Weekly Overview - Ukraine crisis: more attempts at diplomacy, little change in fundamentals, ‘‘the most dangerous moment”, and what can still be done this late in the game?
Ukraine crisis: more attempts at diplomacy, little change in fundamentals, ‘‘the most dangerous moment”, and what can still be done this late in the game?
This past week witnessed a lot of last-minute diplomatic scrambling to achieve some progress or at worst, delay and defuse the crisis to some extent.
None of them seemed to have moved the needle - failing to impact the fundamental calculations of Putin.
We shall unpack the highlights, analyze the implications and unintended consequences of these diplomatic attempts, and take a closer look at Russian preparations, and at allied messaging ahead of the possible invasion.
Biden - Scholz Meeting
To date, Germany has been the weak link in the Transatlantic show of resolve against Russia.
As such, it was only natural for President Biden to insist on an in-person meeting with the new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, where the previous demonstrative deficiencies in German policy could be compensated for - optics matter.
But the meeting undoubtedly also benefited the German Chancellor - a much needed reputational rehabilitation was needed, after taking a global media battering for its wishy-washy stance on Russian sanctions, failure to provide military aid to Ukraine (and sending 5,000 helmets instead - rightly leading to much ridicule, even from the recipients themselves), and even astonishingly blocking another NATO ally, Estonia, from delivering German-origin artillery equipment to Ukraine.
In the meeting itself, Biden definitively promised to shut down the Nord Stream 2 pipeline if Russia was to proceed with an invasion.
Unfortunately however, even after traveling all the way to Washington DC, and in a joint-press conference that followed the meeting between the two leaders, the German Chancellor still failed to verbally confirm the same commitment.
Promises of “acting together” and of not taking ‘‘different steps’’ were never followed by an explicit commitment to kill the NS2.
And yet, Mr Scholz had a number of opportunities to do precisely that - both at the press-conference, and afterwards - during a number of media appearances.
So why would the German Chancellor still refuse to make a clear commitment?
Well, a benign interpretation is that he is worried about prematurely triggering legal challenges and being dragged into a long litigation initiated by the six- company consortium (led by Putin’s friend Matthias Warnig), that runs the NS2 project.
But there could be a more insidious explanation as well - delaying clear commitment until the rest of the Russia-friendly EU states come on board to push back against the NS2 sanctions.
Under this scenario, the German Chancellor gets to demonstrate unity with the US, and yet insures itself from opposing the sanctions alone.
One hopes that this is not the case - but if it is, the German Chancellor was no doubt happy to learn that only a few days after his DC trip, Austria already got on board in resisting the NS2 sanctions.
Regardless of the German intent here, the US should push Germany to do what it promised - demonstrating unity.
It must also be made clear (via backchannels) that German failure to get on board (if/when needed to pull the trigger on NS2) will result in a severe reputational damage - and that the US will make sure of it.
Countries that depend heavily on the US shield, must be made accountable for their lack of commitment to the alliance.
Macron’s big gamble
The French President took a significant reputational risk when traveling to meet Putin in Moscow.
For if Russia proceeded with an invasion (which is very likely) so soon after his visit, Macron’s shuttle diplomacy and attempts to steal the spotlight would backfire - highlighting his lack of influence in shaping the European security affairs.
This is a risk that may have been worth taking for any other leader with no ambitions to lead the EU towards an independent security architecture and strategic autonomy (from the US).
But visit he did, and the trip itself was accompanied by rather uncanny visuals of Macron and Putin - from a duel-like posturing (reminiscent of a spaghetti western), to an unreasonably long table selected for a one-to-one conversation.
(side note: Those who interpreted the long table as Putin’s snub, were rebutted by the clarification that supposedly, the extra long-distances were precautions taken due to Macron’s refusal to take a Russian COVID test - fearing that this would reveal the DNA of the French President. On its face, this is a plausible and legitimate reason to refuse the COVID test. But one wonders if the French side insisted on the use of their own wine glasses and cutlery - since Macron and Putin dined together, and surely the Russian scientists could recover DNA samples at the conclusion of the meal - this technology has been available for ordinary police forces for decades, and would not be beyond the Russian capabilities either..)
And in terms of substance - little (if anything) was achieved.
Since what is it really that Macron could have offered to Putin?
Anything possible to move the needle has already been suggested by the US and NATO - meaning that Macron by definition couldn’t have offered anything better, given his clear lack of authority to do so.
If there were any possible extra concessions (beyond US/NATO reassurances on offensive weapons/missiles in Eastern Europe) that could have swayed Putin, then only the US was in position to make offers of such magnitude.
And if NATO is in fact considering the very opposite of concessions - increasing the permanent presence of troops in its eastern flank, then any further (and meaningful to Putin) concessions are unlikely to materialize.
Therefore, and rather predictably, the conversation reverted back to the well-trodden narratives of implementing the Minsk agreement, and the ‘‘Finlandization’’ of Ukraine.
But what about the Minsk agreement?
The agreement has been floated by the media a lot - time to clarify a few crucial realities.
1) There are two separate agreements: the first one was signed on September 5, 2014, produced almost no results, and consequently led to the second agreement on February 12, 2015 - which was signed by the Ukrainian President under conditions of extreme duress - literally, to save the lives of trapped and surrounded Ukrainian soldiers in Donbas.
Russia is the party to the agreement, and yet pretends to be only a facilitator - insisting that the agreement is in reality between Ukraine and the two Russia-backed separatist ‘‘republics’’: the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR)
2) Russia has been violating the Minsk Agreements from the very outset.
The deal requires (under an OSCE supervision and oversight): removal of foreign military forces, dissolution of illegal armed groups (ostensibly belonging to DNR and LNR), and Ukraine taking back control of its eastern border with Russia.
Russia refused to implement any of these requirements - in fact it continued to arm and support the two separatist “republics’’.
Ceasefire was not a default - it was a temporary welcome respite from an otherwise continuous fighting that claimed the lives of approximately 14,000 people since 2014.
3) There is nothing else that Ukraine could reasonably be expected to do.
In accordance with the Minsk agreement, Ukraine passed (and renewed) legislation providing special status to the occupied territories, amnesty for those that committed crimes in the course of the conflict, and provisions for local elections.
Here are the two main issues:
a) Certain parts of the Minsk agreement cannot be implemented precisely because of Russian involvement.
For example, the local elections would be held for Ukrainian cities and councils -not for separatist and fake ‘‘republics’’ of the DNR and LNR.
b) The agreement requires a certain extent of devolution of powers from the central government in Kyiv - Ukraine has complied with this.
But there is absolutely no provision of the agreement requiring Ukraine to create a Federal State where the DNR and LNR get a say on foreign affairs of the country - this is exactly what Russia desires: an effective veto (via puppet DNR and LNR) on Ukraine’s foreign policy choices.
Given that Ukrainian acceptance of such wild ‘‘interpretations’’ of the agreement would effectively amount to the forfeit of a national sovereignty, it is no wonder that Kyiv (correctly) rules out such a possibility.
All of this begs the question: what is there for Russia to gain from continuous talks around the Minsk agreement?
Nothing - unless Ukraine submits to the Russian interpretation of the agreement.
And even though this would certainly satisfy the Kremlin’s appetites, Russian foreign minister Lavrov himself finds it improbable to take place - his comment, confirming that ‘‘of course’’ Russia would be ‘‘satisfied with this result’’, was quickly followed by caveats that he ‘‘hardly believed’’ that this was indeed possible.
And furthermore what possible Finlandization could there even be?
Given that, while is technically a ‘‘neutral’’ country and not part of NATO, Finland is after all member of the EU, and is furthermore capable of freely choosing to purchase 64 American F-35 fighter jets.
Could one imagine Putin agreeing to such a deal with Ukraine?
The war since 2014 started precisely because Ukraine chose to pursue an association agreement with the EU (which is far from a membership).
Here is the crux of the matter: The Kremlin is not interested in Finlandization of Ukraine - it doesn’t care for a neutral Ukraine, and instead, wants a vassal on its Western border.
The Ukrainian Foreign Minister was therefore correct to categorically dismiss such an interpretation of the “Finlandization” of Ukraine, declaring that Russia would never have a veto over Ukraine’s foreign policy choices.
‘‘This is not going to happen’’ declared Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba - that is a pretty definitive rejection of Russian plans.
Given this reality, one could (at the risk of too much cynicism) persuasively assert that Macron was merely trying to delay the crisis until after the April’s Presidential elections in France - where his possible foreign policy failure wouldn’t cost him electoral losses.
But this was a wrong bet to make - since, even if Putin is eventually dissuaded from an invasion, that will be the result of something that only America can offer.
Therefore, Macron would fail to promote himself as a diplomatic genius - his domestic political opposition would make sure of it - loudly declaring that Macron had nothing to do with the eventual positive result.
On the flip side however, he will now share the downsides of failed diplomacy.
And in the meantime, the Kremlin already dismissed Macron’s statement that Putin (apparently agreeing to de-escalate) promised to refrain from any new military maneuvers on the Ukrainian border.
This is how the Kremlin treated Macron even after he blatantly promoted Russian security interests by stating that ‘‘There is no security for Europeans if there is no security for Russia”(absolutely, it is surely Ukraine threatening to invade Russia - not the other way around).
That is already a significant snub - one that the French President surely deserves for his over the top theatrical pretensions for diplomatic prowess.
Liz Truss’s fiasco
The UK Foreign Minister’s last minute Moscow visit was rather pointless.
First off, what was her objective?
Was she there to offer something to her interlocutor, Foreign Minister Lavrov?
Was she there to discuss possible steps to de-escalate?
In other words, was the British Foreign Minister going to say something this late in the game, to grab Lavrov’s attention and force him to engage?
Clearly not - same issue with Macron: no mandate, and in this case, also a further disinterest in making concessions.
So then why go to Moscow?
If the goal was to threaten (with more sanctions) and berate Russians, doing so from a distance was more appropriate - this would have prevented Lavrov from trolling Truss, and ridiculing her lack of geographical knowledge of Russia.
Lavrov (making a point that Russia can move its army within its own territories as it pleases) asked Truss if the UK accepted that the two cities of Rostov and Voronezh belonged to Russia.
To which Truss replied with “the U.K. will never recognize Russian sovereignty over these regions”.
Now, it would have been excusable for the British Foreign Minister to be unaware of some small Siberian towns - but both of the aforementioned cities are: a) important economic centers, with b) populations over a million, and c) located close to Ukraine, and currently hosting a significant amount of Russian troops.
Being unaware of this information was not excusable.
This is naturally a boon for the Russian propaganda officers - who now get to paint everything and anything coming out of the UK as a bunch of nonsense.
This will be particularly helpful if/when Putin decides to invade, and the Western sanctions will need to be rhetorically dismissed as creations of ‘‘utterly delusional foreign leaders intent on weakening Russia”.
The meeting backfired so badly, that some may even think that the embattled British PM (dealing with the lockdown violation crisis), may have deliberately sent over his Foreign Secretary (who is prone to over the top theatrical displays of toughness) to take a public beating, and thus damage her credibility as a potential leadership challenger.
But this is far too speculative - and moreover, assumes that a) PM Johnson could have predicted the extent of the humiliation, and b) that he would really be content with a national humiliation, as long as his potential challenger took some beating too.
But in any case, all of this is rather unfortunate of course - briefly overshadowing all the great things achieved by the UK.
The very same week for example, the UK decided to supply Ukraine with crucial anti-ship missiles - much needed at the time when the Ukrainian coastal cities are under an effective blockade, and an amphibious assault is not out of the question.
And yet unfortunately, the British Foreign Minister’s faux pax, stole the spotlight.
Russian preparations & last minute options
At the time when; the US is warning that an invasion is almost imminent, and can happen at any day (including during the olympics), when embassies from all across the world are evacuating their staff in Kyiv, and airlines are cancelling flights to Ukraine, a closer look at the latest context on the ground is warranted - specifically, we shall unpack what preparations the Kremlin is currently engaged in, and what option exist for an escalation (and even for retreat).
These will be divided into three parts: 1) Russia laying down the pretext for a potential military campaign, 2) Indicators of intent, and 3) How the US/NATO messaging affects Putin’s attack & withdrawal options.
1)Pretexts
There are two major pretexts that the Kremlin could utilize
a) Escalation of a fake conflict in Donbas, that then leads to calls for Russian protection of ‘‘ethnic Russians in the Eastern Ukraine’’ and;
b) Accusing Kyiv of seeking out unacceptable (to Russia) weaponry from the West.
Indeed, Russia’s response to Ukraine’s request for THAAD air-defense systems from America, was rather quick and definitive.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister issued the following crude warning:
‘‘We call on our American colleagues with whom we are in dialogue at various levels, including the highest level, not to do anything stupid and behave prudently and not to use the situation to drive it further and further into a deadlock from which it will be difficult to find a way out"[emphasis added].
An attack on Ukraine could therefore be framed in terms of a preemptive strike to remove a hostile government seeking to bring over weaponry that is unacceptable to Russian security interests.
But this pretext is a much harder sell - the US could immediately and publicly refuse the request, and at a very low cost.
A more likely pretext, will therefore be something to do with Donbas.
And there are already certain indicators that this indeed would be the route taken by Russia - the senior commander of the DNR has requested a reinforcement of 30,000 troops from Russia, and only a few days later, the head of the DNR somehow finds a mass grave of 130 people killed in conflict with Ukraine.
A mere coincidence?
More likely: laying the ground for a potential casus belli.
Of course, Russia could also come up with a completely new pretext - after all, we are dealing with Putin here.
2) Further indicators of intent
Direct indicators
Russia has now deployed more than half of all its Battalion Tactical Groups (nearly 100/168) to the border with Ukraine - furthermore, 6 out of 7 Spetsnaz (special ops - each comprised of 250-350 elite fighter) units have also repositioned near the key locations of a potential invasion.
All of the ‘‘these are just military exercises’’ analysts will be hard pressed to explain deployments in Crimea’s Oktyaborskaya airfield, and submarines crossing the Bosphorus strait (in a clear violation of the article 12 of the Montreux convention) and joining the massive naval build-up in the Black Sea - none of these have anything to do with the joint-exercises with Belarus.
Further abnormal and unexplainable deployments are:
a) Massive build-up of 58th Combined Arms Army army near Novoozernoye in the north-western coast of Crimea.
b) Helicopters and military equipment at the Zyabrovka airfield near Gomel, less than 25 km from the border with Ukraine.
c) Peculiar build-up of troops near Kursk.
d) The 41st Combined Arms Army abandoning Yelnya (after a very long deployment since late 2021), and repositioning by the city of Bryansk - also 25 km from the border with Ukraine.
e) 1st Guards Tank Army moving to Veselaya Lopan - also close to Ukrainian border (this happened after the Saturday’s Biden-Putin call - a really bad indicator).
At this point however, it is important to note that the (to date) useful Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) on Russian troops build up, could become less valuable going forward.
In fact, we need to treat all new reports of Russian troop movements with more care and scrutiny.
One could even argue that Putin has in some ways benefited from the OSINT - it was a credible method of signaling intent without an outright warning of an invasion - not only were Russian threats therefore more believable, but Putin also left himself some room for a de-escalation (since technically, he didn’t threaten an invasion).
But now that Russia no longer has the strategic element of surprise (thanks to OSINT), it may decide to use the OSINT for tactical surprise - future troop movements may be undertaken with an intent to disorient and deceive - hiding the precise direction of an actual attack
Indirect indicators
Russia demonstrated utter indifference and disinterest towards serious diplomacy
The Kremlin knowingly concocted diplomatic knots - insisting that Ukraine negotiates directly with the separatists - making it a ‘‘red line’’.
Predictably, Ukraine rejected this - since it was not willing to go down the path of federalization, and empowering the fake Russian puppet states with a veto on its sovereign national decisions.
In addition to trolling the UK, Russia dismissed the direct diplomatic engagement with the EU and NATO as standalone units (it is either divide & conquer or nothing for the Kremlin), and the last-minute phone calls with Presidents Macron and Biden produced little indication that diplomacy could still save the day.
In fact, briefing the press after the Saturday’s Biden-Putin call, Putin’s Foreign Policy adviser Yuri Ushakov commented that the conversation between the two heads of state did not “touch upon the central, key elements of Russian initiatives”.
In other words: nothing fundamental was offered to Russians to delay an invasion and incentivize further dialogue.
Coupled with an unprecedented (and unexplainable) military build-up, a lack of a diplomatic effort vis-à-vis the West is a credible indicator in itself, but Russia went further and outright refused to respond to Kyiv’s formal request (within the required 48 hours under the article III of the OSCE’s Vienna document) to explain the militarization surrounding Ukrainian border.
Finally, for the first time in 20 years, Russia is not sending a diplomatic delegation to this week’s Munich Security Conference.
3. Implication of the allied messaging: ‘‘The Most Dangerous Moment’’ or the Western ‘‘Hysteria’’?
Given all this, was the last minute US/NATO messaging correct?
Is the British Prime Minister right to call this ‘‘the most dangerous moment?’’ , or were all of these warnings truly over the top?
Considering the analysis above, the Russian military campaign against Ukraine (whether it is an outright invasion, or a more limited air/missile strike campaign) is indeed very likely.
In fact, it could even take place during the Beijing Olympics - since the original rationale of stealing the spotlight from Chinese partners of the Kremlin, is no longer valid - all eyes are already on the Ukraine crisis.
Against this context, the Biden administration’s decision to raise alarm and warn about an imminent invasion was the correct decision.
It is a win-win strategy no matter how you look at it, since one of three scenarios will occur:
1) Invasion/military campaign will take place - the Biden administration will not be caught off-guard like in Afghanistan. In fact, the US will recover the credibility of its Intel. The US will furthermore get to delegitimize any potential ‘‘false-flag’’ operation concocted by the Kremlin.
Russian invasion will not be justifiable to any reasonable person in the world - the whole world will see the ruthlessness of Russian leadership.
What an effective way to rally global support for a US-led rules-based world order?
2) Putin decides against an escalation - under this scenario, there will be some limited damage to the Western credibility.
Russian media will accuse the US of ‘‘hysteria’’, and reiterate that the invasion was never going to take place - that the build-up was all for military exercises.
But this is an acceptable cost - one that will be shared across NATO allies.
In addition, if this warning (rather perversely) ends up serving as an acceptable off-ramp for Putin (allowing him to retreat without losing too much face - enabling him to write it off as Western panic instead) then so be it.
The benefit of saving Ukraine from a further invasion, will most definitely be worth it.
Finally, the US will also get to reduce the damage by promoting its power - advertising the Russian retreat as the success of its leadership and strategy of effective deterrence (although, they would be wise to do so after some time - allowing Putin to save face in the meantime).
3) Putin delays the invasion/attack by several weeks - keeping the pressure high and draining the Ukrainian leadership. This is a tricky scenario (one that would need further analysis - if/when it happens), but even these circumstances are preferable to all other alternatives.
After all, both the US and NATO will have more time to help Ukraine.
Overall then, the costs are asymmetric - the US has much less to lose by erring on the side of raising alarm.
Biden’s comment on confronting the Russian troops.
‘‘That's a world war when Americans and Russia start shooting at one another’’ said President Biden - when explaining why the US wasn’t going to send its troops to rescue Americans trapped in Ukraine.
The comments were intended to explain the risks of the rescue operations - and why Americans should leave now.
But this specific phrasing arguably caused more problems than it was trying to solve.
Firstly, even if the US and Russian troops were accidentally engaged in a firefight, an escalation into a total world war is extremely unlikely - there are backchannel communications to quickly resolve these issues.
Secondly, the Commander in Chief of the world’s strongest military, should not express any verbal concern about confronting Russia on the battlefield.
Since, what exactly is the message to Putin?
If after all, every potential incident with Russia is viewed from a prism of a total world war, Putin may indeed consider that the US wouldn’t enter this ‘‘world war’’ on behalf of some remote Baltic NATO states either.
What if Russia moves its troops to occupy the Suwalki gap between Poland and Lithuania?
That would technically be an invasion of a NATO member state.
What if Russian troops move into Narva in Estonia - ostensibly, to protect ethnic Russians?
Putin may calculate that if Biden is so worried about a total world war, he may not do much (militarily) in response to a relatively bloodless invasion of these smaller NATO states.
And the damage to NATO’s threat display credibility would then be immense - potentially unrecoverable.
And what about China?
Xi may also calculate that Biden wouldn’t defend Taiwan for precisely that reason - given that a potential war with China would probably lead to even higher costs for the US and its allies.
The US leadership must remember that the public admission of a fear of confrontation, is highly provocative - for it incentivizes risk-taking in gamblers like Putin.
Last minute steps at deterrence
Given that it was always unlikely to count on the Biden admin to impose (politically tough) meaningful sanctions (the most impactful being those on Russian oil & gas - but many more have been considered in previous cables), deterring Russia was primarily about raising the direct costs of invading Ukraine.
Ukraine was indeed armed - but nowhere near enough.
Specifically, it was armed (with Drones, Stingers, Javelins, etc) to protect itself in the context of a close-combat.
The crucial anti-ship missiles were delivered far too late.
Ukraine is still not in possession of anything effective to counter long-range precision cruise missiles or air force attacks.
This late in the game, the US and NATO should do the following:
1) In addition to continuing the supply of more conventional defense weaponry, the US and NATO should supply Ukraine with anti-cyber capabilities: the first wave of attack will most likely be accompanied with massive cyber attacks on the crucial Ukrainian infrastructure.
The US should allocate a special unit to help Ukraine to a) Repel these attacks, and b) Engage in counter-attacks against Russian military’s key command & control centers.
2) Deter Putin from any temptation in relation to Estonia and Lithuania.
The US should agree to satisfy Lithuania’s request for a permanent US troop presence - and do the same in relation to Estonia and Latvia.
3) Finally, the US and NATO countries must resume public statements that indicate willingness to engage in a protracted standoff, and absorb costs that result from sanctions imposed on Russia
This should be done in tandem with further backchannel offers to de-escalate.
It may indeed be too late to affect Putin’s calculus one way or another - but now is not the time to sit back and wait.