Weekly Overview
The war in Europe: preliminary conclusions, the narrative warfare, Russia’s diplomatic isolation, and what more needs to be done to help Ukraine
“War is the continuation of politics by other means.’’ - Carl Von Clausewitz.
We are now several days into the war initiated by Putin - a military campaign that has specific grand strategic & political objectives (as discussed in the previous cables).
It is too early to pass firm conclusions, but one has a strong suspicion (to say the least) that not everything is going according to the plan.
Firstly, Russia suffered significant diplomatic and narrative losses.
Specifically;
1) His supposedly closest allies refused to stand by Putin: a) China abstained from the vote in the UN Security Council condemning Russian aggression (instead of actively voting in line with Russia), and Monday’s emergency UN General Assembly session is not promising a much better outcome, and b) Kazakhstan refused to send over its troops to Ukraine (recall how only last month, the Kazakh president survived and remained in power due to Putin’s help).
2) Even the pro-Kremlin EU spoilers like Hungary refused to block EU-wide sanctions on Russia.
3) The hitherto perpetual dove of Europe, Germany; agreed to impose SWIFT sanctions, reversed its decision on military aid, and approved the delivery of thousands of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine.
The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz further (and publicly) proposed a 100bn Euro defense fund, and committed to spend more than 2% of Germany’s GDP on defense (NATO benchmarks that Germany hitherto dismissed).
4) For the first time in its history, the EU is devoting large sums of money to provide military aid to a non-member country involved in a war.
5) Turkey signaled that it will block further entries of Russian warships into the Black Sea (under the Montreux convention) - although not immediately impactful (there are plenty in the Black Sea basin already - certainly enough for the current operation), the move is a significant shift in Ankara’s hitherto passive criticism of Russia - this is a crucial development that opens doors for further consequential engagement from Turkey.
6) After the Afghanistan debacle, and after months of warning, the US was finally vindicated in its intel assessments - recovering its credibility on the global stage.
7) On the morning of February 25 - once the Western world woke up to videos of shelling and missiles killing Ukrainian civilians, Russia’s frequently pushed narrative of being an aggrieved party fearful for its security, was definitively crushed.
The final nail in the coffin came with Secretary Blinken’s timely warning that Russia was trying to revive and recreate a new Soviet empire - the fact that not a single serious individual publicly disputed this claim, was a strong indicator that Russia quite indisputably lost the informational war.
Hopefully the whole world will soon realize how fortunate it is that the US is still the preeminent superpower.
But, we will (in the upcoming cables) have an opportunity to dive in deeper into some of the most consequential and long-term repercussions - suffice it to say for now however, Russia lost its geopolitical capital to a very significant extent.
And what about the early results of Putin’s war?
For now, we shall 1) look at the early battlefield indicators, and make (where possible) some tentative inferences from Putin’s ongoing military campaign, and 2) look at what more needs to be done to help Ukraine survive this onslaught.
Early battlefield observations & conclusions
First, some caveats are in order: OSINT (open source intel) and official Russian and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense accounts should all be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism.
We are now in the active military phase of the conflict and so 1) OSINT will be susceptible to deliberate disinformation/disorientation maneuvers, and 2) official accounts from the warring parties will likely attempt to paint a desired picture.
Since 1) Ukraine is interested in creating an impression of even stronger resilience (which so far, is actually rather impressive) to a) inspire local population and b) persuade external observers to increase their military aid (i.e. this is not a wasted cause), and 2) Russia will likely try to cover up its embarrassing flops (blitz going just as planned), and maintain the impression of inevitability of the eventual success.
In this context (and given the reputational/credibility concerns outweighing those of active deception/propaganda needs), independent investigative outlets like Bellingcat and official intel agencies of NATO states that are careful about their credibility (like the UK MoD’s Defence Intel), are likely to produce a more realistic state of affairs (even if still far from perfect).
With these caveats out of the way, and taking a holistic look, some preliminary inferences can indeed be made with reasonable level of confidence:
1. Russia refrained from using extreme firepower during the opening Blitz
Russia had amassed significant MLRS / air force power in Belarus - only 100 miles away from Kyiv.
(a significant departure from Russia’s previous military campaigns)
Yet this overwhelming firepower was not put to use.
Given Putin’s political objectives of a prompt regime change, the initial desire to avoid too much physical and human devastation is understandable.
After all, once the new pro-Kremlin regime is installed, Putin will need compliance of the Ukrainian population to make it work - something that is less likely to happen if there are devastating human costs that anger the Ukrainian people and thus, encourage an insurgency.
It is therefore reasonable for Putin not to pursue tactics that are likely to frustrate his political / strategic objectives.
But what about the Ukrainian military targets? There is little evidence that all key military installations were under cruise/ballistic missile attacks.
Again, it is possible that the Russian SVR concocted a planned coup with the aid of certain Ukrainian military leaders - large casualties amongst the Ukrainian servicemen would make it harder for the top brass to take over the government and invite in the Russians - all whilst securing the obedience of ordinary Ukrainian soldiers.
This is a reasonable inference to make - one that begs the question: did this too fail?
Possible - it is plausible that a superior US/NATO counter-intel helped Zelensky to identify the traitors and quietly remove them at the very beginning of the Blitz.
It is also possible that the potential side-switchers in the Ukrainian military leadership are waiting to see how this thing plays out - that is, they are currently hedging their bets.
2. Russia not utilizing cyber attacks to full effect
There is a lot of speculation in the OSINT community that Russia failed to use their cyber capabilities / didn’t resort to these at all.
This is actually a problematic judgment to pass.
Since 1) Just the mere fact that the wider civilian resources were not targeted (to avoid antagonism from the local population), does not in itself preclude the speculation that Ukrainian military’s command & control was indeed attacked.
After all, one would not expect the Ukrainian military to admit that their command & control was successfully attacked and caused operational difficulties.
What we can infer however, is that even if the Ukrainian military targets were subjected to cyber attacks - these were either repelled, or did not produce devastating effects (since the defenders were able to mount competent & coordinated counter-attacks).
3. Russia’s planning problems
a) The very first airborne attack on Feb 24 (targeting Antonov airport in Hostomel - in the outskirts of Kyiv) was repelled and reclaimed by the Ukrainian forces (later to be contested yet again) after only a few hours of fighting.
Here is a quick conclusion that we can draw: Russian military planners were either a) overly optimistic in their assessments of their blitz, or b) didn’t have adequate plan B/contingency planning.
The argument that Ukrainian troops displayed better than expected fighting prowess (or received better than predicted intel assistance from US/NATO), is simply not going to fly.
This is not day 40 of fighting - where planning is harder and more reactive / situational.
This was Russia’s opening salvo - and they failed.
They simply didn’t have a good enough plan B to secure the airport - from a purely operational perspective, a total waste of airborne resources.
b) Then there is the curious case of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones flying unimpeded - wreaking havoc on Russian tanks and BTRs
This raises the following questions: why didn’t Russia attack Bayraktar bases with cruise / ballistic missiles prior to the assaults?
Why do the tank and BTR columns advance without the cover of anti-drone/anti-aircraft systems - like Pantsirs.
Or perhaps they are, and the Russian anti-aircraft systems are simply not that effective?
Why is Russia not shooting down these drones with their SU-34 fighter jets?
Again, is this simply the case of poor planning?
Or is Ukraine (with undoubtedly the assistance of the US/NATO) deploying some sophisticated tools of electro-magnetic warfare that in turn jam/blind the Russian fighter jets?
These are some crucial questions - since it isn’t like only one or two lucky Turkish drones survived the onslaught.
The Youtube/Twitter space is full of non-stop footage of drone strikes -debilitating Russian heavy armor columns.
(side note: Turkey is going to have a significant boost in its drone sales in the upcoming years - which is great news for the US, since it is much better that a NATO ally dominates the low-cost drone sales, and squeezes out China in this crucial and fast-growing market)
c) Finally, Sunday’s foolhardy assault on Kharkiv - Ukraine’s second largest city, located in the north east.
Frustrated that their armed units were making slow progress, the Russian army decided to take over the city with Spetsnaz/Special Forces units, using lightly armored Tigr-M vehicles.
Predictably, it didn’t go well - the attack was repelled, and Russia suffered heavy losses.
The attack in Kharkiv seemed especially badly planned and reactive in nature.
It seems like (and there are hints of it discussed below) Putin is running out of patience, and the pressured army staff end up resorting to half-baked tactics - that then crash against the reality of elementary military science.
4. Russia’s logistical problems
Twitter/Youtube space is full of video clips by the locals that show (allegedly) Russian BTRs/Tanks stuck due to lack of fuel.
Again - take it with a grain of salt, but the UK’s defense intel concurs with this assessment.
If it is indeed true that Russian heavy armored regiments ran out of fuel this early in the campaign, then the Russian military leadership failed demonstratively.
Since either a) there was terrible planning only few days into the campaign, or b) there was an unforeseen detour, or c) Russian planned for enough fuel but the logistical lines were hit successfully by Ukraine
The first option is a total embarrassment - and the latter two options indicate better than expected resistance from Ukraine - which is still something that Russians should have planned for.
Unacceptable for tanks to run out of fuel this early in the campaign.
Having said all this, there are also some unsubstantiated speculations that allegedly, Russian soldiers deliberately drain their vehicles of fuel - to avoid reaching the target cities - some sort of passive disobedience.
Is this due to Russian soldiers’ humane refusal to cause destruction in civilian-heavy areas?
Or there is a much more simple explanation to this: self - preservation?
After all, tanks and armored vehicles are easy targets in the urban warfare setting - any Ukrainian soldier can hide in a random apartment, and (prior to being spotted) manage to destroy several tanks with NLAWs.
We simply don’t know - this could actually be a deliberate rumor, spread to demoralize Russian troops - and perhaps, justify the retreat of others who may have been contemplating a similar move (a sort of a social proof for retreat) - a genius tactic from Ukraine if true.
5. Russia’s morale problems
A lot of videos of Russian soldiers demoralized (with a great example above) - once again, caution is in order - this could be planned propaganda (smart) to demoralize the enemy (smart) but: 1) the number of such videos, and 2)the geographic diversity of locations where these were filmed (inferred from metadata) make it more believable that these are in fact Russian soldiers demonstrating regret and low morale.
It is unlikely that the Ukrainian side could mount such an effective production at such a short notice and in the middle of a massive invasion (metadata proves recency of the filmed videos).
We can also see that many of the Russian soldiers fighting this war appear extremely young/immature - far from experienced special forces.
None of this creates a good look for Putin - who is obsessed with Russia’s threat display capabilities.
6. Putin’s Inadequate Psyops
Shortly after Russia agreed to talk to Zelensky (under terms which would amount to an outright capitulation), Putin delivered a direct appeal to the Ukrainian military leaders to ‘‘take over control’’ - since dealing with them would be easier than with these ‘‘Nazi drug addicts in charge in Kyiv’’.
Leaving aside the absurdity of Putin’s labels (the Ukrainian president is Russian-speaking ‘‘nice guy’’ of Jewish origin - a far cry from a drug addicted Nazi), Putin’s call for a military takeover was actually a huge gamble - since every day that this proposed coup doesn’t take place, is a significant damage to Putin’s influence and power.
With every additional day that Putin’s calls for a coup get ignored, the likelihood of a Ukrainian general deciding to switch-side, and risk being the first one to pull the trigger, goes down.
Since Putin’s calls getting ignored would create a negative social proof (meaning that it would advertise the failure to convince anyone to switch sides), the overall desirability of that direction would correspondingly decrease (whilst the risks would get exponentially higher).
Then there was the televised meeting with the Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, and the Defense Minister Shoygu - where Putin ordered the two men in charge of the military, to put the Russian nuclear forces on high alert.
(side note: raising it to level 2 out of 4 - removing the powerful firewall that prevents the delivery of launch orders (and one that therefore prevents accidental activity under normal ‘‘calmer’’ times) )
Why? Ostensibly in response to the “Nato countries making aggressive statements” - translation: stop arming Ukraine with NLAWs, javelins and stingers - weapons that inflict heavy losses on our troops.
Once again, the main target audience was the (hitherto highly sympathetic to Ukraine’s appeals for military assistance) US and European public.
Putin may have calculated that no American or Western European will tolerate the risk of a nuclear war over Ukraine - in this assessment, he is of course correct.
But he may have miscalculated the actual response that will arise from this sentiment - the support for arming Ukraine may grow, and the pressure on the western leaders to deter (instead of appease) Putin could also increase.
Whilst no nuclear threats should ever be dismissed as total bluffs, it is also clear that Putin’s main intent here is to sow fear and encourage retreat and distancing between NATO and Ukraine.
After all, no one seriously considering the use of the literal nuclear option would openly talk about it on national TV - clearly, disorientation and apprehension are his objectives in this instance.
Given that, the western response must be to a) remind Putin of the fact that NATO also possesses nuclear weapons, and that b) his fear tactics are irresponsible, not working, and that Ukraine will continue to receive NATO support.
Any appeasement at this point will only encourage Putin to recklessly repeat the same tactics whenever he wants to turn the tables.
7. Zelensky’s conduct to date
Zelensky started off rather poorly - by publicly complaining that Ukraine was abandoned and ‘‘left alone’’ to fight against Russia.
The appeal to NATO: ‘‘will you accept us?’’ was also (obviously) horribly mistimed.
(side note: which tempts one to think that this was a pretext for Zelensky agreeing to concede to Putin’s demands, and declare neutrality, and later justifying this to Ukrainians with : ‘‘Look I tried, but they weren’t going to accept us, so I decided to do what’s best in Ukraine’s national interests”. The early success in repelling the Russian attacks may have then convinced Zelensky to put that thought on hold.)
Even though there was a rationale to Zelensky’s earlier statements (evoking sympathy/guilt in the western audience and creating an excuse for concessions) the statements of helplessness were also extremely risky - since this is precisely what a wavering Ukrainian general needs to hear to be convinced of switching sides (and agreeing to take part in Putin’s proposed coup).
Fortunately (and probably encouraged by early success in repelling Russian attacks) Zelensky changed his tune and started to demonstrate admirable leadership and resolve.
His refusal of the US offer for evacuation with a zinger “I need ammunition not a ride’’ was particularly effective in: a) inspiring the nation under siege, and b) encouraging further NATO support - indicating that this assistance will not be in waste.
(side note: the proposed evacuation was surely not going to be by air - implying the presence of covert US special forces operatives. Great if true - Putin must not succeed in killing/capturing a leader of a democratic nation. And the presence of the covert American operations could be yet another factor holding back the would-be coup plotters amongst the Ukrainian military leadership).
Finally, Ukraine’s decision to provide a hotline for the families of Russian soldiers - to allow them to find out whether their loved ones were captured or dead, was a genius move.
Not only is this a humane move (that will not doubt garner Ukraine further global sympathy), but it is also an effective way of fighting against the preposterous Russian disinformation - the ridiculous claims, that to date Russia sustained very few casualties.
How may the conflict unfold going forward
It is too early to make reasonably accurate predictions - there are simply too many unknown unknowns.
Having said, and very crudely, it seems like (at least for the next few days) Putin will either a) double down on his original plan - throwing the kitchen’s sink at Kyiv (and there are indications of Belarus joining in with its army), or b) inflict more military losses on Ukraine, take over some second-order city/regional capital, and offer to negotiate - making some extreme demands, declaring an unconvincing victory, and pronouncing that he did in fact ‘‘demilitarize’’ Ukraine.
Indeed, the upcoming negotiations with Ukraine (for which Zelensky wisely decided to send a representative only), provides Putin with the aforementioned options: he can see what face-saving concessions he might secure (Zelensky would be wise to reject all sovereignty damaging demands), whilst creating a hope for diplomatic resolution in the US/EU (aiming to stall further sanctions).
One prediction that we can make with a reasonable level of confidence: in the short-term/next few days, flustered and annoyed Putin will likely resort to more indiscriminate firepower to compel submission.
Indeed, there is already evidence of Tos-1 and other MLRS accumulating near Kyiv and Kharkiv.
This however, would be a huge mistake - the Ukrainian people have already demonstrated incredible bravery and resolve, and rising casualties are thus only likely to make them angrier - creating further costs and headaches for the Russian army.
But at this point, Putin may unfortunately think that his hopes for a quick regime change (with a corresponding submissive/non-resistant population) will not materialize - ergo, he might focus on projecting more power and saving the loss of face caused by the initial failures in the Russian advance.
What must the US/NATO/EU do now to further help Ukraine survive the upcoming onslaught
Sanctions to date have been surprisingly impressive - the blocking of Russia’s sovereign investment fund, and crucially the central bank (there goes fortress Russia -40% of the $632bn in reserves parked in North America and the EU, is now inaccessible), sanctions on major Russian banks like Sberbank and VTB (long advocated by these cables), and their removal from SWIFT are all going to hurt - we will see the early signs of damage once Russian markets open on Monday and settle on Tuesday.
(side note: and looking after its own interests, China isn’t really helping Russia to evade these sanctions: Chinese state banks have now restricted financing for Russian commodities)
The US/EU sanctions on Putin and Lavrov were also unprecedented (and the effective implementation of these will require task-forces hunting down all of their assets registered under different individuals).
(side note: Defense minister Sergei Shoygu was left off the hook - most probably because there is a hope that unaffected Kremlin leaders may want to avoid getting on the list and persuade Putin to cool off - probably unlikely to materialize)
But with Russian army at the gates of Kyiv there is more to do:
Economic sanctions:
a) All major state enterprises, (not just the big banks) must be sanctioned - this includes Gazprom and Rosneft - all of their assets and funds held overseas must be frozen.
b) The US is currently unwilling to ban the export of Russian oil & gas - but it can ban any investment in upstream projects (those shouldn’t create immediate price hikes - beyond the initial market reaction), and threaten to put on full export restrictions if Russia refuses to cease its military operations - it can do so quite confidently - Spring is coming, and the EU members have 3 months worth of oil supplies and have their gas storage at 32% - enough until other players step up the production of oil & gas.
c) De-list all Russian companies from western stock exchanges.
Military aid
a) Turkey should be urged to provide more Bayraktar TB2 drones - they are working really well.
b) Cyber & electromagnetic warfare
NATO must create informal ‘‘underground’’ cyber attack networks that target Russia’s command & control and their inter-BTG (battalion tactical group) communications.
Similarly, NATO experts should also help with electromagnetic warfare - targeting Russian fighter jets - jamming and disorienting them.
c) NATO should enforce a de-facto no fly zone- providing air- defense systems and sending in covert ‘‘advisers’’ to help with operations.
(side note: a formal no fly zone is a political non-starter - at this very moment, no NATO member is going to openly ‘‘enforce’’ this no-fly zone by actively targeting and shooting Russian fighter jets- that would amount to a declaration of war)
d) More anti-ship missiles, more Javelins and NLAWs - the scale should be in thousands not hundreds - turning major Ukrainian cities into heavy armor death traps.
e) Zelensky should invite in professional western mercenaries to target Russian heavy armor columns, and engage in high-risk complicated military operations -the US/EU should fund Ukraine - enabling the payments for these mercenaries.
Intel & propaganda
a) EU’s ban on RT and Sputnik was welcome - the US should follow suit in shutting down the operations of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation outlets.
b) Kick out all Russian FSB / SVR / GRU “rezidenturas” in the EU/NATO countries.
Remove all Russian spies that currently operate under a diplomatic cover - they are all potential saboteurs (once things escalate further).
Remember what happened in Czech Republic arms depot in 2014.
Prevent the repeat of widespread sabotage ops now.
c) Reverse Psyops
Offer incentives for Putin’s closest aides to defect - but frame it in charitable terms:
Offer amnesty/ability to enjoy riches parked in the West to every general that refuses to join Putin in committing further war crimes.
Indeed, this might be the ideal time to use Putin’s playbook against him: there are already cracks amongst Russia’s financial elite - with several oligarchs already speaking against the war.
Overall then, there is much more to do - but Ukraine is not only fighting for its survival - it is also fighting for a different kind of world: one in which bloodthirsty barbaric imperialists don’t get to succeed.
As such, Ukraine deserves all possible help it can get.