Weekly Overview
Ukraine war: Donbas war updates, new Russian embarrassments, desperate rhetoric.
Battle for Donbas.
As discussed in the previous cables, Russia is all but certain to capture Mariupol.
In an attempt to prevent an outright slaughter, President Zelensky warned that the negotiations with Russia would halt if soldiers trapped in Mariupol were to be killed.
Russia did in the meantime offer terms of surrender - with no indication that this happened (after the initial deadline had passed).
(side note: and in the meantime, port of Mariupol and the Azovstal steel factory were subjected to further bombardment by the Tu-22M3 strategic bombers)
Indeed, due to the recent civilian-targeting massacres, tactical retreats and surrenders are unlikely to take place from the Ukrainian side.
This ‘‘fighting to the bitter end’’ mindset is a major intangible in this conflict - an unmeasurable factor that surely does have a significant impact.
Faced with such an adversary, the already dispirited Russian soldiers are likely to experience further demoralization.
And it doesn’t help that Ukraine keeps killing more and more Russian generals: with Major General Vladimir Frolov being the 8th such casualty.
Russia’s disproportionate loss of Generals have long puzzled western intel agencies.
A possible explanation: failure to effectively (and safely) communicate orders to the front, compels flag officers to do it themselves - making frequent trips to the most dangerous frontlines.
If true, Russia has even bigger logistical and command & control issues than previously assumed.
(side note: and it is perhaps telling that we are yet to hear about any high-level officer casualty from Russia’s military police units - this is especially strange given that the military police is by definition going to deploy into frontlines and occupied territories. It could therefore be a possible indicator of their absence and thus, perhaps even a circumstantial evidence of Russian leadership deliberately closing its eyes to horrific atrocities being committed in Ukraine)
Russia is however, trying to counter this morale loss with its own propaganda and lies: claiming that the government in Kyiv refused to save the lives of the trapped Ukrainian soldiers - ordering Azov battalion to shoot all surrendering troops instead.
Such brazen lies are unlikely to convince many Ukrainians - but even some doubts among some of the Ukrainian frontline soldiers, is already a win for Russia.
Against this background, there are new gruesome reports of the Russian “torture chamber” in the recently liberated Trostyanets in Sumy (Northeastern Ukraine).
It is precisely such conduct that will supply the long-term stamina and patience to the Western public: to endure all inconveniences and suffering necessary to defeat Putin.
Russia faces further embarrassments.
This past week, Russia had to deal with a humiliation of an epic proportion.
Its symbolically important (and carrying the name of the capital), ‘‘Moskva’’ cruiser was sunk following the successful anti-ship missile strikes from Ukraine.
The two domestically produced (another prestige boost to Ukraine) Neptune missiles hit the missile cruiser on Wednesday.
Russian officials confirmed that the ship has sunk on Friday - offering multiple implausible and implausible explanations for the failure: first blaming it on a random fire in the ammunition depot, and thereafter blaming the bad weather that apparently made the towing impossible.
(side note: it’s like there is an informal competition in the Kremlin: “who can crush our global credibility in the shortest period of time?’’. Russians use WWII information warfare tactics in the age of OSINT (open source intelligence) and TikTok/Twitter.)
There are of course, some direct and significant military implications of this embarrassment - after all, this was the biggest naval casualty that Russia had experienced since WWII - and a most significant ship loss experienced by any country since the Falklands war.
First and foremost - loss of manpower: at the moment of the attack, the cruiser had 500 sailors on board.
How many have survived? It is unclear, but the available footage suggests that potentially half of the crew members have either perished, or are currently in recovery.
Secondly, and although the cruiser was not carrying the 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles (used by the accompanying ships to hit targets in Ukraine), Moskva did nevertheless possess advanced air-defense system (S-300F) against the medium and long-range missiles strikes - and provided active cover to the accompanying ships in the Black Sea.
Supplanting medium- and short-range defense systems, Moskva could have also engaged its six short-range close-in weapon systems (CIWS) (an equivalent of America’s Phalanx system) as a last resort.
The Russian CIWS system could fire up to 5,000 rounds a minute - essentially creating an impenetrable wall for missiles.
So then, why didn’t it? Why did Russians fail at all 3 three layers of defense?
This attack shouldn’t have overwhelmed Moskva’s air-defense systems - not unless there was either: 1) a shortage of ammunition (a common theme in the Russian army), or 2) simply, sheer incompetence.
In addition, Moskva’s design rendered it especially vulnerable for such attacks.
This is because unlike American warships, Russian cruisers carry offensive weaponry above deck - making it easy for ongoing fire to catch other missiles and create further explosions and damage to the ship.
All of these facts will therefore lead to further strategic implications: Russia’s Navy will suffer a prestige (and thus, deterrence) loss.
Selling these ships will also become harder.
Who would be a potential buyer for Russian cruisers?
A country with its own naval ambitions that is facing another great power?
India comes to mind - the American pitch to replace Russians as primary military suppliers (more on that later below) just got much easier.
Why buy Russian ships, when you can go for better designed (ammunition stored below deck) American warships with much more advanced “Aegis” air-defense systems?
In the meantime, another strategic issue will now haunt Putin - boosting Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea.
Achieving that will be exceptionally difficult, since Turkey (implementing the wartime provisions of the Montreux convention) has shut access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to Russian ships based in Syria.
(side note: Turkey’s strategic value just got much higher. It is therefore great to see DC policymakers realizing this, and doubling down on rapprochement efforts: 1) In a letter to Congress, the State Department recommended the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, and 2) Following Victoria Nuland’s Ankara trip, the US and Turkey jointly announced the launch of a “strategic mechanism" to repair relations and explore areas of cooperation in the economy, defense, and counter-terrorism.)
Russia’s response.
Predictably, Russia responded with rage - further attacks against Kyiv and the military-industrial bases of Ukraine.
(side note: and by continuously supplying Ukraine with further ammunition, missiles, and weapons needed for successful counter-attacks, the US/NATO must defeat the logic of Russia’s ‘‘demilitarization’’ attacks).
In addition, Russian officials resorted to inflammatory threats and rhetoric.
The Editor-in-Chief of Russia Today (now correctly banned in many Western nations) argued that Russia was in fact waging war against NATO as a whole.
Beyond serving as an excuse for the Russian military’s poor results in Ukraine, the statement serves an additional purpose: laying the rhetorical ground for mass mobilization of the Russian army.
This is because, a mass mobilization becomes politically excusable if the war is in fact being waged against the entire malicious West.
In addition, the former puppet President, and the current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, threatened nuclear deployment in the Baltics if Finland/Sweden were to proceed with their NATO membership plans.
Of course, this is not really a radical development.
First off, Russia was already (since at least 2018) upgrading nuclear weapons storage facilities in its Baltic enclave, Kaliningrad.
In other words, Russia was already (for a considerable time) planning nuclear deployment in the Baltic - given that appropriate facilities were being developed, it was always a matter of when not if.
Secondly, and even if Sweden/Finland weren’t going to join NATO, after such an embarrassing performance in Ukraine, Russia was most likely going to double down on nuclear deterrence capabilities - forward nuclear posture in Kaliningrad was therefore very likely to happen in any case.
Russia’s threats must not be wholly dismissed however.
The director of CIA William Burns was correct in his comments about the need to take Russia’s tactical nuclear threats seriously.
Not only is this a necessary rhetorical framework to satisfy Russia’s ego (and prevent Russia from resorting to ever more escalatory rhetoric in order to compensate for lack of perceived deterrence), but in practical terms too, this is indeed a serious issue to consider and prepare for.
Possible strategies to counteract this ghastly scenario of Russia resorting to a use of tactical nuclear weapons (as well as the possibility of Russia’s mass mobilization - and policies to prepare for such an eventuality), will be explored in the next cables.
In the meantime, and in addition to the very welcome news of expanded US-Ukraine intelligence sharing (that will empower Ukraine with better real-time targeting and battlefield tactics capabilities), weapons must keep flowing into Ukraine: especially artillery - 18 155mm Howitzers supplied by the US are not adequate to the scale of the upcoming battles.
They probably amount to less than 2% of all types of artillery guns currently deployed in Donbas.
And someone needs to inform the German Vice-Chancellor, that another NATO member, Czech Republic, is already supplying T-72 tanks to Ukraine, and that if doing so is going to turn NATO to Russian ‘‘target’’ - well it is already too late for that.
NATO has already crossed the Rubicon, and it now must respond vigorously to Russia’s vague threats (on purpose - ensuring flexibility to backtrack without a significant loss of face) that its decision to continuously supply and arm Ukraine could lead to ‘‘unpredictable consequences’’.
This must be the retort: ‘‘any attacks against NATO supply columns would lead to very predictable consequences’’.
Ouster of Imran Khan in Pakistan: risks, opportunities for a reset, and a chance for more leverage over India.
No Prime Minister in Pakistan’s 75 year history served a full term, and Imran Khan was yet another casualty of the country’s turbulent political system.
This context of a complex political arena with multiple power structures/influential stakeholders is important to note - since Imran Khan claims that his removal was a conspiracy between the country’s military and the US leadership.
Although there is little evidence to back this enormous claim, (and if such a soft coup did in fact happen without any leaks whatsoever - well, that would be clear signal than Mr Khan was exceptionally unpopular with the entire political establishment, and that his ouster was therefore only a matter of time) his removal certainly suit the interests of the military establishment (as well as the national interests of the US) just fine.
Indeed, unlike Imran Khan, the Pakistani military had put significant weight into the relationship with the US.
It was embarrassed with (and forced to make compensatory comments) Mr Khan’s horribly timed Moscow visit on the first day of the Ukrainian invasion.
And with Mr Khan’s authority all but gone ahead of the no-confidence vote in the parliament, the Pakistani Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa readjusted the formal diplomatic stance of the country by describing the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a “huge tragedy’’ that ‘‘must be stopped immediately”.
In a further contrast with Imran Khan, the Army Chief praised the ‘‘long and excellent strategic relationship with the US’’ - further emphasizing how both the UK and the EU were vital to the country’s interests.
All of these could create some speculations around Mr Khan’s removal: that too many powerful stakeholders wanted it for it to amount to a simple exercise of a parliamentary democracy checking the executive.
But a consensus amongst the political power centers need not imply an outright complicity: and applying the Occam’s razor, (and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary) one could stop at a relatively simple explanation: that a charismatic leader overpromised and failed to deliver, that economy is in a tailspin, and that his foreign policy was not aligned with Pakistan’s long-term strategic interests.
Looking at it from this angle, it is not at all surprising that Imran Khan was ousted.
Risks and Opportunities for the US policymakers.
Pakistan’s new Prime Minister is Shehbaz Sharif - a leader representing a long standing political dynasty (his brother Nawaz Sharif was a former Prime Minister himself), that lacks charisma of Mr Khan, but compensates for it with a reputation of a competent administrator.
Sharif has his work cut out for him - the economy is in a serious decline, and the 13% inflation is cutting into the already low living standards.
And so the primary risk to the US, is that the Prime Minister gets to work on implementing the stalled China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects (part of Beijing’s Belt and Road/BRI initiative to finance/build infrastructure and create economic dependence), and increase Pakistan’s dependence on China: in substance, even if not in rhetoric.
Indeed, the Sharif brothers have been extremely important to China in setting up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): so much so that the Chinese remained in close contact and worked closely with Nawaz Sharif - even after his ouster as a PM.
And the new PM Shehbaz Sharif, was personally known to implement a number of CPEC projects as a governor of Punjab (2013-2018) - in fact, the Chinese were in awe of his ‘‘Punjab speed’’ administrative execution.
What if Mr Sharif reinvigorates stalled infrastructure projects and expands the remit of CPEC?
Someone looking for an early momentum and a kickstart for the economy will likely do exactly that.
It is thus clear that at least in industrial/economic matters, Pakistan is on a course of a closer integration with (i.e. dependence on) China.
Of course, there is already a framework to address these risks: there were two new global policy measures launched in 2021: by both the US and the EU.
The two infrastructure investment and financing projects: the Biden admin’s ‘‘Build Back Better World’’ and the EU’s “Global Gateway”, aim to provide alternative sources of sustainable funding models to China’s BRI.
The arguments for these globally competitive infrastructure investment policies are ironclad: peeling away low to middle income countries from China’s orbit (and in the process, lifting millions out of poverty, and creating a rich consumer base for the US and EU markets) is a solid strategy to counter Beijing.
But to date, the evidence for the scale and success of these projects has been rather scant.
One hopes that neither project gets bogged down in impossible bureaucracy and legalism - making the (otherwise financially predatory) BRI projects more appealing.
Pakistan is a good case to solve - and the sooner the better.
Successful investment projects in Pakistan would not only stall Beijing’s influence over a strategically important Western partner, but it would also encourage the envious India to step up its game in aligning its policy with the US/EU.
And in the meantime, (and once the US/EU proceed with these plans), it would be smart to include Turkey in potential infrastructure projects - not only would they be more cost competitive (than the European/US companies), but their stake in the region would rise - pitting them further against Beijing (which should already a long-term policy goal for the US).
Short-term opportunity to press India harder.
With Imran Khan gone, there is a chance for a reset with Pakistan - and with that, an opportunity to exercise further leverage over India.
The Pakistani army is pro-US, (at least in geostrategic/great power competition terms - even if they continue to actively work with the Taliban for their own tactical interests. Although, with this past weekend’s air raids against terrorists in Afghanistan, that too may be changing), the current PM will almost certainly be easier to deal with than was the case with Mr Khan, and historically pro-US Pakistan Peoples Party/PPP will get 7 federal cabinet jobs: all of these allow for a practical diplomatic leverage.
In addition the Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa said that they were ready to “move forward” and resume talks with India over Kashmir, a disputed region - ergo, (at least in the short term) Delhi will not be able to cite Pakistani intransigence over Kashmir as another grievance with Washington (and DC’s apparent lack of interest in pushing Pakistan towards productive peace talks) to justify continuous lukewarm commitment to a partnership with the US.
India will now be unable to contrast its pro-Western stance (even if unenthusiastic and half-hearted), and commitment (even if weak) to QUAD, with the former Pakistani PM Imran Khan’s harsh anti-Western and pro-China/Russia rhetoric.
If Delhi could previously persuade the US to settle for something over nothing, such a contextual comparison opportunity will now weaken.
This in turn means that India will have to step up its game and avoid creating too drastic of a value gap in relation to the US-Pakistan relationship.
The current context naturally incentivizes India to compete with Pakistan for favorable positioning vis-à-vis Washington.
The Biden administration must take note of this changing dynamic and use this valuable leverage to a good effect.
And indeed, there are signs that this is exactly what is now happening: with Biden/Blinken’s one-two-punch in pressing PM Modi on energy reliance/fuel purchases from Russia, and comments around India’s human rights problems (an issue that somehow wasn’t on the mind of the Secretary of State for the past couple of months).
This is indeed the correct approach to take (and there are early signs of success - India cancelled the purchase of 48 Russian Mi-17 Helicopters - ostensibly to boost domestic production. But the timing would surely not be merely coincidental) - but a short-term pressure must still be paired with a longer-term strategy to reduce India’s reliance on Russian military tech (and what better time to do this than when Russian weapons are experiencing daily embarrassments in Ukraine).
If Washington wants a stronger and a more reliable ally against both China and Russia, it must do everything to remove the natural bottlenecks that prevent this from happening right now.
The US must urgently replace Russia as the primary military partner and supplier - that is the quickest route to achieve a more assertive (and pro-US) foreign policy posture from India.