Weekly Overview

Ukraine War Updates:

• Donbas battlefield & outlook.

• Ukraine is pushing back with counterattacks in the northeast, and has made some gains outside Kharkiv.

• Russia is pushing further down southwest from Izyum - and has now taken over full control of Popasna, Luhansk Oblast/district- a small city of 20k residents.

• Overall, Russia is still struggling to establish dominance over the Donbas theater.

• On the other side, Ukraine’s military leadership announced its need for long-range MLRS systems - this is of course what has also been argued by these cables - even back in March, these cables have advocated for delivery of advanced NATO MLRS systems (like the Turkish Roketsan MBRLs).

• (side note: That is in addition to the soviet made Smerch BM-30s -in possession of many former Warsaw pact countries)

• The US must listen to Ukraine’s appeal, and supply advanced MLRS systems (like the Lockheed Martin M270s) in addition to long-range howitzers and the accompanying ammo.

• Peculiarly, Zelenksy’s military adviser revealed that (given the time needed to receive new supplies/prep for a new offensive) Ukraine will not be in a position to launch a major counteroffensive anytime before mid-June.

• Quite why this was a necessary statement is unclear.

• Either Mr Arestovych was being truthful (and thus revealed the precise timeline of the counterattack) or he was bluffing - and the actual counterattack will occur sooner than claimed.

• In either case, the incentive for Moscow is to scale its operations and try to 1) capture as much territory as possible, 2) in the shortest amount of time.

• In other words, this was an error of judgement on behalf of Ukraine’s leadership.

• Zelensky’s gambit.

• The President of Ukraine announced that a peace deal was possible only if Russian troops retreated to their pre-invasion/Feb 24 positions.

• This is a risky gambit - Mr Zelensky has now trapped himself within this fixed position - walking back on this condition, will result in significant domestic political damage and a loss of face vis-à-vis Russia.

• Naturally, Zelensky is betting on gains - which are substantial.

• Such a red line is a signal to Ukraine’s NATO allies that Kyiv is determined to fight on and see this through to the end.

• It is a signal to Washington that Ukraine has staying power and that further military aid must come without worry that Zelensky may get a cold feet and fail to prosecute the war to the very end.

• But by boxing himself in, Zelensky has also reduced his options.

• And the range of probable future outcomes have now been cut down to the following:

• 1) If Russia wants to end the war and enter a peace deal, Putin will have to sell a different version of victory to his domestic audience: with no territorial gains to show for, the Kremlin would have to argue that they have successfully denazified (defeated Azov battalion) and demilitarized Ukraine, and prevented Ukraine’s NATO membership.

• 2) Russia and Ukraine agree to a peace deal where Russian troops are withdrawn to their pre-invasion positions, but Donbas states gain independence (and a larger territory) - Ukraine is unlikely to agree to this save for Russia’s total battlefield dominance that simply compels Kyiv into a reluctant submission.

• 3) There is no peace deal: Russia invades/annexes further territories in Donbas / Northwest of Crimea, then stops - placing the burden of counterattacks on Ukraine.

• 4) Same as option 3 above - but Ukraine doesn’t counterattack, and an unstable stalemate/new frozen conflict is established. This is a repeat of the post-2014 scenario but with additional territorial gains for Russia.

• 5) War continues on until either Russia is defeated and pushed out (and is forced to sell a different version of ‘‘victory’’ - similar to option 1 below but with far less to show/harder to hide the embarrassment) or Russia advances considerably (probably after a mobilization) and the war drags on - hard to predict anything further at this stage. But this scenario holds nothing good for Ukraine.

• 6) War continues, Russia advances, and Ukraine agrees to Russia’s “victor’s peace’’ : submitting to exceptionally harsh terms, and thus walking back on Zelensky’s red lines.

• President Zelensky is now taking extremely high strategic risks - the US and NATO must do everything possible to ensure that Ukraine prevails and defeats Russia.

• Information war.

• The US military officials demonstrated a hitherto uncharacteristic brazenness by disclosing their involvement in the targeting of Russian generals.

• To date, Ukraine has killed 12 Russian generals - and American officials’ admission of an active participation in their deaths (where the US provided actionable intel on the location of Russia’s mobile HQs) is a remarkable step.

• First and foremost, and if the White House did not get involved to later ‘‘correct’’ the claims of this NYT report, (more on that later below), this would have been a loud yet indirect message to Moscow: we are not deterred by your non-stop nuclear threats. Here, look: we helped locate your generals on the battlefield.

• Naturally, all stakeholders, (including the Kremlin) were probably aware that the US was almost certainly behind the successful targeting of these generals.

• But to date, the US (with a desire to avoid escalation) was following the policy of maintaining some plausible deniability: this brazen admission puts an end to this more distanced posture.

• In addition, these revelations would have had further implications and powerful signaling effects:

• 1) Ordinary Ukrainians getting a major morale boost - closer US battlefield participation is reassuring. Russian soldiers and officers will on the other hand, suffer a major morale boost: paranoia - that their every move is being tracked by the powerful US intel - will surely spread;

• 2) Signal to Moscow that the US is willing to maintain terrible relations for a very long time - gone are the days of careful and apprehensive US posture - hoping to avoid a definitive breakdown in the relationship with Moscow. The Kremlin should now expect that the longer this war drags on, the more pronounced will the US involvement become.

• 3) Signal to Putin’s inner circle and the wider Moscow elite: sticking with the current leadership means ever more pain and confrontation with the US.

• 4) Message to Beijing: do not think of breaking your passive posture this late in the game - things are only going to get worse for Russia - we will make sure of it.

• 5) Message to the NATO allies: do not fear an escalation with Russia - we are undeterred, and willing to confront Putin with ever more openness and aggression.

• In other words, this was not a minor news update: rather, this was a monumental shift in the US posture vis-à-vis its involvement in the Ukrainian war - and one that was overdue.

• Now, did the White House then get involved, and did the indirect signals mentioned above get significantly diluted (if not cancelled out altogether)?

• Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is yes.

• Biden admin’s National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson, pushed back against the narrative of America’s direct involvement in targeting of the Russian generals:

• “The headline of this story is misleading and the way it is framed is irresponsible….The United States provides battlefield intelligence to help the Ukrainians defend their country. We do not provide intelligence with the intent to kill Russian generals [emphasis added].”

• We provide battlefield intel but not with the intent to kill Russian generals.

• This, of course, is nothing more than a distinction without a difference.

• What is the purpose of US battlefield intel? To help Ukrainians plant roses in the fields?

• Or to help them destroy and degrade attacking Russian BTGs?

• Which then necessarily implies actively targeting top Russian military assets: their generals and C2 infrastructure.

• If the US is actively helping to target a major warship, Moskva (that was then successfully sunk by Ukraine), then it necessarily also helps Ukraine to target Russian admirals - there is really little benefit in denying this essential truth: the meagre benefit of “not triggering Putin even further’’ is outweighed by the risk of looking weak and apologetic.

• Now that the US (with the Defense Secretary’s speech establishing the clear strategy) has officially revealed its political objectives of degrading and weakening Russia, and given that the US is doing all it can (short of actively fighting on the battlefield) in relation to the provision of military and economic support (even if these can, and should be done on an even higher scale), it must not shy away from rhetorical assertiveness either.

• There is a clear asymmetry in willingness to escalate rhetorically: Putin is throwing around nuclear threats like the Halloween candy, and the US is still trying to avoid triggering Russian leadership.

• With its far more aggressive, open, and clearly articulated support to Ukraine, the US has already crossed the threshold of ‘‘direct involvement’’ in this war: no need to sugarcoat things and risk looking weak and fearful of escalation in return for what exactly?

• A minor face saving ego protection for Putin?

• We have crossed the Rubicon: such gestures should only be reserved for the context where Putin is willing to reciprocate and de-escalate - clearly not happening anytime soon.

• As such, and for as long as the war goes on, the US must not weaken the impact of its assertive posture by constantly equivocating in fear of an escalation: again, the US must not demonstrate a disproportionate worry about heating things up, and end up weakening the strength of its otherwise powerful signals to allies and foes alike.

• Lukashenko hedging.

• Moscow’s supposed puppet, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko started to show signs of re-emerging independence: and it was not exercised in a pro-Kremlin way either.

• Commenting on the ongoing war in Ukraine (in an interview with the Associated Press), Lukashenko aimed to: 1) distance himself from Putin, 2) signal his independence, and thus his value to the Western leaders, and 3) set his own ‘‘red lines’’:

• “I am not immersed in this problem enough to say whether it goes according to plan, like the Russians say, or like I feel it …. I want to stress one more time: I feel like this operation has dragged on.” and commenting that Russia potentially resorting to nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be : “unacceptable because it’s right next to us — we are not across the ocean like the United States … Whether or not Russia is capable of that — is a question you need to ask the Russian leadership. [emphasis added]”.

• Crucially, Lukashenko also called for the end of ‘‘war’’ - a term never used and strictly avoided by the Kremlin (Russia is still sticking to the ‘‘special operation’’ label).

• This distancing and insubordination is of course calculated - Lukashenko is a political cockroach - he senses the direction of the wind and adjusts his maneuvers appropriately.

• (side note: in addition, sticking with Russia doesn’t offer anything promising to Belarus: in contrast to the Russian ruble (that is up 12% vs the dollar since the beginning of the war), the Belarusian ruble has slid 24% vs USD and astonishingly, 32% against the Russian ruble. Add to this, the IMF estimates a GDP contraction of 6.4% for this year.)

• This interview is an invitation to treat - Lukashenko has signaled his openness to collaborating with the West.

• He is now waiting for some appealing offers from the US/EU to play a role of a powerbroker (however limited) in this conflict: naturally his influence and leverage is minimal.

• But securing even a minor diplomatic role in the future negotiations (in return for additional distancing from the Kremlin, and/or some public assurances of neutrality/promises to stay on the sidelines of the War in Ukraine) will add at least some legitimacy to his morally corrupt political regime.

• Lukashenko is also likely to seek assurances for his political future from both the US and the EU.

• The West should in turn be open to backchannel diplomacy: since in the long-term, removing Lukashenko will be much easier when he is pulled away from Putin’s side.

• In the meantime, economic sanctions must strengthen even further - this is the only effective way of dealing with chronic manipulators like Lukashenko.

• His political power is wholly illegitimate, and any meaningful rapprochement and ease in sanctions must come with significant strings attached: meaningful political reforms, release of political prisoners, and promise to hold new elections with the OSCE/EU observers present on the ground.

• Until then, the West can keep on flirting with less significant gestures - anything to peel him away from the Kremlin - creating a further rift with Putin.

• At this point, painting the (actual) picture that Putin is being abandoned by his puppet dictators is worth the price of temporary (even if unsavory) political flirtations.

• And the picture is indeed real - Belarus is not an exception but follows a pattern now: Kazakhstan’s President (who, only as recently as in January was rescued by the Kremlin’s hard power interventions) is breaking with Russia, openly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, canceling (together with Uzbekistan) 9th May victory parade (hitherto held in solidarity with the Kremlin), and loudly berating Russian propaganda chiefs.

• The abandoned sinking ship metaphor is extremely powerful - one that will surely create doubt in the Kremlin circles as well.

• Russia’s subtle threats.

• 1) Poland could be a “source of threat” said the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitriy Peskov.

• Technically, a true statement (from Russia’s perspective), that amounts to an implicit threat: it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Russia could at some point target military supply convoys within NATO territory.

• Putin could estimate that a long-range cruise/air strike that would thereafter be justified as self-defense (and the Kremlin propagandists will point at the double standards: Ukraine can target military targets on Russian territories, so it only follows that Russia surely do the same on NATO’s) would fall below the threshold of a declaration of war (and he might certainly bet on most NATO members preferring to interpret this as anything but war), and would serve as a powerful deterrent against further supplies.

• And in the meantime, subtle threats that fall short of overt warnings, allow the Kremlin to deliver the necessary message without creating a rhetorical trap and a clear-cut obligation to act/respond if NATO continues with its current policy at a similar (or even higher) scale.

• 2) Russia’s foreign ministry (and the message was not delivered by the most senior official) ruled out Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons within “the course of a special operation”.

• In other words, the carefully phrased denial doesn’t necessarily rule out the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine within the conditions of war.

• With a formal declaration of war, Russia could more easily claim the existence of an ‘‘existential threat’’ that would then allow for the use of nuclear weapons - in line with the Russian doctrine.

• A subtle warning that NATO should be interested in preventing further escalation and Russia’s declaration of war on Ukraine.

• Once again, these threats are nothing new - both threats have existed from the very beginning - NATO must not be deterred and should in fact step up the scale of its military aid to demonstrate further resolve: only this escalation dominance could deter Putin from gambling and trying his luck with these exceptionally risky bets.

Sweden and Finland Receive assurances.