in urban combat), and further shipments of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones.
And even if NATO still refuses to impose a no-fly zone, it must warn Russia that its aid convoys are off-limits and will be protected vigorously.
Soon, we shall all witness either a new Russian offensive or a negotiated settlement.
Until that moment however, everything must be done to help Ukraine to survive and succeed under the worst case scenario.